Ware v. Srinivasan
| Decision Date | 31 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1568-17-2 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TAMMY T. WARE v. SUDARSAN SRINIVASAN |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, Alston and Decker
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Janipher W. Robinson (Robinson and Greene, on briefs), for appellant.
Kimberly Fitzgerald Austin (Friedman Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Tammy T. Ware (appellant) contends that the Circuit Court for the County of Henrico (trial court) improperly divided the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Appellant specifically argues that the trial court erred in its approach to crediting mortgage payments, late fees on those mortgage payments, and homeowners' association (HOA) fees as well as when it assessed monthly rent against appellant. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
Suffice it to say that the background of the dispute is rather convoluted and complex. Appellant and Sudarsan Srinivasan (appellee) were married on March 29, 1996, and together they have a minor child. The parties filed cross-petitions for divorce in 2013: appellant's ground for divorce was adultery, and appellee sought a no-fault divorce. As the petitions proceeded, appellant requested pendente lite relief. Accordingly, the trial court issued apendente lite order on September 10, 2013, granting appellant "[e]xclusive use and possession of the marital residence" but also requiring her to "pay . . . the mortgage . . . , mortgage insurance, homeowner's insurance, and [HOA fees]." The divorce action and the equitable distribution case were bifurcated, and the trial court issued the final divorce decree on September 28, 2015, awarding appellant a divorce on the ground of a one-year separation after determining that the separation date was July 27, 2013.
The trial court next set forth the framework for equitable distribution.1 In this regard, the trial court first acknowledged that marital property was to be "divided equally" between the parties and that the marital residence was to be classified as marital property. Moreover, in the final decree of divorce, the trial court ordered that the marital residence be listed for sale by February 19, 2016, and that the net proceeds from that sale be divided equally between the parties. The trial court also directed the parties to "fully comply with the listing agent's [written] recommendations" and to make the marital residence "available for showings."
Appellant objected to the trial court's equal division of the net proceeds of the sale of the marital residence even though she had agreed with the trial court's approach to dividing marital property at trial. Consequently, the trial court issued its January 19, 2016 letter opinion in which the trial court set forth its Code § 20-107.3(E) analysis and reiterated its prior determinations regarding the disposition of the marital estate. To this end, and consistent with the requirements of Code § 20-107.3(E), the trial court observed that appellee is 47 and appellant is 48, that the parties were married 19 years, that they "enjoyed a very good standard of living," and that they both are mentally stable, but physically, appellant suffered from some medical conditions. In addition, as found by the trial court, appellee possessed two master's degrees and has a lucrativecareer whereas appellant possessed a high school diploma and was a stay-at-home mother. Appellant assumed this role at the request of appellee as per his cultural tradition. It follows then that appellee made all monetary contributions whereas appellant made most of the nonmonetary contributions. Appellee also provided financial support for his parents in the amount of $1,200-$1,500 per month. The trial court also noted that after appellee lost his job due to no fault of his own, he found a comparable position in New Jersey. Appellant refused to relocate there with the parties' minor child. Consequently, appellee traveled to Henrico, Virginia on the weekends to see appellant and their child. Regarding the marital residence, the trial court found that the date of valuation for the marital residence was May 9, 2013. The marital residence was valued at $430,000, and the mortgage debt was $257,783.47 as of September 15, 2015. Thus, at the time of equitable distribution, the equity in the marital residence was $172,216.53. The trial court articulated its findings in the letter opinion and incorporated the letter opinion into the final decree, which was entered on March 28, 2016.
As directed by the trial court, a realtor, Amy Pryor, was retained, who made recommendations to the parties to prepare the marital residence for listing. One of her recommendations was that the parties "remove all clutter" from the marital residence by July 15, 2016. Pryor emailed and left a hard copy of her recommendations with appellant and also forwarded them to appellant's counsel, appellee, and appellee's counsel on July 6, 2016.
Appellee subsequently filed a petition for a rule to show cause regarding the sale of the marital residence. Appellee alleged that appellant violated the trial court's order to comply with Pryor's written recommendations because appellant failed to "remove all clutter."2 OnSeptember 6, 2016, the trial court heard evidence on the show cause as well as on appellee's motion regarding payment of the mortgage—the final decree was silent as to which party was to assume that obligation. When ruling on the show cause, the trial court did not hold appellant in contempt; rather, the trial court concluded that by the hearing date, appellant was motivated to and had complied with Pryor's recommendation.3 In its resulting September 29, 2016 order, the trial court reiterated that both parties were required to comply with Pryor's written recommendations and permitted the parties to schedule emergency hearings if either party failed to do so. The trial court also directed appellee to "advance [funds] for all repairs, expenses, and costs for sale recommended by . . . Pryor[,]" noting that appellee would be reimbursed for these advancements. Then, addressing the motion on the mortgage payments, the trial court shifted that responsibility from appellant to appellee, stating that appellee was to be "credit[ed] for [those] payments from the . . . proceeds." The matter was continued to October 11, 2016.
On October 11, 2016, the trial court reviewed the status of the show cause. Pryor testified that she hired a professional to photograph the marital residence. The day before the session was set to occur, appellant notified Pryor that the date that had been arranged for the photo session was no longer convenient. This caused Pryor to cancel the appointment and list the marital residence with just an exterior photograph. Pryor rescheduled the photo session. During the re-scheduled photo session, appellant refused to leave the marital residence despite the photographer's request.
Pryor also attempted to schedule showings of the marital residence. She provided appellant with two possible times—one was a few hours later and the other was the next afternoon. Appellant indicated that both proposed times were inconvenient. Pryor followed upwith appellant about those dates, and appellant maintained that the times were inconvenient and informed Pryor that she was now ill. Upon hearing that, Pryor asked appellant to step outside of the house so that the potential buyers could view the marital residence, but appellant refused.
At the October 2016 review hearing, the trial court repeated that appellee was going to be credited for mortgage payments he made. In its November 3, 2016 order, the trial court found that "[appellant] purposefully procrastinated and delayed the sale of the [marital residence, and that she] did not cooperate with the realtor regarding the showing . . . nor did she cooperate with the photographer." The trial court ordered appellant not to "prevent or hinder any showings of the [m]arital [r]esidence" and specifically directed her to leave the marital residence during the entire showing. If appellant failed to do so, she would be ordered to vacate the marital residence.
Ultimately, the marital residence was contracted to be sold for $370,000. Appellee and the buyers signed the purchase agreement on February 9, 2017. On February 14, 2017, appellee notified appellant of the purchase agreement and demanded that she vacate the marital residence by March 16, 2017 because of the impending closing date. Appellant did not confirm receipt of the purchase agreement or agree to vacate the property.
Consequently, appellee filed a motion for an emergency hearing on February 23, 2017. The trial court heard the matter on March 13, 2017 and again reviewed the status of the September 2016 show cause.4 Regarding the emergency hearing, appellant stipulated that she was notified of the purchase agreement; however, she took issue with permanently vacating themarital residence. Appellant testified that she did not have the resources to facilitate moving out of the marital residence with the parties' minor child.
With regard to the show cause, Pryor testified that she required access to the marital residence to conduct a termite inspection to facilitate the sale of the property. During the termite inspection, appellant left the marital residence, as she was ordered to do, but directed another individual to remain in her place. Pryor also stated that the buyers required access to the marital residence to complete a final walk-through as stated in their addendum to the purchase agreement. Pryor expressed concern that if appellant prevented the buyers from conducting the final walk-through, the buyers would dissolve the purchase agreement. Pryor noted that contractors also needed access to the marital residence to remedy the HOA violations, which were required to be repaired before the marital residence could...
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