Ware v. Ware, ED 95236.

• Citation: 337 S.W.3d 723
• Decision Date: 15 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. ED 95236.,ED 95236.
• Parties: Marian WARE, Appellant,v.Philip WARE, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

337 S.W.3d 723

Marian WARE, Appellant,
v.
Philip WARE, Respondent.

No. ED 95236.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

March 15, 2011.

[337 S.W.3d 724]

Kevin J. Kasper, St. Charles, MO, for appellant.Joseph Kuhl, St. Charles, MO, for respondent.PATRICIA L. COHEN, Judge.

Introduction

Marian Adele Ware (Mother) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Charles County denying her motion to set aside and vacate judgments entered in 2002 and 2005 modifying the child support provisions of a Texas court's Decree of Divorce (Texas Judgment). Mother claims the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to modify the Texas Judgment. We affirm.

Background

In 1994, a Texas court entered the Texas Judgment, dissolving Mother and Phillip Allen Ware's (Father) marriage. The Texas Judgment appointed Mother sole managing conservator of the parties' minor child and ordered Father to pay Mother $517.60 in monthly child support.

In 2002, Father registered the Texas Judgment in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County and filed a motion to modify the Texas Judgment. At that time, Father and the minor child resided in Missouri while Mother resided in Colorado. Mother waived personal service, and the parties filed a stipulation for modification of the Texas Judgment. In accordance with the stipulation, the trial court entered judgment modifying the Texas Judgment and granting Father primary physical custody and terminating his child support obligation (2002 Judgment).

In 2005, Father filed a second motion to modify in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. At this time, Father and the minor child resided in Missouri while Mother resided in Texas. Mother did not answer or otherwise defend Husband's motion to modify. Thereafter, the trial court entered a default judgment, granting Father sole legal and physical custody and ordering Mother to pay Father $619.32 per month in child support (2005 Judgment).

Five years later, in 2010, Mother filed a motion in Circuit Court of St. Charles County to set aside and vacate the 2002 and 2005 Judgments pursuant to Rule 74.06. In her motion, Mother asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA to enter the

[337 S.W.3d 725]

2002 and 2005 Judgments, and, therefore, the judgments were void. The trial court denied Mother's motion. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Ordinarily, we review the circuit court's ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment under Rule 74.06 for an abuse of discretion. Kerth v. Polestar Entertainment, 325 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Mo.App. E.D.2010) (citing In re Marriage of Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. banc 2006)). However, whether a judgment should be vacated because it is void is a question of law that we review de novo. Kerth, 325 S.W.3d at 378.

Discussion

In her first and second points, Mother contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside and vacate the 2002 and 2005 Judgments on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. More specifically, Mother contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA to modify the Texas Judgment because the requirements of Sections 454.971 and 454.973 were not met. See Sections 454.850 to 454.997.¹

Section 454.971 provides that a tribunal of this state may modify a child support order of another state only if the requirements of Section 454.973 are met. Section 454.973 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in this state, unless the provisions of section 454.978 apply,² the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if, after notice and hearing, it finds that:

(1) the following requirements...