Warfel v. State

• Decision Date: 21 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 582S183,582S183
• Citation: 454 N.E.2d 1218
• Parties: Myron Edward WARFEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. . O
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1218

454 N.E.2d 1218

Myron Edward WARFEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 582S183.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

O

Oct. 21, 1983.

Geoffrey A. Rivers, Muncie, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Appellant was charged by information in the Delaware Superior Court 1 with the offense of burglary, a class B felony, in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-2-1. He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to a term of twelve years' imprisonment.

On appeal he raises two issues: (1) whether it was error to admit his confession into evidence, and (2) whether it was error to overrule his objection during the State's final argument.

The facts, briefly summarized, indicated that on January 12, 1981, appellant in the company of youthful friends, Jackie J. and Phillip R., went in Jackie's car to the victim's home, situated in a woods and accessible by a lane. Pursuant to a joint plan to break into the house and steal, appellant and Phillip pried their way through the back door of the house with a screw driver, while Jackie waited outside in the car. They collected money and numerous items of personal property and successfully made their getaway.

Pursuant to leads provided by witnesses who saw and could describe the car, the police went to Jackie's residence on January 15, 1981 at 8:30 a.m., and awakened its sleeping occupants including appellant. Appellant was told that he was a suspect in a burglary and taken to the police station, where at 9:30 a.m., he was advised of his right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. He signed a waiver form stating that he waived those rights and wanted to make a statement. The interrogator was then interrupted. At 10:30 he was again advised of the same rights and signed a second waiver form. At 12:30 p.m., he signed a written statement describing his participation in the break-in and theft.

Appellant's conduct and demeanor at the time he was advised of his rights and signed the written waivers and made his confession was described by police officer witnesses as normal. They stated that he did not appear intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. To them he was coherent and appeared to understand what was being said to him. His answers and responses were sensible. Appellant, on the other hand, testified that he had been at a party until 5:00 a.m., and was still intoxicated from ingesting alcohol and drugs. According to him the officers told him "that it would be best for me to sign a statement because they would go easier on me in court," and that his drunken state rendered him unable to resist their suggestion. Contrary to this testimony, one officer testified that no reasons were suggested to appellant for making his statement.

I.

A confession cannot be admitted in evidence over proper objection unless the trial judge be first persuaded by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given freely and voluntarily and not through inducement, violence, threats, or other improper influences so as to overcome the free will of the accused. Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165; Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790. In considering whether the State has met this burden, "We will consider the evidence which supports the decision of the trier of fact in the case of contested evidence, and any uncontested evidence presented by the appellant." Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811. Appellant's claim is based upon his intoxication and fatigue at the time of the interrogation, and his consequent lack of will to resist the suggestion of the interrogator that he would benefit by confessing. Cf. Ashby v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192.

In this case the evidence relative to appellant's intoxication and fatigue at the interrogation, as well as the existence of an implied promise of the police officer of benefit, is in conflict. On the basis of the testimony on the issue of admissibility, the court could reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not so intoxicated as to obstruct his natural will to resist and that the implied promise of benefit from making a statement was not given, or even if given was so slight in its persuasive force as not to have brought about a confession not freely self-determined. Rogers v. Richmond, (1961) 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760. No error has been demonstrated in...