Warger v. Shauers
| Citation | 135 S.Ct. 521,190 L.Ed.2d 422 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–517.,13–517. |
| Parties | Gregory P. WARGER, Petitioner v. Randy D. SHAUERS. |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Sheila L. Birnbaum, New York, NY, for Respondent.
Sarah E. Harrington, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondent.
Steven C. Beardsley, Gary D. Jensen, Beardsley, Jensen & Von Wald, P.L.L.C., Rapid City, SD, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Counsel of Record, James M. McDonald, Matthew B. Nicholson, Leslie Cooper Mahaffey, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Ronald R. Kappelman, Gregory G. Strommen, Cassidy M. Stalley, Banks, Johnson, Kappelman & Becker, PLLC, Rapid City, SD, Sheila L. Birnbaum, Counsel of Record, Douglas W. Dunham, Ellen P. Quackenbos, Laurentia C. McKessar, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, for Respondent.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)provides that certain juror testimony regarding what occurred in a jury room is inadmissible “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.” The question presented in this case is whether Rule 606(b)precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror's affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror's dishonesty during voir dire. We hold that it does.
Petitioner Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by respondent Randy Shauers struck him from behind. Warger claims he was stopped at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger suddenly pulled out in front of him. Regardless of the cause of the accident, no one disputes its tragic result: Warger sustained serious injuries that ultimately required the amputation of his left leg.
Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court. During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy voir direof the prospective jurors. Warger's counsel asked whether any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and suffering or for future medical expenses, or whether there was any juror who thought, “I don't think I could be a fair and impartial juror on this kind of case.” App. 105. Prospective juror Regina Whipple, who was later selected as the jury foreperson, answered no to each of these questions. See id.,at 83, 89, 105.
Trial commenced, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Shauers. Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted Warger's counsel to express concern over juror Whipple's conduct. The complaining juror subsequently signed an affidavit claiming that Whipple had spoken during deliberations about “a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and a man died,” and had “related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a.
Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial. He contended that Whipple had deliberately lied during voir direabout her impartiality and ability to award damages. Thus, he asserted, he had satisfied the requirements of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), which holds that a party may “obtain a new trial” if he “demonstrate[s] that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,and ... that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id.,at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845.
The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that the only evidence that supported Warger's motion, the complaining juror's affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). As relevant here, that Rule provides that “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” evidence “about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations” is inadmissible. Rule 606(b)(1). The Rule contains three specific exceptions—allowing testimony “about whether (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form,” Rule 606(b)(2)—but the District Court found none of these exceptions to be applicable.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 721 F.3d 606 (2013). It first held that Warger's proffered evidence did not fall within the “extraneous prejudicial evidence” exception set forth in Rule 606(b)(2)(A). The court explained that “[j]urors' personal experiences do not constitute extraneous information; it is unavoidable they will bring such innate experiences into the jury room.” Id.,at 611. Next, the court rejected Warger's alternative argument that Rule 606(b)is wholly inapplicable when a litigant offers evidence to show that a juror was dishonest during voir dire. Acknowledging that there was a split among the Federal Courts of Appeals on this question, the Eighth Circuit joined those Circuits that had held that Rule 606(b)applies to any proceeding in which the jury's verdict might be invalidated, including efforts to demonstrate that a juror lied during voir dire. Compare id.,at 611–612(citing Williams v. Price,343 F.3d 223, 235–237 (C.A.3 2003), and United States v. Benally,546 F.3d 1230, 1235 (C.A.10 2008)), with Hard v. Burlington N.R.,812 F.2d 482, 485 (C.A.9 1987)(“Statements which tend to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by [Rule 606(b)]”), and Maldonado v. Missouri P.R. Co.,798 F.2d 764, 770 (C.A.5 1986)(same).
We granted certiorari, 571 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1491, 188 L.Ed.2d 374 (2014), and now affirm.
We hold that Rule 606(b)applies to juror testimony during a proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire. In doing so, we simply accord Rule 606(b)'s terms their plain meaning. The Rule, after all, applies “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.” Rule 606(b)(1). A postverdict motion for a new trial on the ground of voir dire dishonesty plainly entails “an inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict”: If a juror was dishonest during voir direand an honest response would have provided a valid basis to challenge that juror for cause, the verdict must be invalidated. See McDonough, 464 U.S., at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845.
This understanding of the text of Rule 606(b)is consistent with the underlying common-law rule on which it was based. Although some common-law courts would have permitted evidence of jury deliberations to be introduced to demonstrate juror dishonesty during voir dire,the majority would not, and the language of Rule 606(b)reflects Congress' enactment of the more restrictive version of the common-law rule.
Rule 606(b)had its genesis in Vaise v. Delaval,1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785), in which Lord Mansfield held inadmissible an affidavit from two jurors claiming that the jury had decided the case through a game of chance. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2352, p. 696 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). The rule soon took root in the United States, id.,at 696–697, where it was viewed as both promoting the finality of verdicts and insulating the jury from outside influences, see McDonald v. Pless,238 U.S. 264, 267–268, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915).
Some versions of the rule were narrower than others. Under what was sometimes known as the “Iowa” approach, juror testimony regarding deliberations was excluded only to the extent that it related to matters that “ ‘inhere[d] in the verdict,’ ” which generally consisted of evidence of the jurors' subjective intentions and thought processes in reaching a verdict. 3 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:16, p. 70 (4th ed.2013); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2353, 2354, at 699–702.1A number of courts adhering to the Iowa rule held that testimony regarding jury deliberations is admissible when used to challenge juror conduct during voir dire. See, e.g.,Mathisen v. Norton,187 Wash. 240, 244–246, 60 P.2d 1, 3–4 (1936); Williams v. Bridges,140 Cal.App. 537, 538–541, 35 P.2d 407, 408–409 (1934).
But other courts applied a broader version of the anti-impeachment rule. Under this version, sometimes called the “federal” approach, litigants were prohibited from using evidence of jury deliberations unless it was offered to show that an “extraneous matter” had influenced the jury. See 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:16, at 71; Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1973). The “great majority” of appellate courts applying this version of the rule held jury deliberations evidence inadmissible even if used to demonstrate dishonesty during voir dire. Wilson v. Wiggins,54 Ariz. 240, 246, 94 P.2d 870, 872 (1939); see, e.g.,Willis v. Davis,333 P.2d 311, 314 (Okla.1958); Turner v. Hall's Adm'x,252 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Ky.1952); Hinkel v. Oregon Chair Co., 80 Ore. 404, 406, 156 P. 438, 439 (1916); State v. Cloud,130 La. 955, 958–960, 58 So. 827, 828–829 (1912); Payne v. Burke,236 App.Div. 527, 528–530, 260 N.Y.S. 259, 260–262 (1932).
This Court occasionally employed language that might have suggested a preference for the Iowa rule. See Hyde v. United States,225 U.S. 347, 383–384, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912)(“[W]e think the rule expressed in Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co.,20 Iowa 195 [1866], ... should apply, that the testimony of jurors should not be received to show matters which essentially inhere in the verdict itself and necessarily depend upon the testimony of the jurors and can receive no corroboration”); Mattox v. United States,146 U.S. 140, 148–149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892)(quoting at length a Kansas Supreme Court decision setting out the Iowa test). But to the extent that these decisions created any question as to which approach this Court followed, McDonald v. Plesslargely settled matters. There, we held that juror affidavits...
To continue reading
Request your trial