Warmus v. Larose
| Decision Date | 27 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 1:14 CV 1925 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | MATTHEW WARMUS, Petitioner, v. CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, Respondent. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action is before the Court upon objections filed by Petitioner, Matthew Warmus, asserting error in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("the R&R"). (Doc. #20.) The Court ADOPTS the R&R as to grounds 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; and 10. (Doc. # 19.) The Court further ADOPTS the recommendation that ground 9 be dismissed, but does so on the merits rather than due to any procedural default. (Doc. #19.) Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED AND DISMISSED in its entirety.
The Report adequately states the factual background and procedural history of this matter. Petitioner makes no objection to, and has identified no error in, the Magistrate's Factual and Procedural Background. The Court will accept the factual and procedural history reflected in the Report as written.
Motions made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are governed by the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). AEDPA prescribes a narrow habeas corpus remedy only where a State court adjudication has resulted in (1) "a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or (2) a "decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA further limits "clearly established Federal law" to those principles "determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). For the purposes of habeas review after AEDPA, "clearly established Federal law" refers to the express holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as opposed to the dicta" of that Court's decisions "of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000).
When evaluating a § 2254 petition this Court notes that AEDPA and decisional law applying its restrictions have clearly stated that a district court may not "apply its own views of what the law should be" but must issue a writ only where "clearly established federal law" has been applied unreasonably, not merely erroneously or incorrectly. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 656 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiterates:
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254 (d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the United States Supreme Court's] precedents. It goes no further. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011) (Citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit explains:
A state court decision is 'contrary to' clearly established Federal law 'if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law,' or 'if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant [U.S.] Supreme Court precedent' and arrives at a different result. A state court decision is an 'unreasonable application of' clearly established Federal law 'if the state court correctly identifies the correct governing legal rule from [U.S. Supreme Court's] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. An 'unreasonable application' can also occur where 'the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.
Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 2005), internal citations, to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 405-407, omitted. A petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d), which requires:
28 U.S.C. § 2244; Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2004).
Where, as here, a party files written objections to the report and recommendation issued by the magistrate judge, this Court "shall make" a de novo "determination of those portions of the record or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1). Only those portions of a report and recommendation to which the parties have made an objection are subject to review; absent an objection, this Court may adopt the magistrate's report without review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145, 106 S.Ct. 466 (1985). With regard to those portions of the Report and Recommendation underreview, this Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge Act (28 U.S.C. § 636 et seq.) "does not allow parties to raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate." Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 907 n. 1 (6th Cir.2000); see also Clark v. U.S., 764 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2014) and Enyart v. Coleman, 29 F.Supp.3d 1059 (N.D. Ohio 2014), among others. Thus, this Court's review is predicated on a proper objection to the Magistrate's evaluation of the issues presented to the Magistrate. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72 (b)(3) () It is incumbent upon the party seeking relief to file objections "which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72 (b)(3). "An 'objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an 'objection' as that term is used in this context." Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D.Mich. 2004) citing U.S. v. Walters, 638 F.2d. 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).
Petitioner originally raised ten grounds for review, however, his objections are directed to eight of the ten grounds; thus this Court adopts, without objection, the portions of the Report and Recommendation that address Petitioner's Eighth and Tenth Claims. Petitioner's remaining objections will be addressed, to the extent necessary, as they were evaluated in the R&R.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus only after having fairly presented all constitutional claims to all appropriate state courts, including the highest state court, thereby exhausting his state court remedies before seeking federal relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b), (c). However, if a petitioner's claim either (1) was not fairly raised before a state court when state court remedies were available; or (2) was not presented in compliance with a state procedural rule, and failure to comply with the rule prevents the state court from reaching the merits of the claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted, and may not be considered by a federal court. A petitioner may overcome such a procedural bar only by demonstrating both cause for the failure to comply and prejudice that would result from the application of the bar. "Demonstrating cause requires showing that an 'objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply' with the state procedural rule." Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). The United States Supreme Court has long held that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, absent an identifiable external factor, will not support an exception to a procedural bar. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). That Court has further noted, "without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments" that a "showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials,' made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard." Id. at 488, internal citations to Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) omitted.
If a petitioner can demonstrate an external cause, the petitioner must then demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 452, 170 (1982). "Demonstrating prejudice requires showing that the trial was infected with constitutionalerror." Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2006). This presents a significant burden: a petitioner must not "merely" identify an instruction, decision, or occurrence that is "undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned" the petitioner must demonstrate that error identified operated to so infect the entire trial that the "resulting conviction violates due process." Frady, supra, at 169, quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
Magistrate Knepp recommends dismissing Petitioner's Fourth; Sixth; and Ninth grounds for relief as procedurally defaulted. This Court will address each ground:
(i)...
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