Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc.
Decision Date | 21 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 84 Civ. 4675 (IBW).,84 Civ. 4675 (IBW). |
Citation | 677 F. Supp. 740 |
Parties | WARNER BROS. INC., Plaintiff, v. DAE RIM TRADING, INC., and Yun Yon Cho, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Reboul, MacMurray, Hewitt, Maynard & Kristol, New York City, for plaintiff; J. Joseph Bainton, of counsel.
Curtis, Morris & Safford, P.C., New York City, for defendants; Pasquale A. Razzano, of counsel.
OPINION, WITH FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION
These are the findings of fact and conclusions of law (Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)) and the decision in this action tried without a jury. The action was commenced on July 2, 1984, with a simple one count complaint for copyright infringement in which jurisdiction was asserted solely on a federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331), specifically federal copyright laws (28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
Any reason for the action as one to stop copyright infringement disappeared early in the litigation when, as will appear, the defendants in this action admitted infringement of the one copyright which they had in fact infringed. The action has for over three years been persistently and aggressively prosecuted, not to stop copyright infringement but, as admitted by plaintiff in its "Revised Proposed Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law" filed July 20, 1987, p. 3; hereafter cited "P Brief," for a different reason: "The basic issue in these actions is who should bear the reasonable expenses of a copyright enforcement program—the copyright owner which has had its property infringed or the persons who have willfully infringed it." Under the seemingly permissible guise of securing for plaintiff "(a) the amount of statutory damages, if any ... and (b) ... the amount of costs and attorneys' fees, if any, ...". (Pre-Trial Memorandum of Plaintiff, filed June 17, 1985, p. 25, hereafter referred to as "PTM") the real purpose of the plaintiff in this action has been to shift the business expense of promoting a motion picture away from its producer (Warner, which made a large profit) and to place it, not on a willful infringer, but on a small shopkeeper who committed but a single and innocent infringement.
Thus, the reality is that, while defendants at no time caused any damages whatever to it, Warner has been pressing this litigation for over three years for the purpose of collecting disproportionately large statutory damages and attorneys' fees. The motives for this litigation seem dubious; they have not been necessary to protect any copyright interest of Warner; they have not been necessary to compensate plaintiff for any damages suffered or reasonable expenses incurred; they have not been necessary to deter and penalize defendant, a small and innocent infringer; they seem in context to be "oppressive reasons" and "vexatious" within the meaning of those words in the opinion of the Supreme Court in F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974). Moreover, the litigation, unreasonably prolonged, was itself conducted in an unfair, vexatious, and oppressive manner.
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-497, 53 S.Ct. 721, 727-728, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933). See also Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 715 (2nd Cir.1973). Where several actions are ordered to be tried together "each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment." 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2382 at 254 (1971).
A separate decision, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, will be filed hereafter in each of the nine other actions tried together with this action.
The principal issue as initially framed by the pleadings was whether there should be a permanent injunction against any infringement by defendants of the two copyrights in suit. As will appear, the defendants early offered on November 2, 1984, to consent to a permanent injunction as to both copyrights, this despite the fact that plaintiff had no evidence when the action was commenced (and had never had any evidence) of any infringement by defendants of one of the two copyrights claimed in the complaint to have been infringed; this offer by defendants was rejected by plaintiff, even though it gave plaintiff protection from copyright infringement, because it did not promise payment of substantial statutory damages (there were no actual damages) and attorneys' fees. The defendants do not now contest, and have not for a long time contested, a permanent injunction as to one of the copyrights (that as to the Gizmo character), the only copyright as to which plaintiff has ever had any evidence of infringement. The claim as to infringement of one copyright (that as to the Stripe character), as will appear, was withdrawn by plaintiff on June 17, 1985.
There now remain, some three years after plaintiff had been assured of the primary relief it sought, the following issues for decision which plaintiff pressed to trial:
The plaintiff in this action is Warner Bros. Inc., ("Warner"), a Delaware corporation, whose principal place of business is on Warner Boulevard in Burbank, California, a suburb of Los Angeles near Hollywood. Warner is a subsidiary of Warner Communications Inc. ("Warner Com."), a very large corporate enterprise, the stock of which is publicly owned and listed on the New York Stock Exchange and on other exchanges. Warner Com. has offices at 75 Rockefeller Plaza in New York City and is reported in Standard and Poor's Register for 1986 to have had revenue in that year of 2.23 billion dollars; Warner Com. and subsidiaries are similarly reported to have 8,000 employees, of whom 3,000 are employed by Warner.
Warner provides entertainment services to the public, including the production and distribution of motion pictures; it is reported also to license feature films for television, to distribute TV specials, to produce phonograph records, and to publish music.
On June 8, 1984, Warner released for public showing a motion picture entitled "Gremlins" which became very popular and successful, with attendant and wide publicity. The "Gremlins" motion picture is aimed primarily at children; it concerns fanciful characters which Warner, in the complaint, avers (para. 7) "were developed specifically for the film"; the relevant such characters are "Stripe" and "Gizmo." According to the film, Gizmo is a "Mogwai"; the Mogwais are benign and cuddly; Stripe is a "Gremlin"; the Gremlins are evil; under some circumstances, a Mogwai becomes a Gremlin.
Warner obtained and owns a valid copyright in the "Gremlins" motion picture, which copyright has been registered with the Copyright Office, but no claim is made on that copyright (T5-8; "T" references are to pages of the stenographic transcript of the joint trial). Warner obtained and owns valid copyrights in the graphic representations of Stripe and Gizmo, which copyrights were registered for copyright as "artwork" or "pictorial work," being drawn representations of the characters "Stripe" (certificate VAu 54-951, dated December 30, 1983) and "Gizmo" (Certificate VAu 54-952, dated December 30, 1983).
After its release on June 8, 1984, the film was widely promoted nationally by Warner. Warner claims (PTM, p. 3) that in the first 66 days after release, Gremlins had a box office "gross" of about $125,000,000; that by the end of 1984 it had "grossed" more than $142,000,000; that it was the third most successful film released in 1984; that Warner, through another subsidiary of Warner Com., promoted a licensing campaign for Gremlins character merchandise; and that licenses for such Gremlins...
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