Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Hall

Decision Date31 July 1995
Docket NumberNo. 20A03-9410-CV-398,20A03-9410-CV-398
Citation653 N.E.2d 1057
PartiesWARNER TRUCKING, INC., Appellant-Defendant, and Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Carl C. HALL, Jr. and Sheri Hall, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
OPINION

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Appellants-defendants Warner Trucking, Inc. (Warner) and Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (Carolina) appeal from the denial of summary judgment in favor of Carl and Sherri Hall (Halls) in an action against an employer and employer insurer for the negligent acts of an employee. The designated facts relevant to this appeal are set forth below.

Warner was a vehicle hauling company. Warner had six white International semi-tractors and trailers for hauling. Warner was owned and operated on a daily basis by Lou Warner. Warner was insured by Carolina for liability incurred to the extent that Warner had to legally pay for bodily injury or property damage up to the limits of the insurance policy. Lou Warner was an insured for any covered truck. Anyone else was an insured under the policy if they were using a covered truck owned by Warner with Lou Warner's permission. The insurance policy contained all the agreements between Warner and Carolina concerning the insurance afforded.

As part of employee orientation, Lou Warner instructed the drivers that they were not allowed to drive after consuming any amount of alcohol. Lou Warner also informed the drivers that they were not to use the trucks for personal reasons without her permission. Before each trip, Lou Warner would give each driver an advance for gas, tolls, and expenses incurred during the trip.

Carl Manuel (Manuel) was employed by Warner as a truck driver. Manuel had an official set of keys to the truck assigned. Manuel was given an advance June 14, 1990, and was scheduled to go on a trip on June 15, 1990. At the close of business on June 14, 1990, a trailer was loaded and attached to the semi-tractor assigned to Manuel for the next day's haul.

After the close of business on June 14, 1990, Manuel attended a cookout with members of the Warner staff and their families. Manuel had a few beers and two shots of hard liquor. Later in the evening, Manuel and his wife began to argue on the porch of the house where the cookout was taking place. The Manuels left the cookout with their son in their personal vehicle, unbeknownst to Lou Warner. Manuel's wife drove to the Warner properties and left Manuel because he was going to sleep in the semi-tractor overnight. Manuel's wife took their son home and returned to Warner to spend the night with Manuel. When his wife returned, Manuel was gone with the semi-tractor but left the trailer on the property. Manuel's wife called Lou Warner from Warner offices and told her that Manuel had taken the truck. Lou Warner left the cookout to look for Manuel.

While driving the Warner semi-tractor, Manuel had a collision with another vehicle owned by the Halls and was taken to the hospital for the injuries he sustained. Lou Warner found out that there had been an accident and that the driver of a white International semi-tractor had been taken to the hospital. Lou Warner went to the hospital and located Manuel in the emergency room. Manuel could not recall anything after being on the porch arguing with his wife until he woke up in the hospital with a broken nose. When asked later by Lou Warner, Manuel did not recall what happened or why he was driving the truck.

The Halls filed a complaint against Warner and Carolina alleging inter alia negligence on the part of a Warner employee (Manuel) in operating a vehicle while acting within the scope of his employment, which was the actual and proximate cause of the damages they sustained. On February 2, 1993, Warner and Carolina filed separate motions for summary judgment. The cases were consolidated upon motion of the trial court. Both motions for summary judgment were denied on April 12, 1994. This appeal ensued.

On appeal Warner and Carolina raise one consolidated issue: whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of the Halls.

The review of a ruling on summary judgment requires this Court to apply the same standard used by the trial court. Pierce v. Bank One-Franklin, NA (1993), Ind.App., 618 N.E.2d 16, 18, trans. denied. Parties cannot rely without specificity on entire portions of the record, such as depositions; pleadings; answers to interrogatories; and admissions. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp. (1993), Ind., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 at fn. 2. It is only those portions of the record specifically designated to the trial court that comprise the record for review. Pierce, 618 N.E.2d at 18. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C) states:

"At the time of filing the motion or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. A party opposing the motion shall also designate to the court each material issue of fact which that party asserts precludes entry of summary judgment and the evidence relevant thereto...."

The Halls raise various arguments concerning Warner and Carolina's attempts at designation. All parties in this proceeding attempted to designate entire portions of the record in their respective motions and responses. However, more detailed references to the record were provided in the accompanying memoranda. It is from this designated evidence that a review will be conducted.

Generally, the master is liable for the physical torts of his servant committed while acting within the scope of the servant's employment under the rule of law referred to as respondeat superior. State v. Gibbs (1975), 166 Ind.App. 387, 336 N.E.2d 703, 705, trans. denied. Whether an employee is acting within the scope of his employment at the time of an accident is a question of fact to be determined in light of the evidence of each particular case. Id.

In the instant case, Warner contends that Manuel was not acting within the scope of his employment and against the express rules prohibiting driving after consuming alcohol and using the vehicle for personal reasons without permission.

Summary judgment is not appropriate where material facts conflict or undisputed facts lead to conflicting inferences. However, where material facts which are dispositive of...

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3 cases
  • Barfield v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, A97A1627
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 1, 1997
    ...deviation in use from [the employer's] express permission was a substantial deviation." Id. at 514. See also Warner Trucking v. Hall, 653 N.E.2d 1057, 1061 (Ind.App.1995), in which the court construed an identical policy provision and found coverage did not extend to a driver who violated t......
  • Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 20S03-9603-CV-212
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1997
    ...The Court of Appeals accepted the appeal and held that both summary judgment motions should have been granted. Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Hall, 653 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). We granted While the party losing in the trial court must persuade us that the trial court's decision was erroneou......
  • Harkness v. Hall
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 21, 1997
    ...Only those portions of the record specifically designated to the trial court comprise the record for review. Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Hall, 653 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).3 The Harknesses also challenge the trial court's conclusion that summary judgment should be granted to Orange County......

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