Warner v. State

• Decision Date: 01 April 1924
• Docket Number: No. 24254.,24254.
• Citation: 143 N.E. 288,194 Ind. 426
• Parties: WARNER v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

194 Ind. 426

143 N.E. 288

WARNER

v.STATE.

No. 24254.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 1, 1924.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County.

Henry C. Warner was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. Reversed, and defendant discharged.

Clyde P. Miller, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Mrs. Edward F. White, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

TRAVIS, J.

Appellant brings this appeal from a judgment which imposed a fine and imprisonment, upon his plea of guilty to the charge by indictment of grand larceny.

April 8, 1921, the indictment which charged appellant with grand larceny was returned in open court. April 23, 1921, appellant waived arraignment. The order book entry made by the clerk of the court of the proceedings in relation to arraignment was to the effect that appellant waived arraignment and pleaded not guilty, which was followed by trial by the court, at which evidence was heard, and that the finding was taken under advisement by the court. May 11, 1921, the next order book entry was that the defendant be released on his own recognizance pending the further order of the court. The defendant remained at large until October 2, 1922, when he was produced in court by the sheriff under the order of the court. At this time the original order book entries in the cause were changed (by erasure and interlineation), by the order of the court, and were made to read that upon arraignment the defendant entered a plea of guilty, and the finding was taken under advisement. And the part of the order which recited a plea of not guilty, that a trial was had, and evidence heard, was erased. The court thereupon rendered judgment without making a finding of guilty, which judgment was that the defendant be fined and committed to the state prison. The defendant thereupon filed a motion to require the clerk to reinstate on the order book and the clerk's docket all matter erased therefrom or changed by him, and that the original entries therein made be reinstated, and that the judgment of fine and imprisonment be vacated and set aside and all process stayed thereunder. Motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment then followed respectively. All of said motions were overruled.

The issues involve the action of the trial court (1) in changing the order of the court as recorded in the order book, (2) rendering judgment without a finding having been made upon the defendant's plea of guilty, (3) and in adjudging that the defendant pay a fine and be committed to the state prison, after having been released on his own recognizance for nearly a year and a half before judgment upon the plea of guilty.

[1] 1. Upon being brought before the court October 2, 1922, for sentence, defendant ob jected for the reason that the records as made by the clerk of the action of the court showed that on April 23, 1921, he was arraigned, waived arraignment, and pleaded not guilty; that a trial was had and evidence heard, and the finding taken under advisement; and that the court had no power or authority to change such record, charging that the change was not supported by any written note or memorandum which would dispute the truth of the order as made. An examination of the record shows that appellant is incorrect. The court based this action in changing the record upon an entry made by him upon the back of the indictment at the time appellant was arraigned and pleaded thereto, and that such entry was that appellant pleaded guilty, from which it is plain that the orders entered by the clerk in the order book were at variance with, and contrary to, the minute made by the judge of the court on the back of the indictment at the time of arraignment. A court has the inherent power to correct the errors in its records of a case, to make such records speak the truth or to be in accord with the actual facts of the case. Moerecke v. Bryan (1915) 183 Ind. 591, 108 N. E. 948;Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Strange (1908) 171 Ind. 160, 84 N. E. 819, 85 N. E. 1026, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041;Boonville Bank v. Blakey (1906) 166 Ind. 427, 76 N. E. 529;Johnson v. Gebhauer (1902) 159 Ind. 271, 64 N. E. 855;Knowlton v. Dolan (1898) 151 Ind. 79, 51 N. E. 97;Suloj v. Retlaw (1914) 57 Ind. App. 302, 107 N. E. 18;Pursley v. Wickle (1891) 4 Ind. App. 382, 30 N. E. 1115; 15 C. J. 975. Such a correction of its records by the court may be made at any time while a cause is in fieri and prior to rendering judgment or decree. Boonville Bank v. Blakey, supra. The correction may be made upon motion and notice to the opposite party, but the power to act is not limited to a move by either party; the court by virtue of its inherent right has the power to correct the records of its actions by supplying omitted entries and correcting erroneous ones, acting solely upon its own knowledge and without notice to either party. Moerecke v. Bryan, supra; Gilman v. Libbey, 4 Cliff. 447, Fed. Cas. No. 5,445; McGuire v. Gilbert, 180 Ill. 96, 54 N. E. 167. The action of the court in changing its record was not error.

[2] 2. Upon a plea of guilty it is not error for the court to enter judgment upon the plea without a finding of guilty upon the plea of guilty. It has been held by this court that the trial court has nothing to do upon a plea of guilty but to fix the amount of punishment and render judgment or sentence accordingly, for the reason that the defendant by his confession of guilt makes a finding unnecessary. This is but following the rule practiced at common law. Upon reason a judgment must first have something upon which to rest, either upon a finding by the court or upon a verdict of a jury. A plea of guilty, according to authorities, has been held sufficient foundation upon which to rest a judgment. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 329; Griffith v. State (1871) 36 Ind. 406. The judgment was not erroneous following and being based upon a plea of guilty, instead of following and being based upon the finding of guilty by the court.

[3] 3. The case turns upon the proposition that the court erred in entering judgment and sentencing defendant and in overruling appellant's motion to stay process because of the lapse of time between the plea of guilty and the time of sentence, defendant having been released upon his own recognizance pending further order of the court, during all of the time intervening. It is earnestly contended by reason of this lapse of time that the court lost jurisdiction of the defendant, and the judgment entered against him was erroneous and void. It will be noted that the trial court had not rendered judgment or sentenced defendant upon his plea of guilty, from which we conclude, the record being silent, that the court did not suspend the sentence and parole the defendant under sections 2174-2176, Burns' 1914, as amended by Acts 1919, c. 234, p. 843. Under the common law and early practice generally in the jurisdictions of the states, the trial court was not confined closely as to time when judgment was to be pronounced, either upon a plea of guilty or upon finding or verdict of guilty, but might withhold rendering judgment. Even under statute, this court has held that the trial court may withhold sentence until a time certain for a...