Warnick v. Nmc-Wollard, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2:05-CV-1394.,2:05-CV-1394.
• Citation: 512 F.Supp.2d 318
• Parties: Gary WARNICK and Tamara Warnick, Plaintiffs, v. NMC-WOLLARD, INC. and Hobart Brothers Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

512 F.Supp.2d 318

Gary WARNICK and Tamara Warnick, Plaintiffs, v. NMC-WOLLARD, INC. and Hobart Brothers Company, Defendants.

No. 2:05-CV-1394.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

March 30, 2007.

John A. Lord, Robert J. Mongeluzzi, Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher J. McCabe, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Jason A. Archinaco, Steven J. Forry, White & Williams, Pittsburgh, PA, Geraldine D. Zidow, McKissock & Hoffman, Matthew J. Junk, White and Williams LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

OPINION

THOMAS M. HARDIMAN, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Gary Warnick (Warnick) brought this negligence and product liability action against Defendants NMC-Wollard, Inc. (NMC) and Hobart Brothers Company (Hobart) after he permanently injured his right thumb while working as a baggage handler at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport. Warnick's wife, Tamara, has sued for loss of consortium. Both NMC and Hobart filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and oral argument was heard on January 5, 2007. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for two independent reasons.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated the case by filing a Complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. On May 5, 2005, Hobart removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On May 12, 2005, Hobart answered the complaint and asserted cross-claims against NMC. On June 14, 2005, NMC answered denying all wrongdoing. On October 7, 2005, the case was transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because the injury occurred in this judicial district.

III. Facts

At the time of his injury, Plaintiff Warnick had been employed by U.S. Airways as a baggage handler for almost twenty years. In this capacity, Warnick worked with belt loaders, which are industrial products operated by airline ground personnel. As anyone who has peered out of an airplane window while on the tarmac has noticed, belt loaders are used to transfer baggage to and from the cargo holds of aircraft by means of a mechanized conveyor belt. Belt loaders virtually identical to the product at issue in this case have been sold and used all over the world for decades.

On April 11, 2003, while working at the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport, Warnick attempted to step up from the ground onto the running board of a belt loader when he fell and implanted his right thumb into the metal grate of the running board (known as "grip-strut"). Warnick suffered a hyperextension sprain of his right thumb, which required surgical repair of the collateral metacarpopohalangeal joint and the insertion of hardware. Other than a twisted right knee in 2001, Warnick had never been injured in twenty years of working with belt loaders on a daily basis.

Warnick claims that the belt loader was defectively designed because it required users to negotiate an unnecessarily high step without the benefit of handrails Significantly, however, Warnick does not identify the belt loader upon which he was injured by serial number or year of manufacture. During his deposition, Warnick eventually identified the type of belt loader and the fact that it contained an oval plate near the steering wheel that bore the name "Wollard."¹ The Wollard name has long been associated with belt loaders, having been manufactured by various companies at different times. Criton, Hobart, Steingart, and NMC — either themselves or through related companies — have produced belt loaders that bear the Wollard name. In light of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' cross-claims, there remains some disagreement among the parties regarding both the corporate structures of Hobart and NMC and their involvement in the manufacture of belt loaders. For purposes of this Opinion, which addresses Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs' claims that both Hobart and NMC manufactured the model 886 belt loader, which is the model that Plaintiff Warnick ultimately testified he was injured upon at work on April 11, 2003.²

From 1983 until 1987, Wollard Airport Equipment Company (WAEC) developed and sold the TC-886 model belt loader. At that time, WAEC was operated as a division of Heath Techna and/or Criton Technologies. In 1987, Criton transferred WAEC's assets and liabilities to Defendant Hobart, which incorporated WAEC in Ohio for the purpose of acquiring the. WAEC division of Criton.³ At the time of this acquisition, WAEC was located in Florida and manufactured lavatory trucks, portable aircraft stairways, and belt loaders. Seven years later, on October 21, 1994, Hobart sold the assets of WAEC to Wollard Airport Equipment Company, Inc. (WAEC Inc.), which is a predecessor-in-interest to Defendant NMC.

Plaintiffs submitted the expert report of Daniel Pacheco, P.E., who opined that the belt loader upon which Warnick was injured was the product of an "unreasonably dangerous" design. According to Pacheco, the belt loader was defective because it was technologically and economically feasible, for the model 886 to have a lower running board and/or handrails. In rebuttal, however, Hobart submitted the deposition testimony of Mr. Peter Driver, a WAEC engineer. Driver testified that because belt loaders interface with other equipment on the, tarmac, and because all airport equipment bears "rub rails" at a height of eighteen inches from the tarmac, the running boards on the loaders could not be lower than the height of the rubrails: i.e., eighteen inches from the ground⁴ Driver further testified that adding steps to the belt loaders would not be feasible, as these design features would create tripping hazards.⁵

Finally, Plaintiffs note in support of their collateral estoppel argument that Hobart sought summary judgment in separate state court cases involving belt loaders on two prior occasions in Andrews v. Hobart, et al., October Term, 2003, No. 1655 and Slobodjian, et al., v. Hobart, et al., January Term 2004, No.1956. On February 22, 2006, those Motions were denied summarily by the Honorable Victor DeNubile in a one page Order devoid of reasoning or analysis.

IV. Standard of Review

Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Facts, inferences therefrom, and ambiguities must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. To withstand a summary judgment motion, sufficient evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Thus, a nonmoving party "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue." Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Celotex).

V. Jurisdiction

Defendants invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although Plaintiffs have not challenged Defendants' assertion of this basis of subject matter jurisdiction, "federal courts have the duty ... where the issue of jurisdiction is not raised by any party, to inquire into their jurisdiction to act and to deny relief where jurisdiction is lacking." See Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc. v. Kennedy, 596 F.2d 568, 570 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). The pleadings in this case demonstrate that diversity exists.

As jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the Court must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, Pennsylvania. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). The parties and the Court are in agreement that Pennsylvania law governs this action. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir.1995); see also Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).

VI. Analysis

Defendants advance two independent bases for summary judgment. First, they argue that the belt loaders they manufactured are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. Second, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot prove an essential element of their claim, causation, because they cannot identify the manufacturer of the particular belt loader that caused Warnick's injury. Plaintiffs disagree, insisting that their expert is prepared to testify that belt loaders are unreasonably dangerous, and arguing that — if their "circumstantial evidence" of the identity of the manufacturer of the belt loader that injured Warnick is insufficient — the burden of proving causation should be shifted to Defendants via the doctrine of alternative liability. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff alleging strict product liability ultimately must show that the product was defective, that the defect proximately caused the plaintiff s injury, and that the...