Warnock v. Archer, 02-3322.
| Citation | 380 F.3d 1076 |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-3322.,No. 03-1422.,02-3322.,03-1422. |
| Parties | Steve WARNOCK, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Charles ARCHER, Individually and as Superintendent; Charles Eads, Individually and as Principal; Gene Baldwin, Individually and as School Board President; David Smith, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; L.C. Holloway, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; Verna Gaddy, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; Melvin Hula, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; Vera Doepel, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; Emma Gray, Individually and as member of the Board of Directors of the Devalls Bluff, Arkansas Public School District; Devalls Bluff Public School District, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge.
James Gerard Schulze, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.
W. Paul Blume, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, McMILLIAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
Steve Warnock brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging various practices of the Devalls Bluff School District on establishment clause grounds. Mr. Warnock, though partially successful below, appeals on the ground that the relief granted to him was insufficient. The various defendants cross-appeal, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the first amendment had been violated. We uphold the district court on the merits but conclude that its injunction was insufficiently broad to cure the constitutional violation involved in this case.
Mr. Warnock is an art teacher and part-time bus driver for the Devalls Bluff School District, a political subdivision of the State of Arkansas. The school district required Mr. Warnock to go to a local college sponsored by a Christian denomination for in-service training meetings that included a prayer. Charles Archer, the district superintendent, conducted prayers at mandatory teacher training meetings, in addition to displaying a personal Bible and a framed scriptural quotation in his office. When Mr. Warnock asked Mr. Archer to stop praying at the teachers' meetings, he refused. In response, Mr. Warnock filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After voluntarily abandoning that charge, he instituted this suit against Mr. Archer, various school officials, and the school district. Mr. Warnock challenged the requirement that he attend meetings and training where prayers were recited, and he claimed that students, parents, and a fellow teacher harassed him because he filed the EEOC charge and the subsequent suit. He was time-barred from making any Title VII claims, and his action rests entirely on § 1983 and alleged constitutional violations.
The district court concluded that prayers at mandatory faculty meetings and compulsory in-service training that began with prayer violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. The court held, however, that the Bible and framed scripture verses in Mr. Archer's office, as well as religious jewelry and T-shirts worn by students and staff, were protected by the first amendment's free speech and free exercise clauses. Furthermore, the court concluded that while there was evidence that students and fellow teachers harassed Mr. Warnock, school officials took appropriate action in response to each incident. The court then issued an injunction barring the defendants from offering prayers at any meeting that Mr. Warnock is required to attend and from requiring Mr. Warnock to attend in-service training at denominational colleges where prayers are offered.1 In addition, the district court awarded Mr. Warnock $1,000 in compensatory damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On appeal, Mr. Warnock asks us to modify the injunction against the defendants, reverse the district court's decision that the harassment he suffered did not violate the establishment clause, and award him additional damages. In their cross-appeal, the defendants assert that their conduct did not violate the establishment clause and ask that we reverse the district judge's decision to grant Mr. Warnock attorney's fees.
The first amendment states that the government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const. amend. I. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the district court correctly concluded that this prohibition reaches prayers conducted by school officials at mandatory teacher meetings and mandatory in-service training that included prayers at a sectarian college. This is a question of law that we review de novo.
Although the cases are quite clear that government-mandated prayer for students in public schools is impermissible, see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), as is student-led and student-initiated prayer at public school functions, see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 295-98, 305-10, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000), our task is complicated by the fact that the Court has not established a blanket rule against prayers at all government-sponsored functions. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). Furthermore, although the Court announced three "tests" for establishment clause violations in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), it has often found it unnecessary to rely on Lemon in deciding later cases, see, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330; Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982), and has made it plain that it will not be confined to applying the Lemon principles in all cases "in this sensitive area." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984).
The Supreme Court has frequently dealt with the issue of prayers in school. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962); Lee, 505 U.S. at 580, 112 S.Ct. 2649. In those cases, however, the Court has focused much of its attention on the possibility of coercing the participation of students in state-sponsored religion. E.g., id. at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649. In the context of compulsory education laws, such a concern with coercion is natural, but in this case the relationship between Mr. Warnock and the school district is contractual, and he is clearly a strong-willed adult who is unlikely to be indoctrinated by the religious activity of his employer. Mr. Warnock lays special emphasis on his feelings of exclusion and the offensiveness to him of the prayers. But while such subjective responses may be relevant on the question of damages, we do not believe that strictly speaking they go to the merits of the establishment clause issue. The government can permissibly engage in any number of activities that its citizens find deeply offensive without violating the Constitution.
We agree with the district court that the practices at issue in this case are unconstitutional, but we think that they are constitutionally infirm not because they offended Mr. Warnock but because they endorsed religion. The government, of course, may speak on a large number of different issues. The Constitution, however, forbids it from conveying the message that it decisively endorses a particular religious position. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682, 104 S.Ct. 1355. We believe that prayers at mandatory teacher meetings and in- service training convey such a decisive endorsement.
The defendants rely on our decision in Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 658-59 (8th Cir.1995), (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1042, 134 L.Ed.2d 189 (1996), where we held that a county could not order an employee to desist from "any activities that could be considered religious proselytizing, witnessing or counseling" without running afoul of the free exercise clause. They argue that the prayers at issue here are analogous to the protected activity in Brown. But this case is distinguishable on three grounds. First, Brown involved a free exercise challenge to a government prohibition of religious activity rather than an establishment clause challenge to ongoing religious activity by the government itself. Second, virtually all of the activity at issue in Brown was clearly private speech: It involved personal statements by Mr. Brown about his own beliefs and personal religious effects in his office. Third, the prayers offered at government meetings in Brown were informal, sporadic, and spontaneous. Id. at 652-53. An objective observer of such behavior could not conclude that the government was endorsing Mr. Brown's faith.
In contrast, some of the prayers at issue here were offered in mandatory teachers' meetings by the official conducting the meetings, circumstances that would lead an objective observer to conclude that the government was explicitly endorsing the religious content of the prayers offered. The same is true of the requirement that Mr. Warnock attend in-service training at a religious college where prayers were offered as part of the training. This endorsement, rather than any offensive or coercive impact that the prayers had on Mr. Warnock, is what we believe makes them unconstitutional.
The resolution of Mr. Warnock's challenge to the scope of...
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