Warnock v. Fogle
Citation | 186 N.E. 889,97 Ind.App. 357 |
Decision Date | 19 September 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 14857.,14857. |
Parties | WARNOCK v. FOGLE. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Jay Circuit Court; Frank Gillespie, Judge.
Action by James L. Fogle against William Henan Warnock and others. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant named appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Jacob F. Denney, of Fort Recovery, Ohio, for appellant.
James J. Moran and James R. Fleming, both of Portland, for appellee
This was an action by the appellee, for himself and all others similarly situated, against the appellant and seventeen other stockholders of the Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Geneva, Ind., which was in the hands of a receiver, to recover what is commonly known as the double liability of stockholders in a banking institution under the Constitution of the state of Indiana, on the ground that the assets were insufficient to discharge the indebtedness thereof. The appellee alleged that he and the others for whom he brought the action were unpaid creditors.
The complaint was in one paragraph. To this complaint the appellant, together with the seventeen other defendants, filed a separate and several partial answer in two paragraphs. The first paragraph of answer admitted all of the allegations of the complaint, but by way of confession and avoidance allegedin substance that, at the time said bank was closed and before any receiver was appointed, the banking commissioner of Indiana, in conjunction with the officers and directors of said defunct institution, levied an assessment on the stockholders of said bank of 60 per cent. of the par value of the capital stock of each of said stockholders for the purpose of restoring the capital stock of said bank which had been partially dissipated, and to pay the debts and liabilities of said institution, and each of the said stockholders, including appellant, paid to the cashier of said defunct bank 60 per cent. of the par value of their said stock.
That said money so paid to said cashier was by him applied to the discharge of debts and obligations owed by said bank. That appellant admits owing the 40 per cent. of said capital stock and offers to confess judgment therefor, together with costs and accruing costs.
The second paragraph of answer set up the same facts as the first, except that it alleges that, instead of applying said money so paid in to the payment of said obligations of said bank, it charges that, in violation of said trust, the officers of said bank diverted the same and converted it to the purpose of running and still further operating said bank.
To these answers, the appellee replied in general denial.
The cause was submitted for trial to a jury, who returned a verdict against the appellant in the sum of $714.30. Judgment was entered upon the verdict. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and an exception taken and this appeal prayed and perfected. The only error assigned and relied upon is the ruling of the court on said motion.
The causes stated in the motion for a new trial are: That the verdict of the jury is contrary to law; that it is not sustained by sufficient evidence; that there is error in the amount of recovery, in that it is too large; that the court erred in giving to the jury of its own motion instruction No. 1, and in refusing to give instruction No. 1 requested by the defendant. The appellant in his brief says that each of the causes in the motion for a new trial raises the same question, and he treats them as one. They will be so considered by the court. The instruction given by the trial court and referred to in the motion for a new trial as instruction No. 1 given by the court on its own motion was a peremptory instruction to the jury to return a verdict in favor of the appellee. The appellant's instruction which was refused was based upon his theory that he was entitled to a credit of 60 per cent. of his liability in accordance with the facts set up in his said answer above abstracted.
The following facts were stipulated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial