Warram v. Stanton
| Decision Date | 27 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-580A138,1-580A138 |
| Citation | 415 N.E.2d 114 |
| Parties | Edith WARRAM, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne A. STANTON, individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the Indiana Department of Public Welfare; Elizabeth Samkowski, individually and in her capacity as Director of the Marion County Department of Public Welfare; The Indiana Department of Public Welfare; and The Marion County Department of Public Welfare, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Peter L. Cassady, and William E. Marple, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Gary R. Brock, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.
Edith Warram appeals the judgment entered against her in her class action in which she challenged the validity of certain Indiana regulations relative to the determination of eligibility for Medicaid benefits and sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
On August 13, 1975, Warram, 56, applied for Medicaid benefits as a disabled person with the Marion County Department of Public Welfare. Her application was denied for the reason that it was determined she had transferred property in order to defeat the State's right to make recovery, in violation of a provision of the transfer of property regulations. See 470 IAC § 9-2-2(40) (1979). Warram received an administrative hearing to review the County Department's action and therein the hearing officer upheld the determination of her ineligibility. She appealed to the State Department of Public Welfare, which reached a final decision adverse to her on April 21, 1976. Notice of the decision was imparted to Warram by letter dated May 10, 1976.
On April 1, 1977, Warram filed a class action complaint in four counts in the Marion Superior Court. The first count sought judicial review of the final agency determination denying Warram's Medicaid application. The remaining counts challenged the validity of the regulations under which Warram was declared to be ineligible for Medicaid benefits, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The cause was venued to the Hancock Circuit Court.
The trial court dismissed the first count because it was not timely filed in accordance with the procedures for judicial review of final agency decisions mandated by Ind.Code 4-22-1-14 of the Administrative Adjudication Act (AAA), Ind.Code 4-22-1-1 through 4-22-1-30. Following a trial to the court, judgment was entered against Warram and the class on the remaining counts.
On appeal, Warram raises three issues for consideration. Two issues question the validity of certain regulations as being unauthorized by Indiana statute, contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to that Constitution. Her third issue alleges trial court error in defining the class of persons Warram purportedly represents.
Because we determine the trial court should have dismissed the entire complaint, we do not address the merits of Warram's contentions, but confine our discussion to the issue underlying our determination, to-wit:
Whether a party who has lost her right to secure judicial review of a final agency decision adverse to her may maintain an independent class action challenging the validity of the regulations determinative of her administrative action, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
In its appellee brief, and below in its motion to dismiss, the State argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of this cause due to the failure of Warram to timely petition for judicial review. The State contends that the 15-day time limitation is jurisdictional, and Warram's failure to petition within that period not only divested the court of jurisdiction to review Warram's administrative decision but the collateral issues as well.
The trial court properly dismissed Count I of Warram's complaint, in which she sought judicial review of the administrative decision, as not being timely filed under Ind.Code 4-22-1-14. That section prescribes the procedure for securing judicial review of a final agency determination, and requires that a person or party aggrieved thereby file a verified petition for judicial review within 15 days after receiving notice of the decision. The section states in part that, "Unless a proceeding for review is commenced by so filing such petition within fifteen (15) days any and all rights of judicial review and all rights of recourse to the courts shall terminate."
Although Warram states in her appellant brief that she does not appeal the dismissal of her first count, she argues in her reply brief, responding to the jurisdictional question raised by the State, that the review procedure of the AAA is not applicable to the decision of the Department of Public Welfare finding her ineligible for Medicaid benefits. She bases this argument on the fact that a "determination of eligibility and need for public assistance under the welfare laws" is excluded from the AAA's definition of "administrative adjudication." Ind.Code 4-22-1-2.
This contention was rejected in Zehner v. Indiana State Alcoholic Beverage Commission, (1977) Ind.App., 364 N.E.2d 1037. In that case, the Second District of this court considered whether the 15-day limitation of the AAA is applicable to a procedure initiated for judicial review of an Alcoholic Beverage Commission (ABC) final decision granting a package liquor store permit. As in the case at bar, the underlying agency activity culminating in the final decision sought to be reviewed was excluded from the AAA's definition of "administrative adjudication." 1 The appellant had petitioned for a judicial review of the agency action 28 days after receiving notice of the adverse decision, and the trial court dismissed the petition. The court affirmed the dismissal. Whereas the proceeding sought to be reviewed was not an "administrative adjudication" under the AAA, the ABC was not specifically excluded from the "agency" definition of the AAA. Ind.Code 4-22-1-2. Since Ind.Code 4-22-1-14 controls the procedure for initiating judicial review of "an order or determination made by any such agency," the 15-day limitation was found to apply.
The AAA is bifurcated. The first part of the Act (Ind.Code 4-22-1-3 through 4-22-1-13) covers administrative procedures before an agency. The second part (Ind.Code 4-22-1-14 through 4-22-1-19) delineates the procedure for judicial review of administrative orders, decisions, or determinations not clearly and unambiguously excepted therefrom. See also, State ex rel. Calument National Bank of Hammond v. McCord, (1963) 243 Ind. 626, 189 N.E.2d 583; Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Anderson, (1976) Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d 267. We therefore hold that the procedure for securing judicial review of an administrative determination of eligibility and need for public assistance under the welfare laws must be in accordance with the review procedures of the AAA.
Compliance with statutory requirements in an action for judicial review of an administrative determination is a condition precedent to the exercise of review jurisdiction by a trial court. Failure to comply with the statutory mandate is jurisdictional. Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 1176. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to review the administrative decision adverse to Warram.
Warram contends for the first time in her reply brief the record does not reflect the notice given her of the final agency...
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