Warren, Application of

• Citation: 178 A.2d 528,149 Conn. 266
• Parties: Application of Harry R. WARREN for Admission to the Bar. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 20 February 1962
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 528

178 A.2d 528

149 Conn. 266

Application of Harry R. WARREN for Admission to the Bar.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 20, 1962.

Charles Henchel, New Haven, for the appellant.

Abraham S. Ullman, New Haven, for the appellee (standing committee for New Haven County on recommendations for admission to the bar).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA AND ALCORN, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

On December 12, 1957, Harry R. Warren filed an application with the clerk of the Superior Court in New Haven County for admission to the bar on motion and without examination. It was accompanied by his sworn statement on the form furnished him and by supporting affidavits. Practice Book, § 8. ¹ The application was referred to the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar, under the rule. The committee was composed of five members, one of whom did not participate in its deliberations and report because of a disqualification due to a possible personal interest. The committee requested and received, pursuant to its practice, a report on the applicant from The National Conference of Bar Examiners and conducted two interviews with the applicant.

On January 8, 1960, the committee's report was submitted to a duly called meeting of the members of the bar of New Haven County. The committee reported that it could not find that the applicant had met all of the requirements of § 8 of the rules of the Superior Court and recommended that the applicant not be admitted. Members of the bar at the meeting requested that the chairman of the committee state the reasons for its recommendation, but he said that its information was of a confidential nature which it could not furnish without an order of court. The meeting was adjourned to January 22, 1960, without any action being taken upon the recommendation or the application but with the instruction that the committee obtain a ruling from the judges as to whether it should disclose the reasons for its recommendation. Thereafter, the committee conferred with the presiding judge of the Superior Court sitting at New Haven. He declined to act on the ground that he did not have authority to intervene at that point in the proceedings. On January 22, a duly warned meeting of the bar was held, the chairman of the committee reported that he was unable to procure an order of the judges authorizing him to disclose the committee's reasons for its recommendation, and, after discussion, a motion that the meeting accept the committee's recommendation was declared lost and the meeting was adjourned. The committee then filed its report with the clerk of court, together with a transcript of the proceedings at the meetings of the bar on January 8 and 22, 1960. See Practice Book, § 8.

On February 19, 1960, the applicant, by his counsel, claimed his application for a hearing at short calendar. See Practice Book, § 8. At a hearing on March 11, 1960, the court ordered the committee to present information as to its proceedings and its reasons for its recommendation and continued the hearing until March 25, 1960. Thereafter, the committee filed with the court a statement setting forth the reasons for its recommendation. This statement recited instances of alleged inconsistencies and misrepresentations contained in the documents submitted by the applicant. It expressed the committee's belief, on the basis of information secured by it from others, that, despite the applicant's explanation, there was a deliberate attempt to mislead and that in his personal interviews he was 'evasive and lacking in candor and frankness.' For these reasons, the committee reported that it was not satisfied that he was of good moral character as required by the rule. In a concluding paragraph, the committee stated that 'upon the application being referred to it, in accordance with its practice, it requested a character report from The National Conference of Bar Examiners, which is issued only on the understanding that it will be regarded as a confidential document. The contents of such report were studied by the Committee. The Committee also interviewed the applicant personally on two occasions. Consideration was also given by the Committee to the verified application of the applicant and to a letter and other documents he submitted under date of June 15, 1959.'

Notice of the hearing on March 25, 1960, was duly given to all the members of the bar in New Haven County. See Practice Book, § 8. No further meeting of the bar was held to consider the statement furnished by the committee under order of the court, but it was available to all in the clerk's office. At the hearing on March 25, 1960, the applicant claimed that the statement should be referred to a meeting of the bar, but the court denied this claim. At the hearing, the applicant made what he describes as an offer of proof concerning the committee's statement. This, in substance, was designed to explain in written form, with supporting documents, the alleged inconsistencies and misrepresentations recited in the committee's statement. The chairman of the committee personally advised the court at the hearing that a report on Warren's application had been requested from The National Conference of Bar Examiners, that the report was received, examined and discussed by the members of the committee and that the committee's report was based on this report and its contents and two interviews with the applicant as well as on papers submitted by him. The court excluded the applicant's offer of proof. It concluded that 'the report of the Committee was based on its examination of the application submitted by the applicant, evidence and documents offered by him, the confidential report from The National Conference of Bar Examiners and two interviews with said applicant'; that the committee gave full, complete and thorough consideration to the application and all the material available to it; that it acted fairly, reasonably and without prejudice after a fair investigation of the facts; and that its conclusion that the applicant failed to satisfy it that he was of good moral character could not be disturbed. The court denied the application, and the applicant has appealed.

'Fixing the qualifications for, as well as admitting persons to, the practice of law in this state has ever been an exercise of judicial power.' Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185, 169 A.2d 652, 656, and cases cited. This power has been exercised with the assistance of committees of the bar appointed and acting under rules of court. Practice Book, §§ 2, 7; Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 186, 169 A.2d 652; State ex rel. Bazil v. Boardman, 127 Conn. 475, 477, 18 A.2d 370; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415, 165 A. 211, 87 A.L.R. 991. Although these committees have a broad power of discretion, they act under the court's supervision. In re Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 244, 43 A.2d 224; see Grievance Committee of Hartford County Bar v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 265, 152 A. 292. It is the court, and not the bar, or a committee, which takes the final and decisive action. Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. 183, 169 A.2d 652, and cases cited therein.

In this case, the committee's report recommended that the application be denied. At the hearing on March 25, 1960, the court had before it the application for admission, with supporting documents, as well as the report of the committee and the statement filed by it pursuant to the court's order of March 11, 1960. The applicant's offer of proof, made at the hearing on March 25, was excluded by the court on the ground that it 'would not go behind the report if the Committee had acted fairly, reasonably and without prejudice.' In O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 55, 63 A. 777, 780, we held that the court had 'rightly declined to hear evidence as to questions the decision of which was entrusted to the state bar examining committee' and that it was 'proper for [the court] to inquire whether the approval of the bar was withheld after a fair investigation of the facts.' We have since adhered to that rule generally, stating that the issue before the court is whether the committee or the bar, in withholding its approval for admission, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts. Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Ass'n, 111 Conn. 47, 51, 149 A. 415; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 116 Conn. 417, 165 A. 211; Blaney v. Standing Committee, etc., 129 Conn. 51, 56 A.2d 354. This principle applies to cases such as the present, where the issue involves an exercise of the committee's discretion. It does not apply in cases involving specific requirements of the rules as to such things as age, residence, or graduation from an approved school--requirements over which the committee has no discretion. In re Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 244, 43 A.2d 224; In re Application of Plantamura, 149 Conn. 111, 114, 176 A.2d 61. Where, as in this case, the decision called in question is within the discretion of the committee, the court reviews the committee's decision on...