Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 10066.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1941
• Docket Number: No. 10066.,10066.
• Citation: 124 F.2d 42
• Parties: WARREN-BRADSHAW DRILLING CO. v. HALL et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

124 F.2d 42 (1941)

WARREN-BRADSHAW DRILLING CO. v.HALL et al.

No. 10066.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 9, 1941.

W. M. Sutton, of Amarillo, Tex., and Frank Settle, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.

Davis Scarborough, of Abilene, Tex., for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON and HOLMES, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Another of the growing number of cases brought in this circuit, by employees under Section 16(b),¹ of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, this suit was to recover for overtime pay.The claim in general was that plaintiffs were engaged in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(j),² of the Act, and that they had worked overtime hours for which they had not been paid.The claim in particular was that defendant was a drilling contractor engaged in the business of drilling oil wells not for itself, but for others with rotary drilling machinery and equipment; that plaintiffs were members of its drilling crews; and that the oil produced and to be produced from said wells, was intended for and did go into commerce as defined in Section 3(b)³ of the Act.There were three defenses.One was that defendant and plaintiffs were not engaged in mining or the production, of goods for commerce, because, defendant was a contract driller, having no interest in the oil or its production, and further, the work it and they did with the rotary drilling rig ceased short of the oil producing horizon, the wells were thereafter drilled in to the horizon and the oil produced with other machinery and equipment.A second defense was that the oil produced did not go into "commerce".Its third defense was: That plaintiffs worked on each well in question as a new job and new employment without any express agreement as to their hourly rate of pay but with the expectation of working eight hours each day, seven days per week, until the rotary drilling on the well should be completed; that there was an implied agreement between the parties that the pay they should receive for the work during the period of the job, should include pay for overtime in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act; that the payment received and accepted by plaintiffs was based on such implied agreement; and that the amount being more than sufficient to cover the minimum of straight and overtime wage requirements of the act, defendant is not liable to them.

Plaintiffs' testimony established: That they operated rotary drilling tools; that the last thing they did on each well was to set the pipe in the well and then pull the tools; that when they got down to a certain point before they reached the oil producing sand, the casing was set in cement; that they then took out the rotary tools and a new crew came on and drilled the well in.The defendant offered no evidence.The District Judge thus summarized the facts: "The defendant was not the owner of any of the leases worked upon.It was simply under contract for such owners to drill the wells.It had nothing whatever to do with the wells, or holes in the ground, other than above indicated.When it finished such work, it would move to another location and commence another well, and so on, * * *"40 F.Supp. 272."As a practical matter, in the drilling of these oil wells, the defendant used rotary rigs for drilling the wells down to, or near to, the pay sand.At that juncture, the rotary crews would cement the casing at or near the expected pay sand, and then would withdraw all the rotary machinery and another crew would move in and complete the well, bring it in, or demonstrate it was a dry hole, with cable tools.In other words, plaintiffs here did not do the whole job, but it was finished by the cable tools crew.That is true with respect to every well on which the plaintiffs worked that is involved in this suit. * * *."40 F.Supp. 272.

Concluding: That the oil produced and to be produced from the wells plaintiffs worked on, was intended to and did move in "commerce"; that plaintiffs were engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and that they had worked overtime without being paid one and a half times their regular rate for doing so; he gave plaintiffs judgment.

Appellants here contesting these conclusions, present these points: (1) That workmen engaged in operating a rotary drilling rig as employees of a drilling contractor engaged in drilling wells for others under contract where neither the employer nor employee produced any oil or had any interest in oil that might be thereafter produced are not engaged in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938;(2) that plaintiffs did not prove that the oil that might be and that was produced from the wells in question was intended to move and did move in interstate commerce; and (3) that upon the evidence that plaintiffs merely joined themselves to a rotary drilling crew on each...