Warren Glass-Works Co. v. Keystone Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1886 |
| Parties | WARREN GLASS-WORKS CO. v. KEYSTONE COAL CO. OF SOMERSET, PA. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Washington county.
Action to recover damages for breach of warranty on a written contract to sell and deliver coal of a kind named therein. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Ferd. Williams and H. H. Keedy, for appellant.
A Hunter Boyd and H. Kyd Douglass, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Washington county. The appellant, as plaintiff below, alleged in its declaration that, being engaged in the manufacture of glass the defendant sold and delivered to it 1,800 tons Keystone coal, knowing that said coal was to be used in its manufacture aforesaid. It is also averred in the declaration that, at the time of the sale and delivery, the defendant warranted the coal to be good and merchantable and reasonably fit for the purpose to which it was to be applied, but that a large quantity of said coal was unfit for such purpose; that its unfitness was known to the defendant; and that the quality of the glass manufactured was greatly deteriorated by the inferior quality of the coal thus furnished. The alleged breach of warranty therefore forms the foundation for the action.
When goods inferior to the quality specified in the warranty have been offered for delivery, the vendee may refuse to accept them; or, having accepted them, he may withhold payment, and compel the vendor to bring his action, and thus have an opportunity to avail himself of his remedy by way of recoupment; or he may seek redress by the institution of a suit for the recovery of damages resulting from the breach of warranty. The plaintiff in this action claims damages for an alleged breach of warranty, and it is manifest that he cannot recover unless this averment in his declaration is supported by competent proof. The allegata must be verified by the probata. In actions at law, as well as in suits in equity, the same inflexible rule is applicable; and the material facts forming the foundation for the remedy invoked, must not be averred, but must be made apparent by the adduction of satisfactory proof. In the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, this is a maxim too well established to be disregarded. Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 189. The circuit court determined that there had been a failure to comply with this fundamental rule, or, in other words, that the evidence in the cause did not support the averment in the declaration, and this is the material question presented by the pending appeal.
The contract between the parties is in writing, and consists of a letter addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff's agent, and the reply of the latter to this communication. The first letter is in these words:
The agent of the plaintiff, in response to this letter, wrote as follows:
"In reply to your favor of the fourteenth inst. would say that you can enter our order for 1,800 tons of coal, or as much more as we may require for use at our works here, for delivery during the year 1885, at the following prices, on cars at Keystone Junction, provided, however, that the freight rate from that point to this is not raised during the year: Fine coal at 45 cts. per ton of 2,240 lbs.; and run of mine at 60 cts. per ton of 2,240 lbs. when it is impossible for you to supply fine coal."
These two letters are the only evidence of the formation of a contract between the parties to the action. At the trial of the cause in the court below the plaintiff endeavored to supplement this evidence by an offer to introduce testimony tending to prove that, on the day before the purchase of the coal mentioned in the contract, the agent of the defendant, from whom it was bought, was informed by plaintiff that bad coal would ruin the glass, and that in the manufacture of this article good coal was necessary. The court excluded this testimony, and its ruling forms the basis for the plaintiff's first bill of exceptions. There is no perceptible error in this ruling. The exclusion of this testimony rests on well-established principles. When parties have reduced their agreement to writing, anything in relation to the subject-matter which was said anterior to the formation of the written contract cannot be proved for the purpose of varying its meaning, or adding to the obligations imposed by the terms selected and adopted by the contracting parties. If the rule were otherwise, the most solemn instruments of writing would be liable to alteration by oral proof; for some conversation in regard to the subject-matter must necessarily preclude the execution of every agreement. As was said in Pickering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 784:
What has been said in relation to the plaintiff's first bill of exceptions is equally applicable to the second. The plaintiff sought to prove that a conversation between the agents of the parties led to the formation of the contract; that this conversation was on the day before the first of the letters forming the contract was written, and related to the quality of the coal, and the promise of the defendant to furnish Keystone coal suitable for the purpose specified. As this conversation preceded the formation of the written contract, it was simply an attempt...
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