Warren-Hunt v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 81027-COA,81027-COA |
| Citation | 497 P.3d 636 (Table) |
| Parties | Ryan Anthony WARREN-HUNT, a/k/a Ryan Anthony Warrenhunt, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Court of Appeals |
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Five people participated in the robbery of a Las Vegas Verizon store.1 Three masked men, at least one armed, entered the store yelling expletives and demanding phones while two robbers remained outside waiting in a nearby Ford vehicle with a paper DriveTime placard for a license plate. Inside the store, two robbers took the manager into the back room and forced him to put dozens of inventory phones into a bin while the third robber demanded and collected customers’ property at gunpoint. Unknown to the robbers, the manager also placed a tracking device in the bin with the phones.
After the robbers exited the store while still wearing masks and entered the getaway vehicle, a vehicle later identified as Warren-Hunt's, officers monitored the vehicle's movements through the tracking device until it stopped at a specific apartment building. Just three minutes later, police officers arrived on scene and conducted aerial visual surveillance. Those officers then observed someone, later identified as Warren-Hunt, move a vehicle in the apartment parking lot to a covered spot that obscured visual surveillance and then enter apartment 1109. When the officers sent a detective to obtain a visual observation on the car, the detective confirmed it matched the description of the getaway vehicle.
Officers then observed two individuals exit apartment 1109, one of whom, Warren-Hunt, approached the getaway vehicle and removed the DriveTime placard before entering the vehicle. After minutes of waiting in the vehicle, Warren-Hunt attempted to exit the parking lot, observed the police blockade at the exit, and then continued driving within the parking lot until the police stopped him and took him into custody. During a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, officers discovered the DriveTime placard, a phone taken during the robbery, $1,000 in $100 bills (the amount and denomination taken from a customer during the robbery). Warren-Hunt's driver's license, and his California license plate.
In total, officers observed five people exit apartment 1109. Besides Warren-Hunt, one individual was arrested after discreetly exiting the apartment and entering his own nearby apartment. Officers found a purse stolen during the robbery in his apartment. Another suspect jumped out the apartment's back window and escaped officers. And the remaining two individuals only exited the apartment after a six-hour standoff with police.
During a subsequent search of apartment 1109, officers discovered incriminating evidence from the robbery. For example, they found 29 of the phones hidden in a bedsheet, a hoodie matching one that a robber wore, a knife matching one a robber wore, a handgun, and two pairs of shoes matching those the robbers wore that had either been hidden or shredded into pieces. Officers additionally found a backpack that contained 14 of the stolen phones in the main compartment and Warren-Hunt's debit card, medical insurance card, and California vehicle registration documents in the smaller compartment.
A grand jury subsequently indicted Warren-Hunt on, and a trial jury convicted him of, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, one count of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, and seven counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. The district court subsequently sentenced Warren-Hunt to an aggregate sentence of 16-75 years. Now on appeal, Warren-Hunt makes numerous arguments. We address each in turn.2
Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence
Warren-Hunt argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted (1) Gianna Dellegrazie's testimony regarding the contents of her purse and the effect the robbery had on her daughter, (2) evidence that his personal effects were found within the same backpack as stolen phones, and (3) Detective Jeffrey Clark's testimony that Warren-Hunt alleges reaches the ultimate conclusion of his guilt.
On appeal, we review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse if ‘‘manifestly wrong." Archanian v. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1029, 145 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2006). At trial, only relevant evidence is admissible. NRS 48.025. Evidence is relevant when it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination ... more or less probable." NRS 48.015. Even relevant evidence may be excluded though if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." NRS 48.035(1). Such prejudice generally appeals to the "emotional and sympathetic tendencies of a jury, rather than the jury's intellectual ability to evaluate evidence." State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 933, 267 P.3d 777, 781 (2011) (quoting Krause Inc. v. Little, 117 Nev. 929, 935, 34 P.3d 566, 570 (2001) ). Probative value, on the other hand, "turns on ‘the actual need for the evidence in light of the issues at trial and the other evidence available to the State." ’ Harris v. State, 134 Nev. 877, 881, 432 P.3d 207, 211 (2018) (quoting State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 894-95 (Tenn. 2014) ).
Even when a district court improperly admits evidence, we will disregard harmless errors. NRS 178.598. For nonconstitutional errors such as improperly admitting evidence, the State bears the burden of proving that the error "did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." See Randolph v. State, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 477 P.3d 342, 351 (2020) (quoting Hubbard v. State, 134 Nev. 450, 459, 422 P.3d 1260, 1267 (2018) ).
Dellegrazie's testimony regarding the effect the robbery had on her daughter
At trial, the prosecution called Gianna Dellegrazie, one of the victims from the Verizon robbery, to testify. During her testimony, Dellegrazie testified that her seven-year-old daughter, who was also present during the robbery, "does not like Las Vegas now," that she will not go into a Verizon store anymore, and that she is having trouble at home because of the robbery. Warren-Hunt objected, claiming the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. The district court, however, found the testimony relevant to proving the force or fear element in robbery and in explaining why the daughter was not testifying.
Here, the district court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony. Although perhaps relevant, the evidence had minimal probative value. The State did not need that testimony to satisfy the force or fear element because plenty of existing evidence established masked men, at least one with a gun and another with a knife, yelled threats while demanding phones and other property. Nor did the State need to establish the force or fear element regarding the daughter because the State dropped the charge naming the daughter as a victim in the amended indictment. The jury thus had no reason to know why the daughter was not testifying, and any value that provided to the case would have been minimal.
Yet the risk of unfair prejudice from this testimony was significant. Indeed, the district court allowed Dellegrazie to testify unnecessarily about the significant impact the robbery had on her seven-year-old daughter, which deliberately appealed to jurors’ emotions. And when, as here, it has minimal probative value, the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. Consequently, the district court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony.
Although the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, the State has met its burden in proving the error harmless. The State did not need Dellegrazie's objectionable testimony to prove its case, nor did it rely on the improper testimony. Indeed, as we explain in detail in the sufficiency of the evidence section below, the jury had sufficient evidence to convict without that testimony. In light of such evidence, the State has shown that the improperly admitted testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the trial outcome.
Dellegrazie's testimony regarding the contents of her purse
The State then asked her when the child passed, how old he was when he passed, and whether the items were sentimental and replaceable. Dellegrazie responded that her son passed when he was four and that the items were both sentimental and irreplaceable. Warren-Hunt objected to this testimony, claiming it was irrelevant and prejudicial, and moved for a mistrial. The district court overruled the objection and denied the motion for mistrial because it found the testimony relevant to establishing Dellegrazie's ownership of the purse and did not find the testimony unfairly prejudicial.
Here, the district court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony. Although perhaps relevant, the testimony also had minimal-to-nonexistent probative value. To prove robbery, the State did not need to prove the robbers stole the specific contents of Dellegrazie's purse when it had already established that the purse itself had been stolen. Indeed, Dellegrazie could have simply testified that the robbers took her purse containing personal effects.
Yet the risk of...
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