Warren v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 23 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 4:00CV1057(MLM).,4:00CV1057(MLM).
• Citation: 200 F.Supp.2d 1053
• Parties: Wilma WARREN, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

Page 1053

200 F.Supp.2d 1053

Wilma WARREN, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Defendant.

No. 4:00CV1057(MLM).

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

August 23, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cathy Steele, Cathy Steele Law Office, P.C., Clayton, MO, for plaintiff.

Kenneth C. Brostron, James C. Hetlage, Lawrence J. Wadsack, Lashly and Baer, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MEDLER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Wilma Warren ("Plaintiff") filed a petition in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis ("Defendant") that included five counts: Count I— Unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Count II—Violation of Plaintiff's right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Count III—violation of rights under color of law per 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count IV—Invasion of Privacy; and Count V— Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The action was removed to the United States District Court. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff's complaint, which the Court granted. [18] Thus, only Counts I, II and III now remain. Defendant now moves for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's remaining three counts. [24] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [11]

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the Court shows that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258, 263 (8th Cir.1997). The initial burden is placed on the moving party to clearly establish the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in his favor. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir.1997); City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988).

Once this burden is discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Handeen, 112 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Once the burden shifts, a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment cannot simply rest on allegations and denials in his pleading to get to the jury without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Indeed, the non-moving party must establish to the court that there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would enable a jury to return a verdict for him. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial about an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If there is no genuine issue about any material fact, summary judgment is proper because it avoids needless and costly litigation and promotes judicial efficiency. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.1979). The summary judgment procedure is not a "disfavored procedural short-cut." Rather, it is an "integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988).

II. FACTS

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of any inferences that can logically be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Electric, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1983). Moreover, the court is required to resolve all conflicts in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the following facts are relevant for resolving the instant motion for summary judgment.

1. St. Louis Board of Education Regulation R4844 provides, in pertinent part:

It is the responsibility of the Board of Education to maintain a drug-free working environment and to provide ongoing educational activities, information regarding possible penalties, and available counseling and rehabilitation services to accomplish that goal.

1. Reasonable Suspicion

When a supervisor has a reasonable suspicion, based on objective criteria* that an employee is under the influence of alcohol or drugs while on the job, he/she shall immediately report this by telephone to the Human Resource Officer or his/her designee. A written report must be submitted by the supervisor within 48 hours.

* Objective criteria is defined as suspicion on personal observation by the supervisor of an employee's appearance, behavior, speech or breath odor. Information based on third party observation may not be considered valid as a basis for testing.

2. Testing

Upon receiving a report as described in Section 1, above, the Human Resource Officer or his/her designee shall direct an employee to go immediately to a medical facility to provide urine and/or blood specimens for testing; and to receive a medical examination by a licensed physician to determine his/her fitness to work.

Employees who are subject to the requirement for testing shall be suspended until the required testing results are received. If the results are negative and the employee is declared medically fit to work, he/she shall be reinstated with back pay for the period of suspension. An employee who refuses to undergo testing and examination, shall be subject to disciplinary action including discharge. An employee whose test results are positive shall be subject to disciplinary action, including discharge.

2. Plaintiff has been a teacher in the St. Louis Public Schools since 1988.

3. On May 4, 1999, Plaintiff was serving as a teacher at Ford Elementary Community Education Center.

4. On May 4, 1999, Plaintiff, Mr. Scott, an art teacher, Geneva Jackson, Instructional Coordinator, and Denise Segers, Principal at Ford School, met in Ms. Segers' office to discuss an incident between Mr. Scott and some of the students in Plaintiff's classroom.

5. On May 4, 1999, during this meeting, Plaintiff's principal, Denise Segers, observed Plaintiff eyes to be red and glassy. Plaintiff acknowledges that her eyes were red that day because they have been red all of her life. Ms. Segers had numerous opportunities to observe Plaintiff's red eyes prior to May 4, 1999, because Plaintiff taught at Ford School while Ms. Segers was principal for five years and during that time their relationship was friendly.

6. During this May 4, 1999, meeting, Ms. Segers described Plaintiff's behavior as erratic and aggressive. She found Plaintiff to be "out of control" and "scary." Ms. Segers was also afraid that Plaintiff would become violent. However, Ms. Segers acknowledges that Plaintiff remained seated during the entire meeting, and that she cannot recall what Plaintiff said or did that caused Ms. Segers to fear that Plaintiff would become violent. Plaintiff states she was not upset or irate during the meeting and that she did not raise her voice.

7. On May 4, 1999, Ms. Geneva Jackson, the Instructional Coordinator of Ford School, who was also present at the meeting, described Plaintiff's behavior as aggressive, erratic and argumentative. Ms. Jackson did not describe Plaintiff as violent.

8. In addition to her personal observations of Plaintiff occurring on May 4, 1999, Ms. Segers also personally observed Plaintiff engage in a pattern of erratic and aggressive behavior prior to May 4, 1999, and display difficulty in getting along with her fellow teachers.

9. Ms. Segers' knowledge included her awareness that Plaintiff had previously threatened other people, was very aggressive and verbally abusive and disrespectful toward colleagues, students and parents.

10. Ms. Segers had observed that Plaintiff's interpersonal relations problems with other teachers had been escalating.

11. Ms. Segers had personally observed Plaintiff display mood swings, which were increasing in frequency. She also had...