Warren v. Caro Community Hosp.
| Decision Date | 19 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 103953-103955,No. 8,8 |
| Parties | Cindy WARREN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee, and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Richard W. McHugh, Ann Arbor, and Jordan Rossen, General Counsel, and Thomas C. Carey, Associate General Counsel, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Neil A. Mac Vicar, Lansing, for defendant-appellee.
Sachs, Waldman, O'Hare, Helveston, Bogas & McIntosh, P.C. by Mary Ellen Gurewitz and Nicholas J. Waddles, Detroit, for amicus curiae Michigan State AFL-CIO.
Cindy Warren commenced her employment with Caro Community Hospital on July 15, 1988. While initially being hired as an "on-call" nurse's aide, beginning on February 1, 1990, she was treated as a full-time employee and was regularly scheduled to work at least thirty-two hours a week. After she gained full-time status, she was scheduled to work forty hours a week. Six weeks later, Ms. Warren asked the hospital to schedule her no more than thirty-two hours a week because of her pregnancy. The employer granted her request.
On August 3, 1990, Warren submitted a request for leave of absence during the final weeks of her pregnancy. She provided her employer with a physician's statement supporting her request. The hospital denied the request pursuant to its policy, contained in a collective bargaining agreement, that refused leaves of absence for employees who had not been scheduled to work full-time for one consecutive year before the request.
Pursuant to her doctor's recommendation, plaintiff called the hospital and indicated that she was no longer available to work because of her pregnancy. On August, 13, 1990, plaintiff failed to report for work. Following the birth of her child, Warren was released by her doctor to return to work on October 1, 1990. She sought to return to work at the hospital in late September 1990. The hospital did not respond to Warren's request to return to work, and she was not offered further work by the hospital.
On October 3, 1990, plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Michigan Employment Security Commission held that the claimant was The employer appealed, and in its determination dated December 20, 1990, the agency affirmed its earlier ruling. The employer again appealed, and the MESC referee held that claimant's leaving work was "involuntary." Similarly, a majority of the board of review held that claimant's separation was involuntary.
The employer then appealed to circuit court, which reversed the board of review and held that the claimant was disqualified for voluntarily leaving work without good cause pursuant to the Employment Security Act, M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(a).
Both claimant and the MESC filed appeals with the Court of Appeals, which were consolidated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Court held that because the claimant's pregnancy was deemed not attributable to her employer, claimant did not have good cause for leaving her work. In an order granting rehearing, the Court affirmed its previous decision.
Claimant filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, which was denied. Justice Levin, joined by Justice Cavanagh, dissented. 452 Mich. 852, 550 N.W.2d 539 (1996). Claimant moved for reconsideration, and leave to appeal was granted. 456 Mich. 853, 568 N.W.2d 670 (1997).
The Employment Security Act provides:
An individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she:
(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit. [M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(a).]
As we recently stated in Empire Iron Mining Partnership v. Orhanen, 455 Mich. 410, 417, 565 N.W.2d 844 (1997), citing Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc., 443 Mich. 68, 77, 503 N.W.2d 645 (1993), because "the MESA is a remedial statute, it should be liberally construed to achieve its intended goal." Indeed, the act states:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern which requires action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family, to the detriment of the welfare of the people of this state. Social security requires protection against this hazzard of our economic life. Employers should be encouraged to provide stable employment. [M.C.L. § 421.2; M.S.A. § 17.502.]
It is under this backdrop that we had occasion to decide a similar case, Clarke v. North Detroit Gen'l Hosp., 437 Mich. 280, 470 N.W.2d 393 (1991). In Clarke, two nurses who were employed by defendant hospitals were discharged after they failed nursing board licensing examinations. The Court held that plaintiffs did not leave work voluntarily when they were discharged after they failed their examinations; therefore, they were entitled to unemployment benefits. We noted that the plaintiffs did not "deliberately or negligently fail" their examination, nor would we "ascribe fault to [plaintiffs] simply because they failed the examination." Id. at 283, 289, 470 N.W.2d 393. We specifically noted that in reaching the conclusion that the employees had not voluntarily quit, no issue was presented whether they left work "without good cause attributable to the employer." Id. at 282, 470 N.W.2d 393.
In her opinion in Clarke, Justice Riley (concurring) agreed with the majority that there were no allegations of misconduct, negligence, or illegal acts, nor was there evidence that plaintiffs were negligent in preparing for or taking the examination. She stated:
I agree with these statements and would suggest that they are based more on a rule which focuses on "issues of volition" and on whether the employees "left work voluntarily" than on simply whether the employer discharged the employees.... [Plaintiffs] did not "leave work voluntarily" regardless of whether they were discharged or had to resign. [Id. at 291-292, 470 N.W.2d 393.]
We agree with this statement, and find that Justice Riley's opinion is really a reiteration of the majority opinion. This is so because the majority does not solely rely on the fact that plaintiffs were "discharged" to reach its conclusion. Rather, the opinion, as noted by Justice Riley, focuses on the fact that plaintiffs did not negligently fail the examination or "quit or willingly resign[ ]." Id. at 283, 470 N.W.2d 393. Under either the majority's reasoning or that of Justice Riley, the facts must first show that plaintiff "voluntarily" quit her job before the disqualification from compensation applies.
Therefore, like Clarke, we continue to hold that whether a person is entitled to unemployment benefits is a two-part inquiry. Under the first prong, we must determine whether plaintiff voluntarily left her position. If we find that she left her position involuntarily, the inquiry ends and she is entitled to unemployment compensation. Whether a person left voluntarily will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. However, if the court finds that plaintiff left her position voluntarily, we must advance to prong two to determine whether her leaving was "without good cause attributable to the employer."
In this case, Warren had a note from her doctor stating that she was advised not to work beyond a certain date. Defendant offered no evidence that the doctor's note was a fraud or that the medical recommendation was wholly without merit. Indeed, the advice of the doctor was entirely unchallenged. Furthermore, plaintiff did not seek unemployment benefits for the period when she was medically unable to work. Rather, she sought unemployment benefits only for the period...
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Wilson v. Meijer Great Lakes Ltd. P'ship
... ... omitted); see also Warren" v Caro Community Hosp, 457 ... Mich. 361, 366-367 (1998) ... \xC2" ... ...