Warren v. June's Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 20991
• Citation: 239 N.W.2d 380,66 Mich.App. 386
• Parties: Henry WARREN and Stella Warren, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JUNE'S MOBILE HOME VILLAGE AND SALES, INC., a Michigan Corporation, and John June, individually, Defendants-Appellees. 66 Mich.App. 386, 239 N.W.2d 380
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 380

239 N.W.2d 380

Henry WARREN and Stella Warren, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JUNE'S MOBILE HOME VILLAGE AND SALES, INC., a Michigan

Corporation, and John June, individually,

Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 20991.

66 Mich.App. 386, 239 N.W.2d 380

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 6, 1976.

Released for Publication March 23, 1976.

[66 MICHAPP 387] Bronson & Egnor by Walter K. Hamilton, Ypsilanti, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Peter Sugar, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

[66 MICHAPP 388] Before DANHOF, P.J., and McGREGOR and KAUFMAN, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Wayne County Circuit Court which, after a bench trial, granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to GCR 1963, 504.2.

Defendant June owns a mobile home village in which plaintiffs have a mobile home. This litigation was the result of a conflict between plaintiffs and defendants which began when defendants allegedly underbilled the tenants in the trailer park for electrical service and subsequently rebilled the tenants to cover the difference. Plaintiff, Stella Warren, allegedly called the Michigan Public Service Commission to register her complaint over the events in the park. This dispute was resolved favorably to the tenants. Prior to this time, the parties had an amicable relationship. According to plaintiffs, the defendant June allegedly began to berate plaintiff Stella Warrn and to announce his disdain for her. Defendant later advised the plaintiffs that he might evict them from his trailer park because of their supposed complaints.

By July of 1973 plaintiffs had found a home which they wished to purchase and accordingly advertised their mobile home for sale. A buyer, willing to pay $5,800, was found shortly thereafter. The only contingency in the sale of the mobile home was defendants' approval of the prospective purchasers as new tenants on defendants' mobile home site pursuant to defendants' right to approve new residents. This approval was withheld. Indeed, according to plaintiffs, defendant informed plaintiff Henry Warren that the mobile home would not be [66 MICHAPP 389] allowed to remain on the lot because of plaintiffs' attitude in response to the electrical charges. The plaintiffs were forced, therefore, to return the money deposit given to them by the prospective mobile home purchasers. Further, they claim that they had to abandon their mobile home because improvements to it rendered the home permanent.

Accordingly, on September 17, 1973 plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint alleging that defendants' actions were retaliatory in nature, and that plaintiffs had been financially damaged as a result of defendants' newly developed animosity for plaintiffs. A reading of plaintiffs' complaint does not disclose the legal theory or theories on which it was based. However, in response to a defense motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs alleged claims sounding in contract implied in fact or law and in infliction of emotional distress. Although it certainly was not required to do so, the trial court apparently treated this response as a clarifying amendment to the complaint. Plaintiffs never filed a motion to amend the complaint. The court then tried the case on these grounds.

Plaintiffs attack the trial court's dismissal as to all three grounds. In ruling on a motion to dismiss in a case tried without a jury, the trial court does not, as it would in a motion for directed verdict, view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Illenden v. Illenden,46 Mich.App. 710, 208 N.W.2d 565 (1973). Under GCR 1963, 504.2, rather, acting as a trier of fact, it judges credibility and weighs the evidence and decides the case on the merits. As such, its determination will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous, I.e., the evidence manifestly preponderates contrary to its decision. Buckingham Tool Corporation v. [66 MICHAPP 390] Evans, 35 Mich.App. 74, 192 N.W.2d 362 (1971). We find that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous.

As a guideline for judging claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, this Court has adopted the standards enunciated in the Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, § 46, pp. 71--72:

'(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

'(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.'

Frishett v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 3 Mich.App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (1966). ¹ The cases on which those rules are based require that liability be found only where the defendant's conduct has been 'extreme and outrageous'. The Restatement, Supra, in § 46, comment d, p. 73, notes:

'It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability [66 MICHAPP 391] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Out...