Warren v. Metro Transit
| Decision Date | 13 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20-cv-00781 SRC |
| Parties | JIMMY O. WARREN, Plaintiff(s), v. METRO TRANSIT, et al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
When Bi-State terminated bus driver Jimmy Warren's employment in 2014, Warren filed a charge of discrimination against Bi-State, and later sued in state court. In that suit, Warren did not bring any ADA claims or name Local 788. A couple years after the state court dismissed that case for failure to state a claim, Warren sued in this Court, asserting ADA claims against Bi-State and Local 788, as well as a breach of the duty of fair representation claim against Local 788. In this Order, the Court grants Local 788's motion to dismiss Warren's ADA and fair-representation claims.
Warren alleges that Bi-State Development Agency, his former employer, terminated his employment because of his disability and in retaliation for complaining about discriminatory workplace policies. Doc. 1. Following his termination on August 22, 2014, Warren filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at ¶ 48. The EEOC issued Warren a right-to-sue letter on August 30, 2017. Doc. 11-1.
Warren then filed suit against Bi-State and other defendants in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City on November 20, 2017, asserting various claims, including claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act for disability discrimination and retaliation, which the defendants removed and this Court later remanded back to the state court. Warren v. Metro Transit, et al., 4:17-cv-02936-JAR, Doc. 1-1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2017). Warren did not name Local 788 in that action. On remand, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On June 18, 2019, the state court granted the motion and dismissed all of Warren's claims. Doc. 10-3.
Warren filed the present suit on June 20, 2020, asserting that Bi-State and Local 788 violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminating against him due to his disability and for retaliating against him for complaining about discriminatory policies. Doc. 1. Warren contends that Local 788 violated the ADA by discriminating against Warren "due to his large size." Id. at ¶ 75. Specifically, Warren alleges that Local 788 did not reinstate him and did not fairly represent him in his claims against Bi-State due to his disability. Id. at ¶ 75-79. Warren further asserts that the union breached its duty of fair representation owed to him. Id. at ¶ 76-81; Doc. 11 at 15. Local 788 now moves to dismiss all claims against it.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To meet this standard and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means the factual content of the plaintiff's allegations must "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co.,911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2010). Ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss; however, materials attached to the complaint may also be considered in construing its sufficiency. Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court "must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff[.]" Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recover on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2011). Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although courts must accept all factual allegations as true, they are not bound to take as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
The ADA has adopted the enforcement "procedures set forth in . . . [42 U.S.C. §] 2000e-5." 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Section 2000e-5(e)(1) provides that a charge of discrimination "shall be filed by . . . the person aggrieved within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" with the EEOC. "The purpose of filing a charge with the EEOC is to provide the Commission an opportunity to investigate and attempt a resolution of the controversythrough conciliation before permitting the aggrieved party to pursue a lawsuit." Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Thus, "as a general rule, a complainant must file a charge against a party with the EEOC before she can sue that party under [the ADA]." Sedlacek v. Hach, 752 F.2d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Voss v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Magnolia, Arkansas, 917 F.3d 618, 623 (8th Cir. 2019) .
Local 788 argues that Warren failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not file a charge with the EEOC against it. Doc. 4 at 2-5. The union asserts that although Warren did file a charge with the EEOC, he only named Metro as the discriminating party. Doc. 16 at 3; Doc. 11-2. Warren contends that Local 788 had notice of the charge because the narrative portion of the charge named a member of the union. Doc. 11-8. Because "adequate notice of the charge" has been recognized as an exception to the general rule that the charge must file a charge against a party, see Boyd v. BJC Health Sys., No. 4:17CV814 RLW, 2018 WL 620484, *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2018) (citation omitted), Warren claims he exhausted his administrative remedies.
Warren's argument misses the mark. Regardless of whether Local 788 had notice that Warren filed an EEOC charge, Warren failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the charge does not contain sufficient information to put Local 788 on notice of Warren's ADA claims against it. A party satisfies the exhaustion requirement "if the information supplied in a charge of discrimination is sufficient to provide the employer notice of the charge's subject matter, and identif[ies] generally the basis for the claim." Evans v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. 4:12CV01675 ERW, 2013 WL 6732105, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2013) (citing McNeil v.Metro, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 2010)). While courts must "liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of remedies purposes, [courts] also recognize that 'there is a difference between liberally reading a claim which lacks specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which simply was not made.'" Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir.1996)). Courts recognize such a limitation because "[a]llowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge . . .." Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "claims of . . . discrimination in a complaint may be as broad as the scope of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigation which reasonably could have been expected to result from the administrative charge." Parisi, 400 F.3d at 586 (citing Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000). As such, the Court must assess whether Warren's ADA claims against Local 788 could have reasonably been expected to result from his administrative charge.
Warren's charge only lists "Metro" as the "Employer [or] Labor Organization" that he "believes discriminated" against him. Doc. 11-2. Warren also only checked the box for "disability" as the basis for his discrimination, leaving the "retaliation" box blank. Id. In the narrative portion of the charge, Warren states that Metro knew about his disabilities, but terminated him "because of missed days due to [his] disabilities." Id. After his supervisor at Metro informed him that he "was terminated for violating [his] last chance agreement," his "Union President (Mike Breihan) requested a 2nd last chance agreement" but the "request was denied." Id. Warren concludes the narrative portion by stating he "believe[s] that [he] wasdenied a second chance agreement and terminated due to [his] disabilities . . . in violation of the [ADA]." Id.
Based on these allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Warren's charge exhausted his administrative remedies as to his retaliation and discrimination claims under the ADA against Local 788. As an initial matter, Courts distinguish retaliation claims from discrimination claims for exhaustion purposes. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851-53 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2002)) (other citations omitted). Failure to mention retaliation in the narrative portion of the...
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