Warren v. State

Decision Date25 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. WD,WD
Citation939 S.W.2d 950
PartiesWalter WARREN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. 52620.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Thomas M. Schneider, Jones, Schneider and Bartlett, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, John R. Munich, Gregory L. Barnes, Assistant Attorneys General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before BRECKENRIDGE, P.J., and HANNA and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Walter Warren brought suit against the State of Missouri and various prison officials for injuries he alleges he sustained when a table saw he was using in the prison furniture factory kicked back and struck him because it lacked a safety guard. We affirm the trial court's grant of the individual prison officials' motions to dismiss based on the official immunity doctrine. We reverse the trial court's grant of the State of Missouri's motion to dismiss, however. Mr. Warren's claim falls directly within the State's waiver of immunity for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of the public entity's property. We remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Walter Warren, Plaintiff-Appellant, was an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary on September 26, 1986, when he was injured by a piece of lumber which was thrown back at him, striking his right wrist, as he was using a table saw in the prison furniture factory. Mr. Warren brought suit against the State of Missouri, the Missouri Department of Corrections, and various individual prison officials. 1 His Petition claimed that his injury was caused by a dangerous condition of the table saw, in that the saw did not have a safety guard to prevent it from kicking back and allowing the lumber to strike him. Mr. Warren's Petition also alleged that Defendants had reason to know of the dangerous condition, and in fact had removed the guard that came with the table saw.

Mr. Warren eventually dismissed the Missouri Department of Corrections as a defendant. The remaining defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. Their motion asserted that the individual defendants were protected from suit by official immunity and the public duty doctrine and that the State of Missouri was immune from suit under the sovereign immunity and public duty doctrines. The trial court granted all Defendants' motions to dismiss without opinion. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, we treat all facts pleaded in the Petition as true and give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Leeser Trucking, Inc. v. Pac-A-Way, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo.App.1996); Evergreen Nat'l Corp. v. Killian Constr. Co., 876 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo.App.1994). Where, as here, the trial court does not state a basis for its dismissal, we presume that dismissal was based on the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, that is, official immunity, the public duty doctrine, and sovereign immunity. We will affirm if dismissal was appropriate on any ground supported by the motion to dismiss. Shaver v. Shaver, 913 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Mo.App.1996).

III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Under the doctrine of official immunity, public officers are not liable for injuries caused by their discretionary acts, but may be liable for injuries caused by their ministerial acts. Charron v. Thompson, No. 78783 slip op. at 3, 1997 WL 78517 at * 1 (Mo. banc Dec. 17, 1996); Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985); Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Mo. banc 1984). Therefore, in order to determine whether the official immunity doctrine applies, we must determine whether the individual defendants' alleged negligent act of failing to provide or removing a safety guard from the saw, thereby allowing the table saw to kick back and injure Mr. Warren, should be considered a ministerial or discretionary act.

Discretionary acts require "the exercise of reason in the adaption of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or a course pursued." Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 769 (quoting Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo.App.1979)). In contrast, ministerial acts are "of a clerical nature which a public officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed." Id. (emphasis added).

Whether an act is discretionary or ministerial is determined on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors include "the nature of the official's duties, the extent to which the acts involve policymaking or the exercise of professional expertise and judgment, and the likely consequences of withholding immunity." Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836. The definition of discretionary acts should not be so narrowly construed as to frustrate the purpose of official immunity, which is to relieve public servants from the fear of burdensome litigation. Charron, slip op. at 3-4; Bachmann v. Welby, 860 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo.App.1993); Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836.

In support of his claim that the negligence of the individual defendants resulted from a ministerial rather than a discretionary act, Mr. Warren notes that at the time of his injury, a statute provided that the division director of the prison industry and services program "shall purchase, lease, or otherwise provide suitable plants, machinery, and equipment" for the correctional industry and services program. § 217.560.2, RSMo 1986 (repealed) (emphasis added). A Department of Corrections regulation in effect at the time of Mr. Warren's injury similarly provided, "All work areas containing moving machinery will have appropriate safety guards in place." Regulation 216.020(3)(A) (emphasis added).

Mr. Warren claims that this statute and regulation made placement of safety guards on the saw a mandatory and therefore ministerial duty, not a duty left to the discretion of prison officials. Therefore, he argues, failure to place the guard on the saw constituted breach of a ministerial duty and thus is not protected by the official immunity doctrine. In support, he cites to cases finding public officials conduct to be ministerial in the case before them. See, for example, Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Mo. banc 1996), which held that where the police department's regulations set out detailed procedures for inventorying, recording, and storing an arrestee's property, such activities constituted ministerial functions.

We do not agree that the rationale of these cases applies here. The statute cited by Mr. Warren requires use of "suitable" equipment. Similarly, the regulation in question requires use of "appropriate" safety guards. Unlike the situation in Jungerman, neither the statute nor the regulation further describe what constitutes "suitable" or "appropriate" safety equipment, thus leaving that determination to the officials charged with carrying out the duties involved.

Prior Missouri cases have held that a ministerial function is the antithesis of a function that is left to be performed in a manner the acting official believes to be "appropriate" or "suitable." Thus, as stated in Clay v. Scott, 883 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.App.1994):

a ministerial function involves clerical duties which a public officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in compliance of legal authority, without regard to the public officer's own judgment or opinion on the appropriateness of the act.

Id. at 576 (emphasis added).

We applied this reasoning recently in Miller v. Smith, 921 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.App.1996). The Millers' son committed suicide while he was in police custody and being transported to the police station. They alleged that the suicide was the result of negligence on the part of the police in safeguarding their son during transport. Relevant regulations stated that the police officers having custody of an arrestee "shall be responsible for the proper safeguard of such person." Id. at 46. The regulations did not further set out what type of safeguard was "proper" while an arrestee is being transported. We held that the regulation thus left "the decision on how to safely transport an arrestee to the police station ... to the professional judgment of the police officer." Id. We therefore held that official immunity protected the individual officers from suit. Id.

In reliance on Clay, supra, we similarly held in Barry Serv. Agency Co. v. Manning, 891 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo.App.1995), that a requirement that the Director of a particular Missouri department of government consider the "appropriateness" of rate requests by lenders left it to the discretion of the Director whether to approve the rate requests, stating:

The word "appropriateness" is a noun meaning the quality or state of being appropriate. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 91 (2d ed. 1983). As observed by the trial court, the plain meaning of the word "appropriate" when used as an adjective is "suitable," "proper," "fitting," or "necessary." All these terms comprehend the exercise of some measure of judgment or discretion.... Thus, the Director's task in approving rate requests under § 408.500.1 is not purely ministerial in nature.

Id. at 888 (citation omitted).

The rationale of these cases governs here. While Mr. Warren believes that the only "suitable" or "appropriate" safety decision was to put on the safety mechanism provided by the manufacturer, it was up to the prison officials to determine what safety equipment was necessary or adequate in regard to the particular use of the saw being made by the prison machine shop. It may be that the provided safety guard was the best choice, but that would not always be the...

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