Warren v. Warren
Decision Date | 11 February 1914 |
Citation | 36 R.I. 167,89 A. 651 |
Parties | WARREN v. WARREN. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles F. Stearns, Judge.
Action for divorce by Mary A. Warren against Edmund M. Warren. From an order after decree of divorce in favor of petitioner, granting an injunction and appointing a receiver of the property of defendant pending a determination of the question of alimony, the New England Land Company, to whom defendant was alleged to have conveyed his property in fraud of plaintiff, appeals. Affirmed.
Henry W. Hayes and Richard E. Lyman, both of Providence, for petitioner. James H. Rickard, Jr., of Woonsocket, for respondent.
The original proceeding in the above-entitled cause was a petition for divorce a vinculo matrimonii filed February 10, 1909, and the respondent Warren was duly served with process and entered his appearance, and thereafter the petition was prosecuted and defended until a final decree was entered, divorcing the petitioner as prayed, October 4, 1911. In this original petition petitioner also prayed for alimony out of her husband's estate, to be charged thereon. Pending the trial of the original petition, and on January 3, 1910, Mrs. Warren filed a supplemental petition wherein she alleged the ownership by her husband, when the original petition was filed, of numerous large tracts of land in ten cities and towns in this state, describing the same by references to deeds and records; and further alleged that he was the owner of other real estate of great value situate in the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, and in the province of Nova Scotia, and that he had personal estate of great value; and claimed that she was entitled to alimony based upon the value of all said property. She further alleged that in the month of May, 1909, he caused the deeds mentioned to be recorded in the land records of the various named towns and cities of this state and in the other states named and in Nova Scotia, and that the deeds purported to convey to himself as trustee in the state of Massachusetts and to the New England Land Company in all the other places all his interest in and to his real estate in this state, and in said other states and province respectively. She further alleged that all said deeds were prepared by the respondent after the filing of her petition for divorce and alimony, and were so prepared and recorded for the purpose of hindering and preventing the petitioner from obtaining alimony out of his estate, and from obtaining surety for any alimony which might be awarded to her, and for the purpose of defrauding and depriving the petitioner of the right and benefit of alimony and of obstructing and thwarting the decrees and processes of the court; that said instruments, purporting to contain releases of dower by the petitioner, were not in fact executed by the petitioner; and that any handwriting of the petitioner appearing thereon was fraudulently used by the respondent; that none of the instruments recorded as aforesaid was delivered to the New England Land Company, named therein as grantee; that the New England Land Company knew the fraudulent purpose and intent of the respondent at the time the instruments were executed and left for record, that no consideration was paid by the New England Land Company for said real estate, and that the pretended transfers of the title to said real estate to said company and to said Warren, as trustee, were of no consequence against the rights of the petitioner; and that all said described real estate was properly chargeable with a lien for any alimony which might be awarded; and prayed for the establishment of a lien upon the real estate described.
April 22, 1910, Mrs. Warren filed a further supplemental petition, referring to her petition for divorce and also to her petition of January 3, 1910; and alleged
A decree was entered upon this petition, April 22, 1910, granting an injunction restraining conveyances and incumbrances, but not as to collections of moneys, and not appointing a receiver. On the same date, April 22, 1910, petitioner also filed her motion that the New England Land Company named in her petitions as above set forth be made a party respondent; said company being incorporated under the laws of Maine, and having appointed in this state an attorney in fact upon whom service of process might be made according to law.
The record of this case in the superior court shows that, pursuant to said motion filed April 22, 1910, the petitioner was granted leave to add the New England Land Company as a party respondent; that on said 22d day of April, 1910, she did add the New England Land Company as a party respondent; that on said 22d day of April, 1910, a citation was issued notifying the New England Land Company that it had been made a party respondent to the cause, giving it notice regarding certain allegations made against it in the petition filed April 22, 1910 (already referred to), and notifying it to appear April 30, 1910, at 9:30 o'clock a. m. to be heard relative to petitioner's prayers for injunction, receiver, etc.; that the citation was duly served on April 23, 1910; that the cause was duly taken as confessed by the New England Land Company on the 19th of January, A. D. 1912; that on the 24th day of January, 1912, the New England Land Company moved that the "decree pro confesso be set aside and that it may be permitted to answer in said cause"; that on the 6th day of February, A. D. 1912, the decree pro confesso was set aside on condition "that it" (New England Land Company) "enter its appearance within two days and on condition that said New England Land Company is bound by the decree referring this cause to a master, * * * and on condition that said New England Land Company, if it sees fit to appear before said master, shall defend the allegations of the petitioner upon the merits only"; that appearance was entered in accordance with the conditions imposed: and that ever since the New England Land Company has participated in the proceedings in this cause.
It further appears that the following decree was entered in the superior court January 19, 1912: ...
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