Warren v. WinCo Foods, LLC

• Decision Date: 01 August 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-00594-SAB
• Parties: NICOLE WARREN, Plaintiff, v. WINCO FOODS, LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

NICOLE WARREN, Plaintiff, v. WINCO FOODS, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00594-SAB

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 1, 2022

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

(ECF No. 5)

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Nicole Warren (“Plaintiff”' or “Warren”) initiated this action on April 19, 2022, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Stanislaus, case no. CV-22-001728. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On May 19, 2022 Defendants WinCo Foods, LLC (“WinCo Foods”), and Justin Lamb (“Lamb”), removed this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) Currently before the Court^[1] is Plaintiff's motion to remand, filed on June 1, 2022. (Pl.'s Mot. Remand (“Mot”) ECF No. 5.) On June 15, 2022, Defendants filed an opposition. (Defs.' Opp'n Mot. Remand (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 6.) On June 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Pl.'s Reply Supp. Mot. Remand (“Reply”), ECF No. 7.)

A hearing on the motion was held on July 13, 2022. (ECF No. 9.) Counsel Amanda B. Whitten appeared by video for Plaintiff. Counsel Eden Anderson appeared by video for Defendants. Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, the arguments presented at the July 13, 2022 hearing, as well as the Court's file, the Court issues the following order denying Plaintiff's motion to remand.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Narayan v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 284 F.Supp.3d 1076, 1082 (E.D. Cal. 2018). District courts have original federal question jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. District courts have original diversity jurisdiction, including “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id.

In a case where “the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,” the defendant(s) may remove the matter to the federal “district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. A motion to remand is the proper procedure to challenge a removal based on lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Ultimately, “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Narayan, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1082 (same). Thus, “[w]here doubt regarding the right of removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). If a district court determines removal was improper, the court may award the plaintiff costs and attorneys' fee. Narayan, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1082 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Complaints and Removal Documents

Given the status of the initially filed complaint and the first amended complaint, in relation to removal, was somewhat unclear based on the parties' filings, the Court first turns to summarize the status of the pleadings to set the stage for consideration of the arguments developed in the parties' briefing. These matters were addressed at the hearing, and the parties agreed to allow the Court to adjudicate the issues and arguments developed and presented as to the first amended complaint, in the interests of efficiency and because the relevant law and facts were before the Court.

1. The Complaints

This action was removed to this Court on May 19, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) In moving to remand, Plaintiff states, “[a]t Defendants'] request, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on May 17, 2022, re-naming the defendant entity. Defendants] inexplicably filed an answer to the original complaint on May 19, 2022.” (Mot. 3.) Defendants' opposition also indicates that Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in state court on May 17, 2022, and have attached the amended pleading to their opposition brief. (Opp'n 9; Decl. Eden Anderson Supp. Opp'n Mot. Remand (“Anderson Opp'n Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 6-1 at 2, FAC, Ex. A, ECF No. 6-1 at 5-19.) Defendants emphasize the FAC repeats the same allegations as the original complaint, and the only difference in the new pleading is that Plaintiff substituted WinCo Holdings, Inc. (“WinCo Holdings”), as a defendant in lieu of WinCo Foods. (Opp'n 9.) Defendants proffer that although the FAC was filed in state court on May 17, 2022, it had not yet been served when the notice of removal was filed. (Opp'n 9-10; Anderson Opp'n Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendants state that they were first provided a copy of the FAC, and asked to acknowledge service on May 27, 2022, after the answer to the complaint and notice of removal had already been filed. (Id.) Thus, Defendants state that it is thus not inexplicable why an answer to the complaint was filed on May 19, 2022, as Plaintiff asserted. (Opp'n 10.)

Plaintiff's complaint initially filed in state court on April 19, 2022, alleges claims for: (1) disability or medical condition discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 12940, et seq. (hereinafter “FEHA”); (2) failure to accommodate a disability in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation for requesting accommodation in violation of FEHA; (6) retaliation for exercising rights under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2 et seq. (“CFRA”); (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (8) defamation. (Decl. Eden Anderson Supp. Removal (“Anderson Removal Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 1 at 6, Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1 at 11-25.) The first amended complaint contains the same eight causes of action. (Anderson Opp'n Decl. ¶ 2,, FAC, ECF No. 6-1 at 5-19.)^[2]

In the initially filed complaint, Defendant WinCo Foods is identified as “Employer,” and Defendant Justin Lamb is identified as “Lamb.” (ECF No. 1 at 11-12.) In the first amended complaint, Defendant WinCo Holdings is now identified as “Employer,” and WinCo Foods has been removed from the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 6-1 at 5.)

The first seven causes of action, in both the initially filed and first amended complaints, are brought against “Defendant, Employer, Only.” (ECF No. 1 at 15-21 (emphasis in original; ECF No. 6-1 at 9-15 (emphasis in original).) In both complaints, the eighth cause of action for defamation is brought against Defendants “Employer and Lamb.” (ECF No. 1 at 22 (emphasis in original); ECF No. 6-1 at 16 (emphasis in original).) Thus, the only cause of action against Defendant Lamb is the eighth cause of action for defamation.

The parties agreed at the hearing that the Court can consider the first amended complaint is the operative complaint, and that the arguments pertaining to removal relate to the first amended complaint and the parties named in the first amended complaint, not the initial pleading.. The Court now proceeds on that basis.

2. The Notice of Removal

Defendants' notice of removal proffers this Court has original jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that the action may be removed to this Court under 28 U.S.C § 1441(a) because it arises under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29. U.S.C. § 185 (hereinafter “Section 301”). (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Specifically, the notice proffers that Plaintiff's defamation claim is preempted by Section 301 because the claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and because the statements allegedly made occurred, if at all, during grievance proceedings. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) A copy of the August 11, 2019-August 10, 2024, collective bargaining agreement between WincCo Food, LLC Modesto Distribution Center and General Teamsters Local No. 386 was included in the notice of removal. (Anderson Removal Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C, ECF No. 1 at 43-79.) As a basis for removal, Defendants' notice of removal cites to Scott v. Machinists Auto. Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190 of N. California, 827 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1987); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 121617 (9th Cir. 1988); and Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1989). (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) The notice is directed at aspects of Plaintiff's complaint's eighth cause of action for defamation, specifically, the...