Warrick v. State

Decision Date09 October 1984
Docket Number1 Div. 625
Citation460 So.2d 320
PartiesJames Michael WARRICK v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

William L. Utsey and William R. Christopher, Butler, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

The appellant in this cause has been before this court previously on the same cause of action. We reversed and remanded the cause to the lower court and a new trial was held. The applicable facts of this proceeding are detailed in our previous opinion at 409 So.2d 984.

Appellant was tried again on May 4 and 5, 1983 before Circuit Judge J. Richmond Pearson. The jury returned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and the trial judge sentenced appellant to ten years in the state penitentiary. This appeal followed.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Jimmy Acton to testify as to statements made in response to Officer Acton's questions prior to appellant being informed of his constitutional rights.

A review of the facts reveals that, upon his arrival at the scene of the crime, Officer Acton spoke with Mrs. Pat Cooper and she informed him that several shots had been fired in a nearby field. After noticing the appellant's presence in the field, Officer Acton approached appellant and inquired as to his knowledge of the shooting incident. Officer Acton testified that the appellant stated that he had fired two shots in the air and that he had chased some people down the field toward what is known as the Big Wheel. Officer Acton also testified that, upon appellant's exit from the field, Lillie Williams exclaimed, "You're the one that shot Bobby," at which time the appellant responded, "I ain't shot nobody. If I had I wouldn't miss."

Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in not sustaining his objections to admission of these statements and now argues that they were made while he was "in custody". We disagree.

Miranda warnings are required only when there has been a restriction of one's personal freedom as to render that person in custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). The record in the case at bar does not reflect that the appellant was under any form of custody when he made incriminating statements to both Officer Acton and Lillie Williams. Miranda warnings are inapplicable to such traditional investigatory functions as general on-the-scene questioning. Cork v. State, 433 So.2d 959 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Hall v. State, 399 So.2d 348 (Ala.Crim.App.1981); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 532.

In determining the existence of custodial interrogation, the standard that is applicable is "whether a reasonable man would feel that he was physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action is restricted by such interrogation." Hall, supra; and see cases cited therein.

Montos, supra, developed the criteria that courts should utilize in determining whether Miranda warnings were necessary. The criteria included: (1) probable cause to arrest, (2) subjective intent of the police, (3) subjective belief of the accused, and (4) focus of the investigation. "While the focus of the investigation is especially important in deciding whether an accused should be given the Miranda warning, it is custody and not focus which marks the point at which it becomes mandatory" (emphasis deleted). Hall, supra; Mathiason, supra; Harris v. State, 376 So.2d 773 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 778 (Ala.1979).

The record in the instant case does not support appellant's contention of "custodial interrogation" at the time he made the statements. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required and the trial court acted properly in admitting the statements into evidence.

Similarly, the appellant argues prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in allowing Lillie Williams the opportunity to testify as to statements made by appellant prior to his being given Miranda warnings.

As stated earlier, upon seeing the appellant leaving the field, Lillie Williams stated, "You're the one that shot Bobby." Ms. Williams testified at trial that the appellant initially denied the allegation but went further and stated that if he had been trying to shoot someone he would not have missed. Ms. Williams was also allowed to testify that the appellant made statements to the effect that he was tired of people hunting on his land and that he had shot at someone in a blue denim jacket.

Appellant argues that he was in custody at the time he made the statements to Lillie Williams, since Officer Acton had escorted him to where Ms. Williams was standing and stated that "this is the boy that was doing the shooting." Again, we disagree with appellant's contention.

Appellant refers to Hall v. State, supra, in his argument. The point that appellant relies on in Hall is that the distinction between general and custodial interrogation must be determined by a case-by-case factual analysis. The facts in the case at bar do not meet the "custodial standard" at the point in time the appellant made statements to Ms. Williams. Harris v. State, supra, quoted Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in defining "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The officer's actions and words at the most amounted to "a focusing of the investigation" on the appellant. Therefore, "Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect or one on whom the investigation has focused." Harris, supra, Oregon v. Mathiason, supra; Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Malone v. State, 361 So.2d 674 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 691 (Ala.1978).

Moreover, the questions propounded to the appellant were asked by a citizen, not a law enforcement officer. According to Terry v. State, 397 So.2d 217 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) Miranda warnings are not required in instances where inculpatory or otherwise admissible statements are made to persons who are not law enforcement officers or their agents. Hinshaw v. State, 398 So.2d 762 (Ala.Crim.App.1981); Truex v. State, 282 Ala. 191, 210 So.2d 424 (1968); Ellis v. State, 338 So.2d 428, (Ala.Crim.App.1976); Bedingfield v. State, 47 Ala.App. 677, 260 So.2d 408 (1972). Thus, the trial court acted properly in admitting into evidence the appellant's contested statements.

Appellant also contends that the admission into evidence of photographs of the deceased body had no probative value, since he, the appellant, had stipulated to the cause of death. He therefore maintains that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing their admission.

The law in Alabama on this issue is clear. Photographs which depict the character and location of external wounds on the body of a deceased are admissible even though they are cumulative and based upon undisputed matters. Wicker v. State, 433 So.2d 1190 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Hines v. State, 365 So.2d 320 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 322 (Ala.1978); Ellenburg v. State, 353 So.2d 810 (Ala.Crim.App.1977); Davis v. State, 338 So.2d 507 (Ala.Crim.App.1976). The fact that a photo is gruesome and ghastly, if it has some relevancy to the proceeding, is no reason to exclude its admission into evidence, even if the photographs may tend to inflame the jury. Richards v. State, 337 So.2d 171 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 337 So.2d 173 (Ala.1976). Therefore, the appellant's argument is without any substantial merit.

Lastly, the appellant complains that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying his motion for a new trial based upon juror Virginia Williams's failure to answer questions submitted to the venire during voir dire examination. It is undisputed that, during the voir dire examination, the venire was asked whether anyone knew anything about the facts of the case about to be tried. Several venirepersons responded that they had heard the facts of the case through various sources. However, Venireperson Virginia Williams did not respond even though the substance of the question was asked a total of four times in some form. Later, at a hearing on appellant's motion for a new trial in front of the trial judge, when Juror Williams was asked why she failed to respond, she replied, "I think you would have had all of us stand up and say the same thing." As appellant stated in his brief to this court, "This is not a case of a juror not hearing the question or the question being ambiguous." It is apparent that the juror affirmatively elected not to answer.

The transcript of the motion for new trial hearing also shows that Juror Williams was employed at G and H Ready Mix in Jackson, Alabama, at the time of the trial. Her immediate supervisor, at G and H Ready Mix was the brother-in-law of the deceased. She testified at the hearing that she knew her supervisor James Baby Ray Foster was a brother to Willie and Munk Foster, who had run advertisements in local papers regarding the unfairness of appellant's previous trial and the injustice that had been accorded by such a light sentence. Juror Williams...

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