Warriner v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1973
• Citation: 32 Cal.App.3d 353,108 Cal.Rptr. 153
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edith E. WARRINER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Respondent. Civ. 40339.

Page 153

108 Cal.Rptr. 153

32 Cal.App.3d 353

Edith E. WARRINER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Respondent.

Civ. 40339.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

May 15, 1973.

Hearing Denied July 12, 1973.

Daniel S. Brunner, San Pedro, for petitioner and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward M. Belasco and Robert M. Snader, Deputy Attys.Gen., for defendant and respondent.

KINGSLEY, Associate Justice.

PetitionerEdith E. Warriner sought a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) directing the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to set aside its decision denying petitioner unemployment insurance benefits.The trial court denied the writ, made certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgment was entered accordingly.Petitioner has appealed.

The facts developed at the administrative hearing before the board referee may be summarized as follows: Mrs. Warriner, aged sixty, had been employed by Industrial Control Systems for ten years prior to her departure on November 16, 1970.In 1967she was promoted to the position of office supervisor.At the time of her departure she was being paid $155 per week.She was a competent employee.

In 1969, she had a conversation with her immediate supervisor, Mr. Brown; the question of her eventual retirement was discussed.Mrs. Warriner was indecisive about an exact retirement date, but in response to a direct question from Mr. Brown as to how long she planned to work, she replied, 'I don't really know, Mr. Brown, about a year or a year and a half.'Regarding this answer she testified, 'After all, I am 60 years old.Q.Your answer then is that he asked you how long you were going to work?A.What my plans were in regard to work.Q.What did you indicate, if you remember now?A.No definite time.'

In the spring of 1970, Mrs. Warriner was informed by Mr. Brown that the management of Industrial Control Systems had made a policy decision that in the future office supervisors would be male office managers, and that female supervisors would be replaced.Mr. Brown discussed with her the possibility of advertising for a suitable male office manager, but apparently nothing further developed until early in November, 1970.At that time, Mr. Brown told Mrs. Warriner that she was to commence training her replacement, a young man named Nelson.He had a background of office experience, and had been with the company for six months, first as a route salesman, then for several weeks as a trainee for evaluation as an office manager.Petitioner discovered that Mr. Nelson was currently being paid more than she was, I.e., $164 per week.She complained about this, and Mr. Brown remedied this by increasing her salary to Mr. Nelson's level.

Petitioner's family, her husband and son, was concerned about the petitioner's situation at work.Petitioner's son prepared a letter setting forth terms for petitioner's future employment with the company; she attempted to have this reproduced on the company's letterhead and to obtain the signature of a company official on the document, but failed.Petitioner discussed her future with Mr. Brown.He told her that he could 'personally guarantee' her six more months of employment; that on January 1, 1971, her pay would be increased to $175 per week; that she could have two additional weeks of vacation; that he estimated that it would take three or four months for her to train Nelson to replace her; that possibly she might continue with the company after the promised six months 'Under Mr. Nelson or possibly during the six-month guarantee time I gave her, I may have asked her to go over to our other plant to do possibly the same thing over there, training office personnel.'

Petitioner worked for a week after Mr. Nelson commenced training.She testified that she became 'nervous and upset about the degradation and it was impossible for me to work.'On November 17, 1970, she called Brown and said, 'I was first going to try to do the job, but I couldn't do it.I was upset about being replaced and having to train somebody and the wages being more than what I was getting.'She was dissatisfied 'Because I had worked there for a long time.I had worked hard, and I had the company's interests at heart, and I had no complaints about my work, and I was assured that my work was all right; that this was no reflection on my work.'She told Brown she would not return.Brown testified: 'She said she was nervous.She said she wasn't coming back; that the pressure at home was too much, and I said, why, and she said, 'Well, both my son and husband both would rather I quit.'And at this time I asked Edith, 'Are you quitting?'And she said, 'Yes, I am' . . .'

Petitioner then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which are payable to those persons who are unemployed through no fault of their own.(Unemp.Ins.Code, § 100.)Determination of eligibility for benefits is made by the California Department of Human Resources, a state-wide agency administering the unemployment insurance program.The department denied petitioner benefits on the basis that she was disqualified from receiving them pursuant to Unemployment Insurance Code, section 1256, which provides:

'An individual is disqualified for . . . benefits if . . . he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause . . ..'

Petitioner appealed to an appeals board referee; she claimed she had left her employment for 'good cause,' I.e., sexual discrimination.The referee found for the petitioner.The appeals board reversed the referee, finding that petitioner had left work in anticipation of discharge, which is regarded, pursuant to administrative interpretation, as leaving without 'good cause.'(Appeals Board 6228, January 28, 1955; P.B. Benefit Decision 27.)

The trial court, denying the petitioner's writ, found that the weight of evidence in the administrative record showed: (1) that the petitioner was a competent employee; (2) that petitioner's employer had implemented a policy whereby all women occupying the position of office supervisor would be replaced by men; (3) that petitioner voluntarily quit without notice 'under the emotional impulse of a feeling of injured vanity' at a time when she still had the office supervisor position; (4) that she quit due also to the urging of her husband and son; (5) that she left 'regardless of the sex of her replacement as petitioner contemplated retirement due so her advanced age'; (6) that she left when she reasonably expected to be employed at increased wages and with additional employment benefits for six more months; (7) that she left because 'she might have been discharged' from her position as office supervisor after three or four months; although she could continue employment at the increased wage in some 'suitable and worthy' capacity for at least the balance of the six months, if not longer; (8) that she quit in anticipation of eventual discharge.

The trial court also found that it was reasonable for the petitioner's employer to make arrangements for petitioner's replacement due to (1)petitioner's advanced age (2)petitioner's uncertainty and (3)petitioner's indecisiveness as to how much longer petitioner would be willing to continue her employment; and (4) also because a period of at least three to four months was required just to train another to perform petitioner's duties.

The court concluded that her departure was in anticipation of eventual discharge and was not for 'good cause'; that her employer's policy, specifying that all female office supervisors were to be replaced by men, does not 'necessarily indicate unlawful discriminatory action in violation of Labor Code §§ 1411and1420,'¹ because these sections permit 'classifications on the basis of sex if there is a logical and reasonable basis' for it.

Our power of appellate review of the trial court judgment is restricted to a determination of whether the trial court, in conducting its independent De novo review of the administrative record, made findings of fact and a judgment supported by substantial, credible and competent evidence contained in that record.(Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553;Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 196 P.2d 20;Lacy v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 95 Cal.Rptr. 566.)

We perceive the critical factual issue to be why the petitioner left her employment; whether it was 'voluntary' within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code, section 1256; And, whether it was 'without good cause.'There is no dispute as to the petitioner's competence.There is no dispute that the employer was pursuing a policy of replacement based on sex; the employer representative, testifying at the administrative hearing, described that policy as 'a decision of the company, orders down to me.'It was incumbent on the trial court to arrive at the central, proximate cause of petitioner's termination.

We need not determine whether all of the trial court's findings of fact, or all of its conclusions of law, are correct, because the findings do determine two issues which we regard as determinative of the case at bench.

(1)Petitioner was still employed, under a promise of continued employment, at a non-discriminatory rate of pay, for 'at least' six months.There is nothing in the record before the board, the trial court or this court, to show that she necessarily would have been discharged at any time prior to a date that she might select, for herself, as an appropriate retirement date.²Under these circumstances, petitioner's self-termination of her employment was 'voluntary' within the meaning of the act and it bars her claim unless that self-termination was for 'good cause.'(2) As far as we can see, the 'cause' now relied on by petitioner is two-fold: (a) the decision to...