Wasatch Elec. Dynalectric Co. v. Labor Comm'n

• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20190398-CA,20190398-CA
• Citation: 460 P.3d 1049
• Parties: WASATCH ELECTRIC DYNALECTRIC COMPANY and American Casualty Company of Reading, PA, Petitioners, v. LABOR COMMISSION and Wendell Benward, Respondents.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

460 P.3d 1049

WASATCH ELECTRIC DYNALECTRIC COMPANY and American Casualty Company of Reading, PA, Petitioners,

v.LABOR COMMISSION and Wendell Benward, Respondents.

No. 20190398-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed February 13, 2020

Brad J. Miller and Trent D. Holgate, Attorneys for Petitioners

Gary E. Atkin and K. Dawn Atkin, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Respondent Wendell Benward

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Diana Hagen concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Wendell Benward was electrocuted while maintaining electrical power lines. He survived, but his injuries were so severe that doctors found it necessary to amputate both of his feet. Because of his injuries, Benward qualified for and received workers’ compensation benefits. Despite his injuries, however, Benward eventually was able to go back to work, albeit in a different capacity. His former employer, Wasatch Electric Dynalectric Company (Wasatch), does not think it should have to pay Benward permanent total disability benefits for time periods in which Benward was able to work. Under applicable Utah law, Wasatch’s argument would be a winner with regard to most injured workers, who ordinarily lose eligibility for permanent total disability benefits if they are able to return to work. But Utah law carves out an exception for workers who have lost limbs or eyes in a workplace accident, and considers such workers permanently disabled and entitled to permanent total disability benefits even if they are later able to return to work. We therefore reject Wasatch’s arguments, and decline to disturb the decision of the Labor Commission (the Commission), which ordered Wasatch to continue to pay benefits to Benward and refused to allow Wasatch to offset the wages it paid Benward post-accident.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 On July 23, 2012, Benward was working as part of a team tasked with maintaining a set of electrical power lines. According to Benward, the team was transporting a large pole when Benward observed that the grounded pole was too close to a live power line. Benward rushed over to help, but tripped and twisted his ankle just before reaching them. As he regained his footing, electricity suddenly arced between the pole and the nearby power line. Somehow, the electricity jumped to Benward’s left arm, and the current passed through his body and exited through both of his feet, causing significant injury.

¶3 Benward was evacuated from the scene by helicopter and taken to a hospital, where doctors determined that his injuries required the amputation of both feet. The amputation was performed that same day. In addition to the loss of his feet, Benward also suffered second- and third-degree burns over much of his upper body, as well as hearing loss, sleep apnea, tinnitus, meniscus tears in both knees, and memory loss, among other ailments.

¶4 After nearly a year, Benward recovered sufficiently to return to work on a part-time basis, although not in the same capacity. With some retraining, Benward was able to work as a safety manager, and he performed those duties for Wasatch on a part-time basis for a few months. Then, in January 2014, Benward was able to increase his hours to full time, and continued to work as a full-time safety manager until Wasatch laid him off, for unrelated reasons, in January 2017. After being laid off, Benward was eventually able to find similar employment as a safety professional at an electrical engineering company specializing in high-voltage power installation. Although the work is inconsistent and the wages and benefits are project-dependent, Benward now earns a weekly wage that is even higher than the wage he earned at Wasatch.

¶5 In addition to the part-time and full-time salary Benward has earned since the date of the accident, Wasatch (or its insurance company) also paid Benward workers’ compensation benefits. Beginning on the day following the accident, Wasatch paid Benward temporary total disability benefits until Benward was able to resume part-time work. While Benward was working part-time, Wasatch paid Benward—in addition to his part-time wages—temporary partial disability benefits. After Benward resumed full-time employment, Wasatch paid Benward permanent partial disability benefits, based on a forty-nine percent whole person impairment rating, until it laid Benward off in 2017. In total, Wasatch paid Benward $130,818.68 in various types of workers’ compensation benefits between the date of his accident and the date he was laid off.

¶6 In March 2017, after being laid off, Benward filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits stemming from the loss of both of his feet. In this claim, Benward asserted that he was entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits from the date of his accident, and continuing for the rest of his life, regardless of the fact that he was able to return to work after the accident as a safety manager. In response, Wasatch acknowledged that Benward met the criteria for permanent total disability under Utah’s workers’ compensation statute, given the amputation of both of his feet, and that he should receive benefits for the time periods in which he was fully or partially unable to work. However, Wasatch asserted that Benward was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits once it was demonstrated that he was again capable of gainful employment.

¶7 An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Wasatch, determining that Benward’s injury created only a "presumptive finding" that he was permanently and totally disabled, and that this presumption was rebutted by the fact that Benward had returned to work. The ALJ concluded that Wasatch was not obligated to pay Benward permanent total disability benefits during periods in which he was gainfully employed.

¶8 Benward appealed the decision to the Commission, which reversed the ALJ’s legal determination, concluding that Benward was entitled to permanent total disability benefits even after returning to work, and stating as follows:

The Commission recognizes that awarding permanent total disability compensation to Mr. Benward for a period during which he was working may seem counterintuitive; however, neither gainful employment nor the ability to work are part of the criteria under § 413(9) as they are under § 413(1). The unique criteria found in § 413(9) provide for a final award of permanent total disability compensation without regard for or consideration of the claimant’s interim work following the loss described in that subsection.

However, the Commission noted that Benward would not be entitled to permanent total disability benefits during the time he worked for Wasatch, if his wages had not really been earned but had merely been "intended to be paid in lieu of disability compensation." The Commission remanded the case back to the ALJ for a factual determination about whether the money paid to Benward while he was employed by Wasatch post-accident was "intended as a substitute for disability compensation or as regular compensation for the work performed."

¶9 On remand, the ALJ found that Benward "was paid during the relevant time period for actual work for which [he] earned the wages he was paid," that his job "was not a make-work job" and "was legitimate and not just to avoid permanent total disability benefits," and that Benward "gave a dollar’s worth of labor for every dollar he was paid." The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s factual findings, and concluded that Wasatch acquired an ongoing obligation to pay Benward permanent total disability benefits starting on the date of his accident and continuing for the remainder of Benward’s life, and that—although Wasatch was entitled to an offset for the $130,818.68 that it had already paid Benward for other types of workers’ compensation benefits—Wasatch was not entitled to an offset for what it had paid him in wages after the accident.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Wasatch now seeks judicial review of certain aspects of the Commission’s order. Wasatch does not seek judicial review of any factual findings made by the ALJ or the Commission, and does not dispute the fact that it has a workers’ compensation obligation to Benward for at least the time periods in which Benward was unable to work due to his injuries. However, it asserts that it has no obligation to pay permanent total disability benefits to Benward during periods of time in which Benward was or is gainfully employed, and that it should be entitled to offset the wages it paid to Benward post-accident against its workers’ compensation obligation to Benward. Thus, the issues Wasatch raises in this case are legal in nature, and involve the meaning and interpretation of Utah’s workers’ compensation statutes. In this context, we review the Commission’s legal determinations for correctness. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm’n , 2000 UT 66, ¶ 13, 7 P.3d 777 (stating that "[m]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness" (quotation simplified)); see also Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm’n , 2002 UT App 164, ¶ 4, 48 P.3d 252 (stating that, when reviewing the Commission’s resolution of a question of law, we give "no deference" to the "agency’s determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction" (quotation simplified)).

ANALYSIS

¶11 For most injured workers—those who have not lost limbs or eyes—permanent total disability benefits under Utah’s workers’ compensation statutes are available only if the worker proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of six elements: (1) that he "sustained a significant impairment" as a result of a work-related injury; (2) that he "is not gainfully employed"; (3) that he has an impairment that limits his "ability to do basic work activities" and (4) prevents him from "performing the essential functions of the work"...