Waschle v. Winter Sports, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 13–309–M–DWM.,CV 13–309–M–DWM. |
| Citation | 127 F.Supp.3d 1090 |
| Parties | Niclas WASCHLE, deceased, by and through his personal representative, Patricia BIRKHOLD–WASCHLE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Niclas Waschle; Patricia Birkhold–Waschle, Individually; Raimund Waschle, Individually; and Philip Waschle, individually, Plaintiffs, v. WINTER SPORTS, INC. dba Whitefish Mountain Resort, a Montana Corporation; World Experience dba World Experience Teenage Student Exchange; Fred Vanhorn; Lynne Vanhorn; and John Does 1–10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Channing Hartelius, Jeffrey G. Winter, Hartelius Durocher Winter, Steven M. Johnson, Church Harris Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, MT, for Plaintiffs.
Mikel L. Moore, Moore, Cockrell, Goicoechea & Axelberg, P.C., Kalispell, MT, Mark S. Williams, Susan Moriarity Miltko, Williams Law Firm, Missoula, MT, for Defendants.
This case stems from the death of sixteen-year-old German foreign exchange student Niclas Waschle ("Niclas"). Niclas died following a ski accident that occurred at Whitefish Mountain Resort on December 29, 2010. At the time of his death, Niclas had been living with a host family, Defendants Fred and Lynne Vanhorn ("the Vanhorns"), in Columbia Falls, Montana through the exchange program of Defendant World Experience. Niclas's family and estate ("Plaintiffs") brought suit against World Experience,1 Whitefish Mountain Resort, and the Vanhorns. The Vanhorns seek summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims against them, principally relying on state and federal volunteer immunity statutes. On September 3, 2015, at the parties' request, the Court heard argument on that motion. For the reasons stated on the record and further explained below, the Vanhorns' motion (Doc. 36) is granted.
In 2010, Niclas applied for placement as a foreign exchange student with World Experience. In his application, Niclas indicated that he was interested in skiing, that he was a frequent skier, and that he was a good skier. The application was signed by both Niclas and his mother, Patricia Birkhold–Waschle. Around that time, the Vanhorns applied as host parents with World Experience and advised that they lived near a ski resort and skied frequently. In a letter provided to the Vanhorns, Niclas indicated that he liked skiing a lot, that his last ski trip had been to the Austrian Alps, and that he had improved his skiing skills. World Experience arranged for Niclas to live with the Vanhorns for the 2010 fall school semester.
In September 2010, Fred Vanhorn contacted Niclas's mother about purchasing a ski pass for Whitefish Mountain Resort. She provided both permission to purchase the ski pass for Niclas and funds to do so. Once the ski season began, Niclas skied ten days at Whitefish Mountain Resort between December 5, 2010 and December 29, 2010, sometimes in the company of Fred Vanhorn. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on December 29, 2010, Niclas was found unresponsive by other skiers below the top terminal of the T-bar ski lift, which was within the boundary of Whitefish Mountain Resort. The area was not blocked off in any way. Niclas had fallen in a tree well. Four days later, on January 2, 2011, Niclas died in the hospital.3
The parties dispute whether the Vanhorns warned Niclas of the danger of tree wells, skiing on non-groomed runs, and/or skiing alone. They also dispute whether Niclas was admonished not to ski alone and Niclas's skill level. Because these disputes do not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Vanhorns. The Vanhorns are immune to Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence claims under federal and state volunteer immunity statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 14501 –506; Mont.Code Ann. § 27–1–732. As to Plaintiffs' claims that the Vanhorns acted with gross misconduct and are subject to punitive damages, there is no proof that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Vanhorns warned Niclas of the danger of tree wells or skiing alone. Even if such a dispute could be shown, Plaintiffs have failed to establish facts to raise a fact question that would permit a jury to reasonably find that the Vanhorns' conduct rose to the level of willful or wanton misconduct as a matter of law.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted where the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit will preclude entry of summary judgment; factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the outcome are not considered. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tolan v. Cotton, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1863, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Mont.Code Ann. § 27–1–732. Because this statute only provides an exception from immunity for willful or wanton misconduct, it provides greater protections than its federal counterpart and is not preempted by the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 14502(a). The Vanhorns' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' ordinary negligence claims because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Vanhorns were volunteers acting for a nonprofit organization within the scope of their responsibilities.
"Volunteer" is defined as "an individual performing services for a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive [ ] compensation (other than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses actually incurred)[ ] or [ ] any other thing of value in lieu of compensation, in excess of $500 per year[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6). An individual generally qualifies as a "volunteer" if he is not compensated. Segway, Inc. v. Special Olympics Conn., Inc., 2015 WL 1244509, **7–8 (Conn.Super. Feb. 23, 2015) (unpublished) (); McGeorge v. Town of Hamden, 2012 WL 1434904, at **8–9 (Conn.Super. Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished) (same).
There is no dispute that the Vanhorns were not compensated for acting as Niclas's host parents. Rather, Plaintiffs claim the relationship between the Vanhorns and World Experience falls outside the definition of a volunteer, insisting that the Vanhorns were merely participants in the program, not volunteers for it. The twist Plaintiffs argue is that the Vanhorns were volunteering for Niclas and his family not World Experience. While this fact dispute is material in that it determines whether or not the volunteer immunity statutes preclude liability, it is not a genuine issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs insist that World Experience's limited role in the placement process, the absence of documentation notifying Niclas's mother that the host family was a volunteer for World Experience, the direct communication between Niclas's mother and the Vanhorns, and the Vanhorns' implicit assumption of the parental role and its attendant duties all indicate that the Vanhorns had a more direct relationship with Plaintiffs....
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