Wasey v. Travelers' Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1901
• Citation: 126 Mich. 119,85 N.W. 459
• Parties: WASEY v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

85 N.W. 459

126 Mich. 119

WASEY v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 26, 1901

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Byron S. Waite, Judge.

Action by Anna B. Wasey against the Travelers' Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Montgomery C.J., and Hooker, J., dissenting in part.

Edwin F. Conely and Orla B. Taylor, for appellant.

Harlow P. Davock (Otto Kirchner, of counsel), for appellee.

MONTGOMERY, C.J.

The defendant insurance company issued, upon the life of George E. Wasey, a policy of insurance, payable to the plaintiff herein, for the sum of $12,000, in monthly installments of $50 each. The policy was subject to the condition that in case of suicide committed by Mr. Wasey, while sane or insane within two years from the date of the policy, the limit of recovery thereunder should be the premiums paid thereon. It was issued upon the 23d day of February, 1897. Only one annual premium, of $232.44, had been paid, when Mr. Wasey died. On the 2d day of November, 1897, Mr. Wasey came to his death by drowning in the Flint river, at Flint, in this state. On the trial in the court below the plaintiff contended that the drowning of Mr. Wasey was accidental. The defendant contended that it was intentional and suicidal. This was practically the sole issue in the court below. The jury found for the plaintiff for all the $50 installments past due at the date of the verdict. The defendant submitted to the jury the following question: 'Did George E. Wasey commit suicide?' They answered it, 'No.' At the time of Mr. Wasey's death he was, and ever since the previous July he had been, a patient at the Flint Sanitarium. Mr. Wasey was suffering from melancholia agitata. The evidence shows that this disease is often accompanied by a suicidal impulse, and the statements made by Mr. Wasey to his wife while at Flint indicate that he had, before entering that institution, entertained the idea of killing himself but he at the same time stated that he had not entertained such a thought while at Flint, and asked his wife's forgiveness for having thought of such a thing on the earlier occasion. There was testimony tending to show that Mr. Wasey was under a strong impulse to make his escape from the sanitarium. The manner of his death, briefly told, was as follows: He went for a drive with his friend and former pastor, Rev. Mr. Washburn. They entered the cemetery bounded by the Flint river. Mr. Washburn, having left his horse unhitched at a distance of some 10 or 12 rods away from the point to which they had walked, suggested that they return. Mr. Washburn describes what been occurred as follows 'He says, 'You go back and get the horse, and I will be here when you return.' I went back for the horse. I did not turn to look to see where he was. It was quite easy walking from that point over to the horse, so that I would not be delayed. There is a driveway. I walked at just an ordinary gait. I immediately took the horse, and turned him around. There was no interval of delay. I drove then to the point where Mr. Wasey said he would be,--where I would find him. That was where I left him,--about a rod away from where I left him. When I reached there I did not see him. After a time I called for him, and received no response. I then went about some. On the north side of the cemetery is a ridge that commands all the view. I drove up on that ridge, and drove all about the cemetery, in search of him. I did not see him. It would be hard to judge exactly how long I had been away from him until I returned to the place where I had left him. It does not seem to me it could be over five minutes. It might have been. I would not think it was over five minutes. From the place where the house stands on the little girl's grave, to the best of my knowledge, I think you cannot see the river. The river is visible from parts of the cemetery. The distance from the cemetery to the river varies. I should think at some points it was one hundred rods; other places, perhaps not more than fifty, as the river curves. I am not very accurate in my estimate of distances. It is an open country between the cemetery and the river after you leave the cemetery fence,--the cemetery borders. There are trees and shrubbery on the borders of the cemetery. Between it and the river there are none. It is entirely open for a mile and a quarter or so.' A search was very soon instituted, and it was found that Mr. Wasey had laid aside his overcoat at the bank of the river, and his body was soon after found in the stream.

1. It was the defendant's contention that the evidence conclusively showed that Mr. Wasey committed suicide. The plaintiff contended that the facts justified the inference that deceased went into the river for the purpose of escaping from confinement, and evidently the jury so found. We are not able to say that this theory is wholly unsupported by the evidence in the case. The testimony tending, as it did, to show the strong desire of Mr. Wasey to escape from his confinement, when taken in connection with the circumstances of his death, leaves the case open to the inference that he was attempting to escape by swimming the Flint river. Whether this theory was as well supported as that of suicide was a question for the jury.

2. Mr. Wasey was placed in the charge of Fred R. Armstrong by Dr. Burr, and when he was a witness on the stand he was asked what Dr. Burr said to him when he placed Mr. Wasey in his charge. We think it unnecessary to determine whether this testimony was admissible, as the only purpose for which it was admissible was to show the facts that Mr. Wasey was suffering from melancholia agitata, and that this species of insanity is usually attended with suicidal tendencies. These facts appeared by undisputed testimony. We think, therefore, that it was not prejudicial error to exclude this testimony.

3. Mr Davock, acting for plaintiff, applied to the agent of the company for blanks upon which to make proof of loss. Proofs were made up, consisting of affidavits (1) of an acquaintance of the deceased to his identity, (2) of the undertaker, (3) of the clergyman, (4) of the beneficiary to the age of the deceased, (5) of the beneficiary to her claim, (6) of Mr. M. J. Murphy to the movements of the deceased while insured, and (7) of Mr. Murphy, as a friend of the deceased, that Mr. Wasey came to his death by drowning in the Flint river, Mich. These were all on one sheet of paper. In addition to these papers, there was forwarded to the company an affidavit made by Dr. Burr, in which he stated, among other things, that 'in consequence of melancholia there developed delusions of unworthiness and apprehension which led to suicide; he drowned himself in the Flint river'; that 'the act of suicide had not been caused by any pernicious habit'; and 'that a coroner's inquest had been held which established the fact that death was the result of suicide in consequence of insanity.' The court excluded the statements in the affidavit of Dr. Burr, above quoted, but offered to receive the other statements of the affidavit. Another ruling, closely allied to this, occurred as follows: Mr. Wasey carried other insurance. In the proofs of loss furnished by plaintiff to other companies she made the statement that Mr. Wasey came to his death by committing suicide. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 'In considering the testimony that the plaintiff, in her proofs of death made to other insurance companies, stated that he had come to his death by committing suicide, you must consider whether she had any knowledge on the subject, and, if you find that she had none, you cannot further regard such testimony.' These two rulings may be considered together, and, as will be observed, they present the question whether an admission of a fact is rendered incompetent, and is to be withheld from the jury, or withdrawn from the jury, when it appears that the party who makes the admission has no personal knowledge of the fact. This question arose in Kitchen v. Robbins, 29 Ga. 713. The question was stated and answered as follows: 'Are no admissions good against a party unless founded on his personal knowledge? The admissions would not be made except on evidence which satisfies the party who is making them against his own interest that they are true, and that is evidence to the jury that they are true. Admissions do not come in on the ground that the party making...