Wasfi v. Dept. of Public Health

Decision Date21 November 2000
Docket Number(AC 19418)
Citation761 A.2d 257,60 Conn. App. 775
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesAMR A. WASFI v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL.

Foti, Schaller and Dupont, JS. William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph F. Rigoglioso and Barbara L. Cox, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Heather Wilson, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

FOTI, J.

The plaintiff, Amr A. Wasfi, a veterinarian, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his administrative appeal. The defendants are the department of public health (department),1 which brought charges against the plaintiff, and the Connecticut board of veterinary medicine (board), which revoked the plaintiff's veterinary license. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the board did not violate (1) General Statutes § 4-178 (7) and principles of due process by applying its specialized knowledge to the facts of this case and (2) either its statutory authority or the plaintiff's due process rights by revoking the plaintiff's license following one incident of misconduct by the plaintiff. We disagree with these claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, found by the board, and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of this appeal. Prior to and during the incident giving rise to this litigation, the plaintiff held a Connecticut veterinary license. On November 28, 1992, a car struck Allison O'Connell's dog. O'Connell subsequently took the dog to the plaintiff's veterinary hospital for emergency treatment. After the plaintiff diagnosed and treated the dog's injuries, he informed O'Connell, and his treatment notes indicate, that he diagnosed a fracture to the dog's radius and that part of the proximal surface of her olecranon bone was missing. The plaintiff also told O'Connell that he repaired the tendons in the dog's leg with surgical steel wire. The plaintiff testified, and his treatment notes indicate, that he used number one and number two gauge nylon to repair lacerated tendons in the dog's leg. On the basis of its own expertise, the board found that number one or number two gauge nylon is inappropriate for the treatment of injured tendons in a dog's leg.

On December 7, 1992, O'Connell took the dog to Jeffrey LaCroix, a veterinarian, for further treatment. LaCroix removed the splint and sutures that the plaintiff had applied to the dog's leg. LaCroix palpated and took X rays of the dog's leg, as well as examined X rays that the plaintiff had taken of the dog's leg. LaCroix concluded, and the board agreed, that the X rays revealed no fractures. His palpation of the dog's leg revealed that no repair had been performed to any tendons because he found a fully mobile leg joint with no evidence of scar tissue on the leg. The board also found, on the basis of its expertise, that if the plaintiff had repaired the tendons with nylon, LaCroix should easily have been able to detect the nylon when he examined the dog. LaCroix also found that the dog was weight-bearing when he examined her on December 7, 1992. He testified, and the board found, that the dog would not be weight-bearing if she had sustained a tendon repair two weeks earlier. According to LaCroix's testimony, the dog would not have been weight-bearing for at least four weeks had she sustained a lacerated tendon in her leg.

After her visit to LaCroix's office with the dog, O'Connell contacted the department. The department held a compliance conference on August 10, 1993, and, on November 19, 1993, the department submitted charges against the plaintiff to the board. The statement of charges alleged that the plaintiff did not conform to the acceptable standard of care for veterinarians because the plaintiff (1) misdiagnosed the dog's condition, (2) misrepresented the dog's condition to her owners and (3) misrepresented to the owners the treatment that he provided to the dog.

On December 8, 1993, the department sent a notice of hearing to the plaintiff. The board held hearings on April 6 and 27, 1994. Counsel represented the plaintiff at the administrative hearings. In addition to hearing the testimony of the plaintiff, O'Connell and LaCroix, the board heard testimony from Edward A. Williams, a veterinarian with considerable experience treating dogs. Williams reviewed the plaintiffs treatment notes, X rays and the X rays taken by LaCroix. He testified, and the board found, that the dog did not sustain a fracture and that the plaintiff did not use surgical steel wire to treat the dog's leg.

Williams also testified, and the board found, that the plaintiff violated the customary standard of care required of a licensed veterinarian when he informed O'Connell that the dog's leg was fractured and that he had treated it with surgical steel wire. On the basis of the testimony of LaCroix and Williams, as well as its own expertise in reviewing the X rays and treatment notes from this case, the board found that the dog had sustained no bone fractures and that the plaintiff had misdiagnosed her injuries. On the basis of O'Connell's testimony and LaCroix' examination, the board also found that the plaintiff had misinformed O'Connell concerning the dog's injuries and the treatment that he had provided.

The plaintiff defended his course of treatment and testified that he likely saved the dog's life. He claimed that he did perform a tendon repair on the dog, using number one or number two gauge nylon. He denied using, or telling O'Connell that he used, surgical steel wire. He argued that the type of tendon repair he performed could not be seen on X ray examination and that O'Connell misunderstood his explanation of the treatment he had given the dog.

The board concluded that the plaintiffs conduct violated General Statutes § 20-202 (2). Acting pursuant to the authority granted the board by General Statutes §§ 19a-17 and 20-202, the board ordered that the plaintiffs license be revoked effective forty-five days following the issuance of its decision. The plaintiff, thereafter, appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a).2 Among other claims, he alleged that the board violated his due process rights and that the record did not contain substantial evidence supporting the board's conclusions. The court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reargument on the issue of whether the board's sanction violated the plaintiff's due process rights. The court heard argument on the motion but denied the relief requested. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they become relevant in the context of the plaintiff's claims.

General Statutes § 4-183 (j)3 governs appellate review of agency decisions. "[W]e note that our review of an administrative appeal is limited. Our Supreme Court has established a firm standard that is appropriately deferential to agency decision making, yet goes beyond a mere judicial rubber stamping of an agency's decisions.... Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the agency's decision, and where the record reflects that the agency followed appropriate procedures." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Menillo v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 47 Conn. App. 325, 331, 703 A.2d 1180 (1997).

"Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited.... [I]t is the well established practice ... to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 669, 757 A.2d 1 (2000). Our task is to review the court's decision to determine whether it comports with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., and whether "the court reviewing the administrative agency acted unreasonably, illegally, or in abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 48 Conn. App. 599, 605, 712 A.2d 423 (1998).

I

The board found, on the basis of its own expertise, that number one or number two gauge nylon is too thick to be used effectively in repairing tendons in a dog's leg. The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly approved the board's finding based on specialized technical knowledge without giving timely notice to the parties that it was doing so, in violation of General Statutes § 4-178 (7) and the plaintiffs due process rights. We disagree.

The procedural rules embodied in the UAPA, applicable to the present case, satisfy the procedural safeguards mandated by the due process clause. Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 228 Conn. 651, 661, 638 A.2d 6 (1994). A party to an administrative hearing possesses the right to respond to evidence, cross-examine witnesses and present evidence relevant to the issues before the agency. General Statutes § 4-177c.4 "Due process of law requires not only that there be due notice of the hearing but that at the hearing the parties involved have a right to produce relevant evidence, and an opportunity to know the facts on which the agency is asked to act, to cross-examine witnesses and to offer rebuttal evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 536, 525 A.2d 940 (1987).

A

The present dispute concerns the application of specific...

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