Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Ark Union Station, Inc.
Decision Date | 03 August 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 14–cv–2188 (KBJ),14–cv–2188 (KBJ) |
Citation | 268 F.Supp.3d 196 |
Parties | WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. ARK UNION STATION, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Michael Kelly Guss, Office of General Counsel, Gerard Joseph Stief, Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff
Christopher Raymond Costabile, Law Office of Christopher R. Costabile, Fairfax, VA, Heather R. Beygo, Crosswhite, Limbrick & Sinclair, Kristine A. Crosswhite, Crosswhite, Limbrick & Sinclair, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District JudgeThis is a case about whose interests the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") serves when it spends money to repair damaged transit infrastructure in the Metrorail system—a proverbial third rail of this region's politics. It is also, quite literally, a case about Metro's third rail. On September 25, 2011, a sewer pipe burst under the (since-closed) America Restaurant in Union Station, and the water and other debris that leaked into the ground below impacted an underground electrical traction power substation ("TPSS") WMATA owns and uses to operate a portion of the Metro system's Red Line. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 13–14; see also Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Opp'n to Union Station Mot."), ECF No. 10, at 5 ( ).)1 WMATA alleges that this particular leak "caused fire and water damage to the TPSS and related equipment" (Compl. ¶ 13), which, in turn, "caused WMATA to incur extensive repairs, replacement of equipment, and other lost revenue" (id. ¶ 15).
To recover these expenses, WMATA filed the instant lawsuit against Ark Union Station Incorporated and Ark Restaurants Corporation, which jointly operated the America Restaurant (collectively, "the Restaurant Defendants"). WMATA also named as defendants both Union Station Redevelopment Corporation, which "was responsible for maintenance and construction projects" at Union Station (id. ¶ 11), and Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., which "was the property management company for Union Station" (collectively, "the Union Station Defendants") (id. ¶ 12).2 WMATA's one-count complaint asserts a claim of common law negligence on the grounds that "Defendants, jointly and severally, breached their duty to WMATA by not maintaining or preventing the pipe in question from breaking and leaking water, and otherwise failing to take immediate action once the pipe failed." (Id. ¶ 21.) WMATA asks the Court to "enter judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $6,000,000, plus pre-and post-judgment interest and costs[.]" (Id. ¶ 22.)
Significantly for present purposes, WMATA filed its complaint on December 23, 2014, which is slightly more than three years after the water damage occurred. The time lag between the pipe-burst incident and WMATA's filing of the instant complaint has turned into a major source of conflict among the parties: in separate motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) —which are before this Court at present—the Union Station Defendants and the Restaurant Defendants argue that this lawsuit must be dismissed as untimely because WMATA's claim is barred by the District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations for actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed[.]" D.C. Code § 12–301(8). (See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Defs. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc. & Union Station Redevelopment Corp. ("Union Station Mot."), ECF No. 7–1, at 8; Mem. in Supp. of Ark Restaurants Corp. & Ark Union Station Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Restaurant Mot."), ECF No. 22, at 3–9.) See also Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. , 518 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C. 1986) ( ). Both sets of Defendants fully acknowledge that WMATA is an agency of the District of Columbia government and that the District's statute of limitations "does not apply ... to actions brought by the District of Columbia government." D.C. Code § 12–301. However, Defendants argue that WMATA's claim is nevertheless time-barred because the D.C.-government exemption only applies to WMATA lawsuits that seek to vindicate "public rights," and in Defendants' view, this is not such a lawsuit. (See Union Station Mot. at 8–17; Restaurant Mot. at 3–9.)
In response, WMATA offers several reasons why the instant action is not time-barred. (See generally Opp'n to Union Station Mot.; Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs. Ark Restaurant Corp. & Ark Union Station Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Opp'n to Restaurant Mot."), ECF No. 23.) First, WMATA argues that it is exempted from the statute of limitations regardless of whether this lawsuit seeks to vindicate a public right, because WMATA derives from Maryland and Virginia a categorical immunity from statutes of limitation. (See Opp'n to Union Station Mot. at 6–9; Opp'n to Restaurant Mot. at 1–2.) Second, WMATA maintains that even if it possesses only the limited municipal immunity from statutes of limitation that is reflected in D.C. Code § 12–301, it is exempted from the statute of limitations under that provision because this lawsuit does, in fact, seek to vindicate a public right. (See Opp'n to Union Station Mot. at 9–17; Opp'n to Restaurant Mot. at 2–4.) Finally, WMATA argues that, assuming arguendo that the instant lawsuit is subject to the statute of limitations, it is nevertheless timely, because the applicable provision of that statute is the one that prescribes a five-year limitations period "for the recovery of damages for an injury to real property from toxic substances including products containing asbestos[,]" D.C. Code § 12–301(10), and not the provision that contains a three-year period for actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed[,]" id. § 12–301(8). (See Opp'n to Union Station Mot. at 17.)
Both motions to dismiss are now ripe for this Court's review. (See Union Station Mot.; Opp'n to Union Station Mot.; Mem. in Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc.'s & Union Station Redevelopment Corp.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Union Station Reply"), ECF No. 11; Restaurant Mot.; Opp'n to Restaurant Mot.) In addition, the Court ordered supplemental briefing from WMATA and the Union Station Defendants regarding the relevance of case law concerning WMATA's sovereign immunity from tort suits, and the extent to which WMATA's claim seeks to vindicate a public right. (See Min. Order of Feb. 17, 2016; see also Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss () , ECF No. 18; Pl.'s Suppl. Br. in Opp'n to Defs. Mot. to Dismiss () , ECF No. 19; Reply Mem. of Defs. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc. & Union Station Redevelopment Corp. () , ECF No. 20; Pl.'s Reply to the Defs.' Suppl. Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss () , ECF No. 21.) Having considered the parties' arguments, and for the reasons explained fully below, this Court agrees with WMATA that this lawsuit seeks to vindicate a public right because it advances WMATA's charter purpose of operating public transit facilities, and therefore, WMATA's claim is not subject to the statute of limitations prescribed by the D.C. Code. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss that the Union Station Defendants and the Restaurant Defendants have filed will be DENIED . A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
WMATA is a "common agency" of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, D.C. Code § 9–1107.01(2), and the parties debate the degree to which that status renders WMATA immune from the running of the District's statute of limitations in this lawsuit—a negligence action arising under District of Columbia law. Thus, WMATA's history and structure are relevant background, and so too is the law of government immunity from statutes of limitation, both in general and as it exists in the District of Columbia.
On November 6, 1966, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia entered into a compact that "created WMATA" in order "to operate a mass transit system for the District of Columbia and the surrounding suburban areas of Maryland and Virginia." Morris v. WMATA , 781 F.2d 218, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Congress consented to the WMATA Compact as the Constitution requires, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and it also enacted the Compact as part of the District of Columbia's local law, see Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. Compact, Pub. L. No. 89–774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966) ( ). In a section entitled "Purpose and Functions," the Compact instructs WMATA "to plan, develop, finance and cause to be operated improved transit facilities ... as part of a balanced regional system of transportation[.]" Id. § 9–1107.01(2).
Pursuant to the Compact, WMATA is "a body corporate and politic" that exists as a "common agency" of the District, Maryland, and Virginia. Id. § 9–1107.01(2), (4) (emphasis added). It was "foreseen" that WMATA's "fare revenues [would] never come close to covering [its] costs[.]" Morris , 781 F.2d at 225 ; see also D.C. Code § 9–1107.01(16) ( ). Thus, the Compact contains "[c]ommitments for [f]inancial [p]articipation" from each of the signatory jurisdictions, D.C. Code § 9–1107.01(18), and it also authorizes WMATA to borrow money, issue bonds, and raise revenue through other means, see id. § 9–1107.01(27).
Notably, the Compact does not address the degree to which WMATA is subject to the statutes of limitation of its signatory...
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