Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n v. Hous. Auth. of Seattle

• Decision Date: 09 May 2022
• Docket Number: 82877-1-I
• Citation: 509 P.3d 319
• Parties: WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, presenting the case in support of the complaint filed by Carmen Romero, Appellant, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

509 P.3d 319

WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, presenting the case in support of the complaint filed by Carmen Romero, Appellant,

v.HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent.

No. 82877-1-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED May 9, 2022

Ashley McDowell, Attorney at Law, 800 5th Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Appellant.

Leigh Ann Collings Tift, Seattle Housing Authority, 190 Queen Anne Ave. N Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98109-4975, for Respondent.

OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART

Smith, A.C.J.

¶1 Carmen Romero relinquished her Section 8 housing subsidy under circumstances that she claims were less than voluntary because her disabilities prevented her from fully understanding the consequences. The Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC) brought this action against the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA), requesting a reasonable accommodation of Romero's disabilities in the form of a reinstatement of her housing voucher. The Superior Court dismissed HRC's complaint on SHA's CR 12(b)(6) motion.

¶2 We conclude that SHA is subject to the requirements of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch. 49.60 RCW, because it provides services in connection with real estate transactions. And because HRC sufficiently alleged that Romero may have needed an accommodation to afford her an equal opportunity to access housing, the court erred by dismissing HRC's complaint. Accordingly, we reverse.

FACTS

¶3 SHA administers a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program providing rent subsidies to low-income tenants in Seattle.¹ SHA issued a Section 8 voucher to Romero beginning in January 2012.

¶4 In May 2017, Romero began an e-mail exchange with Katherine Wiles, an SHA employee, about Romero's plan to move to Florida. Romero told Wiles that it was her understanding that she could not transfer her voucher out of state and would need to reapply in Florida. She asked Wiles about the process for giving up her voucher, and asked for confirmation that she could not transfer her voucher to St. Augustine, Florida. Wiles told Romero she could not transfer her voucher because there was no housing authority in the zip code Romero provided, and gave Romero a "Voluntary Program Exit" form. Romero signed the form on June 19, 2017, and wrote on the form, "I am moving to Florida (Palatka). I gave [Wiles] the zip code however there is no housing authority office with the zip[ ]code I provided." But the zip code that Romero provided is in fact served by the Palatka Housing Authority.

¶5 One week later on June 26, Romero e-mailed Wiles, providing a new zip code where she was living and asking if Wiles could transfer her paperwork to that zip code's housing authority office. Wiles responded that Romero could not reverse the voluntary relinquishment of her voucher.

¶6 Romero, who had moved to Florida to pursue a job opportunity, later learned that the opportunity was in fact a sex trafficking scheme. Romero was able to avoid the scheme and returned to Seattle on July 4, 2017, where she had difficulty obtaining stable housing.

¶7 On January 26, 2018, Romero submitted a request to SHA for a reasonable accommodation of her disabilities in the form of a voucher reinstatement. Romero has Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Bipolar Depression, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, and learning disabilities that impact her decision making ability, comprehension, and ability to process directions. In her request, she attached a letter from her psychiatric mental health provider, who explained that Romero "needed to be given detailed information in order to understand the consequences of her actions and that she benefitted from in-person interaction in order to comprehend information at the same level as someone without her disability."

¶8 SHA denied Romero's request on June 16, 2018 and denied her appeal on November 27, 2018. Romero has faced housing insecurity as a result.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶9 After her SHA appeal was denied, Romero timely filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which later referred the complaint to HRC. In March 2021, HRC initiated a complaint against SHA in Superior Court, alleging a violation of the WLAD. HRC alleged that SHA has an administrative plan that provides for "Special Issuance Vouchers," which can be issued outside of the waiting list including as an accommodation for a person with a disability, and that Romero's requested accommodation was therefore reasonable.

¶10 SHA moved for judgment on the pleadings under CR 12(b)(6), alleging that the issuance of Section 8 vouchers was not a "real estate transaction" subject to the WLAD, that SHA did not fail to reasonably accommodate Romero, and that HRC's complaint was untimely. It attached copies of Romero's program exit form and some of the e-mail correspondence that had been referenced in the complaint. Along with its response, HRC attached documentation of Romero's complaint to HUD. SHA then conceded that the request was timely. With its reply, SHA also submitted copies of its website showing that the voucher waitlist was closed at the time that Romero requested reinstatement of her voucher. The court granted SHA's motion, and HRC appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶11 HRC contends that the court erred by considering facts outside of the pleadings and by granting SHA's motion to dismiss. We conclude that the court did not err by considering attachments to the parties’ briefing, that SHA is subject to the WLAD in its role as a voucher administrator, and that HRC adequately pleaded a discrimination claim. Therefore, we reverse.

Standard of Review and Consideration of Facts Outside of Pleadings

¶12 We review orders on CR 12(b)(6) motions de novo. Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 183 Wash.2d 820, 830, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015). "All facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and we may consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff's claim." FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wash.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014). "Dismissal based on failure to state a claim is appropriate only if we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with the complaint which would justify recovery." Byrd v. Pierce County, 5 Wash. App. 2d 249, 256-57, 425 P.3d 948 (2018). Therefore, a CR 12(b)(6) motion should be granted " ‘sparingly and with care’ and, as a practical matter, ‘only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.’ " Kinney v. Cook, 159 Wash.2d 837, 842, 154 P.3d 206 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoffer v. State, 110 Wash.2d 415, 420, 755 P.2d 781, 793 (1988) ).

¶13 HRC challenges the court's consideration of various factual assertions and exhibits submitted by SHA. Generally, on a CR 12(b)(6) motion, if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ... and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by rule 56." CR 12(b)(7). However, " ‘[d]ocuments whose contents are alleged in a complaint but which are not physically attached to the pleading may ... be considered in ruling on a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’ " Trujillo, 183 Wash.2d at 827 n.2, 355 P.3d 1100 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wash. App. 709, 726, 189 P.3d 168 (2008) ). Furthermore, the court "may take judicial notice of public documents if their authenticity cannot be reasonably disputed" without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Rodriguez, 144 Wash. App. at 725-26, 189 P.3d 168. Finally, "where the ‘basic operative facts are undisputed and the core issue is one of law,’ the motion to dismiss need not be treated as a motion for summary judgment." Trujillo, 183 Wash.2d at 827 n.2, 355 P.3d 1100 (quoting Ortblad v. State, 85 Wash.2d 109, 111, 530 P.2d 635 (1975) ).

¶14 Here, SHA attached two documents to its motion to dismiss: Romero's May 30, 2017 e-mail to Wiles and Romero's Voluntary Program Exit form. These were referenced in HRC's complaint and were therefore appropriately considered by the trial court. The other documents submitted by the parties were not referenced in the complaint, but the parties alleged that the court could take judicial notice of them as matters of public record: a July 19, 2019 HUD letter referring Romero's complaint to the Seattle Office for Civil Rights, an October 28, 2019 letter informing Romero that HRC was considering her complaint, and copies of SHA's public information website. The trial court did not specify that it took judicial notice of these exhibits, and it is somewhat unclear whether it considered them at all.² Nonetheless, we conclude that the court did not err to the extent it considered these exhibits and that its consideration of these documents does not transform the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wash. App. 838, 845, 347 P.3d 487 (2015) ("Although the record does not indicate whether the trial court did in fact take judicial notice of these documents, the court's consideration of the documents was appropriate in this CR 12(b)(6) motion. ... Because Jackson cannot challenge the authenticity of these readily available public documents, the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of these documents.").

Real Estate Transactions and Services

¶15 The first issue is whether SHA engages in "real estate transactions" or "services in connection therewith" when it administers Section 8 vouchers, such that it is subject to the requirements of the WLAD under RCW 49.60.222. We conclude that it does.

¶16 "The primary goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Cascade...