Washam-Buford v. City of Prichard
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Act. 1:21-cv-199-TFM-MU |
| Parties | JAMAYA WASHAM-BUFORD, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of JAMES A. BUFORD, JR., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PRICHARD, ALABAMA, and OFFICER JAY WILSON, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Brief in Support Thereof (Doc. 30 filed 04/29/21). After a stay of proceedings, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why the motion to dismiss should not be granted on or before April 10, 2023. Doc. 48. Plaintiff did not file a response to the show cause order, and the deadline has long passed. Having considered the motion and the fact that Plaintiff's appeal with the probate court has now been exhausted, the Court finds the motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is due to be GRANTED, as discussed below.
Plaintiff originally petitioned the Probate Court of Mobile County Alabama for Letters of Administration on May 7, 2019 with the intent of filing a wrongful death action on behalf of James A. Buford. Doc. 30-1 at 3. On May 30, 2019, the probate court issued a ruling indicating that Letters of Administration on the decedent's estate would be issued to Plaintiff subject to a $20,000.00 bond being filed with the probate court. Id. at 8-9. On August 20, 2019 Plaintiff's probate counsel then filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Letters of Administration, which was granted on January 8, 2020. Id. at 11, 17. As a result, Plaintiff was never appointed as the Administratrix of Buford's Estate (“the Estate”).
On April 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case asserting a wrongful death claim and various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Prichard and Officer Rodney Wilson (collectively, “Defendants”). Doc. 1. Plaintiff's claims arise out of the death of James A. Buford, who was killed in a motor vehicle accident following a police chase on April 23, 2019. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Buford's death was the result of excessive force, unconstitutional customs or policies within the City, failure to train, and negligence on behalf of both Defendants. Id.
On September 24 and 27, 2021 Officer Wilson and the City of Prichard filed their respective answers. Docs. 9, 10. After some settlement negotiations conducted by the Magistrate Judge, it was discovered that Plaintiff was not the Administratrix of the Estate. Consequently, settlement negotiations were terminated and on April 15, 2022, the City of Prichard filed a motion to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense “lack of standing” which the Court granted. Docs. 29, 31. On April 29, 2022, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of standing as a jurisdictional issue. Doc. 30. Then, the City of Prichard filed its amended answer. Doc. 32.
Plaintiff initially filed a request for an extension stating that the dismissal of the probate matter was unbeknownst to the Buford family and without their consent. Doc. 33. Further, Plaintiff had filed a motion with the probate court to reinstate the proceedings and appoint her as the Administratrix. Id. The Court granted the extension request. Doc. 34. Next, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay Briefing on the Defendants' motion to dismiss, pending resolution of her probate court appeal because the probate court had denied her motion to reinstate the proceedings. Doc. 35.
Defendants opposed the motion and Plaintiff filed a reply. See Docs. 37, 38, 39. Ultimately, the Court granted the motion to stay and instructed Plaintiff to file ongoing status reports to apprise the Court of the probate appeal. See Docs. 40, 42.
After noting deficiencies on the probate appeal, ultimately the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the action. Despite filing a motion to reinstate the appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the request on February 14, 2023. See Doc. 45. Defendants requested that, as the appeal was no longer pending, the Court lift the stay in this case and rule on the pending motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff conceded that Defendants were correct, the appeal was dismissed, and requested time for briefing on the motion to dismiss. Doc. 46.
Thus, Plaintiff was never appointed as Administratrix of the Estate, and she has now exhausted all of her appeals on the issue. On March 20, 2023, this Court entered an order vacating the stay and ordering Plaintiff to show cause on or before April 10, 2023 as to why the instant motion to dismiss should not be granted. Doc. 48. Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion to dismiss or the show cause order. Further, in a joint motion for extension of the pretrial deadlines and trial, the parties note that “[a]fter researching on the remaining issues, Plaintiff declined to file further pleadings in response to the show cause order.” Therefore, the motion to dismiss is ripe for review and the Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary.
A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion directly challenges the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007); Gilmore v. Day, 125 F.Supp.2d 468, 470 (M.D. Ala. 2000). The burden of proof for a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is on the party averring jurisdiction. Gilmore, 124 F.Supp.2d at 471 (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942)). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may occur either facially or factually. Makro v. Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)); Stalley v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251).
A “facial attack” is based solely on the pleadings and requires the court to assess whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Stalley, 524 F.3d at 123233; Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925 n.5; Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). “On a facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a 12(b)(6) motion-the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, 733 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013) (evaluating whether the plaintiff “has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction” in the complaint and employing standards similar to those that govern a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) review). The Court is “not required to accept mere conclusory allegations as true, nor are we required to accept as true allegations in the complaint that are contrary to factual details presented in the exhibits.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 2007). “[W]hen the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern.” Id. at 1206. When discussing exhibits on a facial attack, the Court may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint as well as those attached to a motion to dismiss. Lawrence v. United States, 597 Fed.Appx. 599, 602 (11th Cir. 2015).[1] Exhibits attached to the complaint are considered part of the complaint for all purposes. Id. Further, exhibits attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered for a facial attack if the documents are central to the plaintiff's claim and their authenticity is not disputed. Id.
On the other hand, a “factual attack” challenges “subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925. On a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) factual attack, the court “may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, in resolving a factual attack, the court “may consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and affidavits.” Makro, 543 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925 n.5); accord Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1233; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S., E.P.A., 105 F.3d 599, 603 (11th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Miccosukee Tribe]. “[A] trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case without presuming the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Makro, 543 F.3d at 1528 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Willett v. United States, 24 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1173 (M.D. Ala. 2014) ( the same). In other words, “the district court should apply a summary judgment standard when ruling on the motion to dismiss as a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction.” Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 603 (citing Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1530).
However, the Court is not at liberty to weigh the evidence when the factual attack “also implicates an element of the cause of action.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. The Eleventh Circuit has specifically cautioned district courts “should only rely on [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) if the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff's causes of action.” Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925 (quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Defendants argue that this matter is due to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, as the Plaintiff is not the administratrix of the Estate, she does not have standing...
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