Washburn v. State

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Carter
• Citation: Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App. 2007)
• Decision Date: 05 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-07-00041-CR.,06-07-00041-CR.
• Parties: Charles David WASHBURN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

235 S.W.3d 346

Charles David WASHBURN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 06-07-00041-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted August 7, 2007.

Decided September 5, 2007.

David E. Moore, Gregory Waldron, Longview, for appellant.

William M. Jennings, Dist. Atty., W. Ty Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Longview, for appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice CARTER.

Charles David Washburn appeals from his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). When dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle accident, Trooper Jonathon Anderson found Washburn sitting on the tailgate of a truck. Washburn was injured, and his face was covered in blood. Washburn admitted drinking, and Anderson could detect the odor of alcohol on or about Washburn's person. At the hospital, Anderson requested a specimen of blood, provided the warnings required by statute to be given to an arrested person, and apprised Washburn of the consequences for refusing to provide a requested specimen of blood. The warning, form DIC-24, read by Anderson, begins: "You are under arrest for an offense. . . ." Washburn consented to providing a specimen of blood. After the trial court denied Washburn's motion to suppress the blood specimen, Washburn pled nolo contendere and the trial court found Washburn guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at 180 days in the county jail, probated for fifteen months. Washburn appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm.

In his sole point of error, Washburn argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the blood specimen was obtained illegally as a result of unlawful coercion and duress. According to Washburn, Anderson incorrectly informed Washburn his driver's license would be suspended if he refused to provide a blood specimen. Washburn contends that, because he was not under arrest, his driver's license could not be suspended. At the hearing, Washburn testified he would have refused the request if he had not been incorrectly informed by the police officer.

We review the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence by applying a bifurcated standard of review deferring to the trial court's determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, but reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); see Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.App.1997). The trial court's evidentiary ruling "will be upheld on appeal if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record." Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Generally, we review de novo determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause after granting deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution guarantee the right to be secure against unreasonable searches. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. The taking of a blood specimen is considered a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd); see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (search reasonable due to exigent circumstances). The defendant alleging a Fourth Amendment violation bears the burden of producing some evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). "A defendant meets his initial burden of proof by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant." Id. The burden then shifts to the State to prove that the search or seizure was nonetheless reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 672-73. Under Article 38.23, evidence must be excluded once a causal connection between the illegality and the evidence is established. Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim. App.1996); see TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2005).

The Texas Transportation Code provides that a person who has been arrested for an offense arising out of acts committed while the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is deemed to have consented to the taking of one or more specimens of breath or blood for analysis to determine the alcohol concentration or the presence of a controlled substance. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.011 (Vernon 1999); Coggins v. State, 160 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.). However, the person retains an absolute right to refuse a test.¹ TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.013 (Vernon 1999); Coggins, 160 S.W.3d at 179. Consent may be involuntary if induced by an officer's misstatement of the consequences of refusal.²

The Texas Transportation Code only requires an officer to give the statutory warnings when the person has been arrested. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.011 ("If a person is arrested . . . ."); and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012 ("One or more specimens . . . may be taken if the person is arrested. . . ."). Because the warnings are only required when a suspect is under arrest, Washburn claims Trooper Anderson incorrectly informed him that his driver's license would be suspended if he refused to provide the specimen.³ Washburn's argument requires us to first determine whether Washburn was under arrest at the time the specimen was requested and then whether Washburn's consent was voluntary.

Washburn Was Under Arrest at the Time of the Request

An individual is arrested when he or she has been actually placed under restraint or taken into custody. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (Vernon 2005). "A person is in `custody' only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)). At least four general situations may constitute custody: (1) the suspect is physically deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way, (2) a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he or she cannot leave, (3) law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his or her freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he or she is free to leave. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained the fourth situation as follows:

the officers' knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect. Such manifestation could occur if information substantiating probable cause is related by the officers to the suspect or by the suspect to the officers. Moreover, given our emphasis on probable cause as a "factor" in other cases, situation four does not automatically establish custody; rather, custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest.

Id.

Trooper Anderson had probable cause to arrest Washburn and did not inform Washburn that he was free to leave. Washburn's car collided with a tree in a suspicious manner. Anderson testified there were no passengers involved in the accident. The wrecked vehicle Washburn was sitting on when Anderson arrived was, according to information obtained after checking the license plate number, held in Washburn's name. At the time of the accident, the road was dry and Washburn's car began to skid while in the lane designated for oncoming traffic. Washburn exhibited numerous signs of intoxication. He admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and Anderson could detect the odor of alcohol on or about Washburn's person. We conclude Anderson had probable cause to arrest Washburn for DWI. See Knisley, 81 S.W.3d 478 (officer had probable cause to arrest operator of motorcycle based on 1) gouges in the pavement which appeared to have been caused by a motorcycle sliding across the pavement, and 2) the operator of the motorcycle smelled of alcohol and was unable to answer some questions); see also Reynolds v. State, 902 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (probable cause to arrest when officer testified defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, breath that smelled of alcohol, and posed a danger to himself and others).

Further, Washburn was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the accident. It is beyond dispute that Trooper Anderson had probable cause to arrest Washburn for driving under the influence by a minor. A person under the age of twenty-one "commits an offense if the minor operates a motor vehicle in a public place while having any detectable amount of alcohol in the minor's system." TEX. ALCO. BEV.CODE ANN. § 106.041 (Vernon 2007). Reviewing de novo the finding of probable cause, we conclude Anderson had probable cause to arrest Washburn for driving under the influence by a minor or for DWI.

The next issue is whether Washburn was under arrest at the time of the offense. The State cites Bell v. State, 881 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), which contains almost identical facts to the case at issue. In Bell, the defendant was transported to a hospital following an automobile accident where he ran his car into a ditch. Id. at 796. The officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath but did not conduct any sobriety tests. Id. At the hospital, the officer read the DIC-24 form to the...