Washington Federation of State Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO v. State

Decision Date23 June 1983
Docket NumberAFL-CI,No. 48937-8,P,48937-8
Citation665 P.2d 1337,99 Wn.2d 878
PartiesWASHINGTON FEDERATION OF STATE EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 28,etitioner, v. STATE of Washington and John D. Spellman, as Governor; Office of Financial Management, State of Washington, Joseph Taller, Director, Respondents.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Cordes, Cordes & Younglove, Douglas P. Wyckoff, Olympia, for petitioner.

Ken Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., James K. Pharris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.

WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

This matter came before the court on an emergency motion for discretionary review and injunctive relief. Petitioner, Washington Federation of State Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO (WFSE), asked this court to enjoin respondents from implementing their announced plans to delay the payment of salaries to state employees and officers, described in the pleadings as the "lagged payroll" plan. On August 24, 1982, then Chief Justice Robert F. Brachtenbach heard oral argument on the motion and, pursuant to RAP 8.3, granted the requested relief by enjoining implementation of the lagged payroll plan until the matter could be reviewed by the en banc court. Following On July 16, 1982, Governor John Spellman wrote a letter to all Washington State employees to inform them that effective August 31, 1982, the State would implement a new "lagged payroll" method of payment. This system was to change the traditional payday from the last working day of each month to approximately the 10th day of the following month. The Governor's stated purpose for shifting to a lagged payroll system was to permit the State of Washington to realize an anticipated $4 million profit by investing state employees' salaries for an additional 10-day period. 1 Also on July 16, 1982, Governor Spellman wrote to numerous financial institutions in Washington to inform them of the proposed lagged payroll plan. The letter asked for their cooperation in accommodating state employees during the transition to the lagged payroll system by adjusting payment due dates whenever possible.

                oral argument to the en banc court on September 7, 1982, we filed an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and requiring that a trial be held in Thurston County Superior Court within 30 days of that date to resolve the remaining issues.   With this opinion, we now set forth the reasons for that order
                

Later that same day, July 16, 1982, petitioner WFSE commenced suit in Thurston County Superior Court requesting that the proposed lagged payroll system be declared unlawful and unconstitutional. Petitioner also requested preliminary injunctive relief to preserve the existing method of payment of state employees' salaries until the court could consider and determine the legal issues presented in the complaint.

On August 9, 1982, Thurston County Superior Court Judge Gerry L. Alexander heard the matter on the parties' On August 20, 1982, the matter was again considered by Judge Alexander. During the interim period, both sides submitted affidavits detailing the costs and expected savings of the lagged payroll plans proposed by each. (WFSE proposed a lagged payroll calling for paydays twice per month.) In the interests of efficiency, both sides permitted Petitioner WFSE filed a motion for discretionary review in this court on August 23, 1982. On August 24, 1982, then Chief Justice Brachtenbach heard oral argument on petitioner's motion for discretionary review and request for preliminary injunctive relief. In an order filed that same day, the Chief Justice granted the motion for discretionary review and, pursuant to RAP 8.3, enjoined implementation of the proposed lagged payroll plan until further order of the court. The order also called for briefing and supporting documentation on the questions of: (1) whether the preliminary injunction should be continued by the en banc court; and (2) the necessity and amount of any bond which might be required of petitioner.

                cross-motions for summary judgment.   The court found the lagged payroll proposal did not unconstitutionally impair state employees' private contracts because the State did not act affirmatively to impair such contracts.   Accordingly, an order of partial summary judgment was entered in favor of respondents on that issue.   No appeal was taken as to that determination.   The court went on to consider the legality of the proposed lagged payroll system in light of RCW 42.16.010 and RCW 42.16.017. 2  After determining a lagged payroll system was authorized under the statutes, the court found questions of fact remained to be determined at trial.   These issues centered on whether any alternative lagged payroll system could achieve the same or better payroll accounting efficiency goals without also creating undue hardship to state employees and a windfall profit to the State.   Because of these factual issues, the matter was continued for further proceedings so that the record could be supplemented with affidavits bearing on these issues
                the court to rule without live testimony based upon the affidavits alone.   The court first restated its determination that a change to a lagged payroll system was authorized under RCW 42.16.010, in conjunction with RCW 42.16.017.   The court then held that although Governor Spellman's letter contemplated implementation of the lagged payroll plan for an unauthorized purpose--to raise additional revenues--it also had the authorized effect of facilitating payroll and accounting efficiencies.   Therefore, the lagged payroll plan was found to be consistent with the statutory requirements authorizing such action.   Petitioner's request for preliminary injunctive relief was denied because the court found that respondents would likely prevail on the merits, both sides would suffer irreparable harm if the other prevailed, and petitioner had failed to make a sufficient showing of harm to warrant injunctive relief
                

To begin, we point out that the ruling of then Chief Justice Brachtenbach enjoining implementation of the lagged payroll plan was based upon RAP 8.3, which provides:

Except when prohibited by statute, the appellate court has authority to issue orders, before or after acceptance of review, to insure effective and equitable review, including authority to grant injunctive or other relief ... (Italics ours.) The purpose of the above rule is to permit appellate courts to grant preliminary relief in aid of their appellate jurisdiction so as to prevent destruction of the fruits of a successful appeal. See In re Koome, 82 Wash.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973); Shamley v. Olympia, 47 Wash.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955). That is precisely what the order enjoining implementation of the lagged payroll plan accomplished. At the time of his emergency ruling, the Chief Justice did not have available to him the trial court's written order, the trial court's oral rulings, or the benefit of legal briefing by the parties. By issuing an order enjoining the proposed change to a lagged payroll system pursuant to RAP 8.3, the Chief Justice merely preserved the status quo in order to insure effective and equitable review by the en banc court. Since the issues now before the court are here upon the referral of the Chief Justice, we treat this matter as an appeal in the nature of a motion to modify his preliminary ruling. See RAP 17.7.

We take this opportunity to emphasize that our decision is in no way meant to resolve the merits of the underlying lawsuit between petitioner and respondents. Nor is our decision meant to indicate a preference for one payroll method over another. Those issues are not before us. Instead, our decision is limited to deciding whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief to petitioner WFSE because it failed to meet the requirements of the injunction statute, RCW 7.40.020. 3

I. MOTION FOR RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON REVIEW

As a preliminary matter, we must dispose of respondents' motion to allow additional evidence on review. The additional evidence offered consists of: (1) a memorandum and order of Joe Taller, Director of the Office of Financial Management, dated August 26, 1982, directing all state agencies to implement the proposed lagged payroll plan; and (2) an administrative order of Mr. Taller regarding promulgation and adoption of WAC 82-50, establishing emergency rules for implementation of the lagged payroll plan, along with a notice of intention to adopt permanent rules in accordance with RCW 34.04.025.

Additional evidence on review may be taken by an appellate court, pursuant to RAP 9.11(a), if the following criteria are met:

The appellate court may only on its own initiative direct that additional evidence be taken before the decision of a case on review if: (1) additional proof of facts is needed to fairly resolve the issues on review, (2) the additional evidence would probably change the decision being reviewed, (3) it is equitable to excuse a party's failure to present the evidence to the trial court, (4) the remedy available to a party through post-judgment motions in the trial court is inadequate or unnecessarily expensive, (5) the appellate court remedy of granting a new trial is inadequate or unnecessarily expensive, and (6) it would be inequitable to decide the case solely on the evidence already taken in the trial court.

The above rule permits the taking of new evidence only if all six conditions are met, and then only on the court's own initiative. 4 Although a literal reading of the rule suggests This case presents a rather unusual situation in that the additional evidence submitted by respondents was created after initiation of this lawsuit and in anticipation of oral argument before the en banc court. Nonetheless, we think those documents are necessary to fairly resolve the issues on review. This is because under RCW 42.16.010 and RCW 42.16.017, the Director of Financial...

To continue reading

Request your trial
76 cases
  • Kucera v. State, Dept. of Transp., 68428-6.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 16 Marzo 2000
    ......v. . The STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and the Washington ... on Behalf of Washington Environmental Council. .         Glenna Malanca, Knute Rife, ... Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 99 Wash.2d 878, 887, 665 P.2d 1337 ......
  • Waremart v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 67029-3.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 16 Diciembre 1999
    ...discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case." Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Council 28 v. State, 99 Wash.2d 878, 887, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983). Furthermore, the "trial court's decision exercising that discretion will be upheld unless it is ba......
  • State v. Elmore, 64085-8.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 7 Octubre 1999
    ... 985 P.2d 289 139 Wash.2d 250 STATE of Washington, Respondent, . v. . Clark Richard ELMORE, aka ...) (same), and Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO v. State, 99 Wash.2d 878, ......
  • Neighborhood v. Washington, 35528-4-III
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • 29 Enero 2019
    ...acts complained of are either resulting in or will result in actual and substantial injury to him. Washington Federation of State Employees v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 888, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983). Because all three of these criteria must be satisfied to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Shareholder Litigation in Washington State (WSBA) Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...In re, 59 Wn.2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962): 189 Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 234 P.3d 187 (2010): 70 Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983): 174 Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wn.2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974): 115, 180 Williams v. Erie Mountain Consol. Mining Co.,47 Wash.36......
  • Chapter §65.6 Analysis
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Civil Procedure Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 65 Rule 65.Injunctions
    • Invalid date
    ...be consistent with the public interest or that of interested third parties. See, e.g., Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., Council 28 v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983); see also Speelman v. Bellingham I Whatcom Cnty. Hous.Auths., 167 Wn.App. 624, 273 P.3d 1035 (2012); Chan, 164 Wn.App. a......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...Ass'n v. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 150 Wn.2d 612, 80 P.3d 608 (2003): 21.11(3) Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. Council 28, AFL-CIO v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983): 9.13, 10.8 Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. v. Dep't of Gen. Admin., 152 Wn. App. 368, 216 P.3d 1061 (2009): 21.11(2)(d) Wash. ......
  • Chapter § 9.13 New Evidence On Review
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 9 Record on Review
    • Invalid date
    ...evidence. The appellate courts rarely grant RAP 9.11 motions for additional evidence. See Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., Council 28 v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983) (discussing limited nature of RAP 9.11 remedy; court reviewed new evidence on appeal because emergency circumstances ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT