Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. United States
| Decision Date | 20 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | 246-75 and 247-75.,156-75,No. 359-72,333-73,359-72 |
| Citation | 545 F.2d 116 |
| Parties | WASHINGTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al. v. The UNITED STATES. 1776 K STREET ASSOCIATES v. The UNITED STATES. METROPOLITAN CLUB OF the CITY OF WASHINGTON v. The UNITED STATES. D. F. ANTONELLI, Jr. v. The UNITED STATES. Jack KOGOK v. The UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Lawrence A. Miller, Washington, D.C., attorney of record for plaintiff 1776 K Street Associates.
Whayne S. Quin, Washington, D.C., attorney of record for plaintiffs Washington Med. Center, Inc., Metropolitan Club of City of Washington and Jack Kogok; Wilkes & Artis, Washington, D. C., and Glenn D. Simpson, Rockville, Md., of counsel.
Thomas L. McKevitt, Washington, D.C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Peter R. Taft, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
Before COWEN, Chief Judge, DURFEE, Senior Judge, and SKELTON, Judge.
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In these five consolidated cases four of the plaintiffs sue the United States to recover money paid by them to the United States for the closing of certain portions of various original alleys in the city of Washington, D.C., and the remaining plaintiff sues the Government to recover the amount paid by him to the United States for the closing of a portion of an original street in said city, namely, G Street, N.W.1 The defendant contends that the charges made for the closing of the portions of the alleys and G Street were proper and in accordance with laws enacted by the Congress, and that the plaintiffs should be denied any recovery. The case is before us on cross-motions for summary judgment.
After carefully considering the pleadings, evidence, briefs, and the argument of counsel, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover and we hold for the defendant.
The facts involved in these cases are generally as follows. The plaintiff, Washington Medical Center, Inc., joined by William J. Cusack and Frances S. Cusack and Mary C. Morgan, 1776 K Street Associates, the Metropolitan Club of the City of Washington, and D. F. Antonelli, Jr., were the owners of various lots abutting certain portions of original alleys in the original squares listed below.2 None of these plaintiffs owned all of the lots in an entire square. The plaintiff Jack Kogok owned certain lots abutting on a portion of G Street, N.W. All of the plaintiffs desired to have the portions of the alleys and street (in the case of Kogok) closed so that they could erect buildings or other improvements thereon. Accordingly, they filed applications with the City Council (formerly the City Commission) of Washington, D.C., the duly authorized agent of the United States, to close the portions of the alleys and street on which their lots abutted. The council acted favorably on the applications of the plaintiffs provided that the plaintiffs would pay "a price not less than the assessed value of contiguous lots." The plaintiffs agreed to such payments and the council determined and found that the proper payments to be made by the plaintiffs, respectively, for the closing of the portions of the alleys in the squares and street listed below were as follows:
Plaintiff Squares Fair market value
(a) Washington Medical
Center _______________ 107 $247,701.60
(b) 1776 K Street
Associates ___________ 126 74,769.05
(c) Metropolitan Club _____ 166 63,725.40
(d) D. F. Antonelli, Jr. __ 252 30,766.00
(e) Jack Kogok ____________ G Street, N. W. 34,700.00
The plaintiffs represented to the council that they were willing to pay the above amounts, respectively, if the council would close said portions of the street and alleys, and, in reliance on such representations, the council made such closings. The plaintiffs voluntarily, and without protest, paid the above amounts found by the council to be due by them, respectively, and in fact were eager to do so. Title to the closed portions of the street and alleys was vested by the council in the respective plaintiffs upon their closings and thereafter the plaintiffs erected buildings or other improvements thereon. At all times the plaintiffs and the council conducted these transactions on the theory that the United States had fee simple title to these original alleys and to original G Street, N.W. The money paid by the plaintiffs was deposited in the United States Treasury to the credit of the United States.
Within three years after the street and alleys had been closed, all of the plaintiffs filed suits in the District Court of the District of Columbia for a refund of the payments they had made for such closings. The suits were against the District of Columbia and the United States. In those suits the plaintiffs relied on the decision of the district court in the case of Carr v. District of Columbia, 312 F.Supp. 283 (D.D.C.1970) which held that the District of Columbia could not charge abutting property owners for the closing of a non-original alley under the Street Readjustment Act of 1932, D.C.Code § 7-401, and that it could not charge them for the depreciated value to nearby property caused by the closings. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed without an opinion.
In their district court suits for refunds, the plaintiffs included claims for portions of the closed alleys that were not a part of the original alleys involved here, but were common law dedicated portions of the closed alleys owned by the District of Columbia for which the council charged them. They also asked for refunds for the amounts (not involved here) for the alleged depreciated value of nearby property caused by the closings. Included in those suits were also the identical claims involved here for refunds of the amounts paid to the United States for the closing of the described portions of the original alleys and original G Street, N.W. On January 8, 1974, the district court entered orders in those cases (Civil Actions Nos. 1906-72, 2514-72, 1905-72, 660-72, 1093-71 and 2015-70) holding that the District of Columbia could not charge abutting property owners the fair market value of alleys owned and closed by the District of Columbia unless an objection to the closing has been made, nor charge for the depreciated value of nearby property caused by the closing, "notwithstanding the fact that a portion of the land in Square * * * was original U.S. property." The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on such claims, but dismissed the United States from the suits because of lack of jurisdiction. In the course of the appeal the plaintiffs raised for the first time the proposition that the United States did not have title to the original alleys and the original street that were closed and by reason of that fact could not charge the plaintiffs for the closings. On June 20, 1975, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in cause No. 73-2053, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 515 F.2d 1018 the judgment of the district court without opinion and without passing on the title question. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the present suits.
Plaintiffs in this action challenge the authority of the District of Columbia to impose a fair market value charge on the basis that (1) the United States had no title to the original street and original alleys that were closed, (2) the District of Columbia has no statutory authority to make such charges under either § 7-401, et seq. or § 7-303, (3) the land areas closed had only nominal value, and (4) the charges were in violation of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act and due process of law.
The defendant says that (1) the plaintiffs are estopped by their prior actions from claiming the refunds, and (2) in any event the United States had fee simple title to the original street and the original alleys, and the District of Columbia was fully authorized by Acts of Congress to make the charges for closing the street and alleys involved here.
There is much support for defendant's estoppel argument and it may be that these cases could be disposed of on that basis. The closing of the street and alleys was a discretionary act on the part of the council. The plaintiffs had no constitutional right to have the street and alleys closed. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs themselves affirmatively initiated the closing procedures by filing their closing applications with the council. They represented to the council that they were willing to pay the charges fixed by the council if the street and alleys were closed, and they intended for the council to rely on these representations. The council did rely on them and closed the street and alleys to the detriment of the city and the United States in that the closed portions of the street and alleys could no longer be used for travel or traffic, garbage pickup, access by police, ventilation, passage of fire trucks, and the installation of utility lines such as gas, telephone, water, sewer, and electric light and power. The plaintiffs voluntarily and willingly paid the charges for the closings without any protest whatever as to title or as to the procedure followed by the council in closing the street and alleys. The title to the closed portions of the street and alleys was vested in the plaintiffs by the council and the property was delivered to them. Thereafter the plaintiffs erected buildings and other improvements on the property and have enjoyed the possession and use of the property since the dates of the closings and they or their successors in title will continue to use and enjoy the same for all time to come. From these facts, it appears that most if not all of the elements of estoppel against the plaintiffs and their claims are present in this case. The plaintiffs say that estoppel cannot be used against them,...
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