Washington Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jeanty, 96-CV-862

• Decision Date: 01 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-CV-862,96-CV-957.,96-CV-862
• Citation: 718 A.2d 172
• Parties: WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. Frances JEANTY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

718 A.2d 172

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. Frances JEANTY, Appellee.

Nos. 96-CV-862, 96-CV-957.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 2, 1998.

Decided October 1, 1998.

Gerard J. Stief, with whom Robert L. Polk and Robert J. Kniaz, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellant.

Keith W. Donahoe, Greenbelt, MD, with whom Christopher R. Banker, Olney, MD, was on the brief, for appellee.

Before TERRY, SCHWELB, and FARRELL, Associate Judges.

SCHWELB, Associate Judge:

Frances Jeanty, a passenger on a Metrobus operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), suffered a fractured shoulder and related serious injuries when the rear door of the bus allegedly malfunctioned, closed too quickly, and catapulted her off the bus and onto the pavement. Ms. Jeanty filed suit against WMATA, alleging primarily that the bus had been negligently maintained and inadequately inspected.¹ Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $560,000.

WMATA challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion for a directed verdict at trial and by a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).² WMATA now reiterates this challenge on appeal. In a written order denying WMATA's post-trial motion, the trial judge held that, although the case was a close one, the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to require its submission to the jury. We affirm.

I. THE EVIDENCE

A. The accident.

The accident which precipitated this litigation occurred on November 13, 1991. Ms. Jeanty, who was then fifty-three years old and employed as a secretary-typist, testified that on the afternoon of that day she was alighting from a Metrobus on her way home from a shopping trip. According to Ms. Jeanty, the rear door of the bus suddenly and rapidly closed on her. Ms. Jeanty was "propelled" to the ground, and she suffered significant injuries.

Anne Ford, another passenger on the bus who was not previously acquainted with Ms. Jeanty, elaborated on Ms. Jeanty's account. Ms. Ford testified that the door ejected Ms. Jeanty "so fast, it would be like someone shot out of a cannon." Ms. Ford added that she had been riding Metro buses all of her life, and that she had never seen a bus door close so rapidly.³

B. The mechanism.

At trial, Ms. Jeanty's counsel called a WMATA maintenance inspector, John Shoemaker, as an expert witness. Counsel also introduced the deposition testimony of Michael D. Cowager, a WMATA maintenance analyst. The uncontradicted testimony of the two WMATA representatives established that the speed at which the rear door closes is controlled by a "door speed regulator." The appropriate setting for the regulator is six seconds, three to open and three to close.

C. The preventive maintenance schedule.

At all times relevant to this appeal, WMATA had in place a preventive maintenance schedule designed to assure the safety of its buses. Pursuant to this schedule, the bus on which Ms. Jeanty was riding was supposed to be inspected every two weeks. Under WMATA's guidelines, the inspection was to include, among other things, a check of the adjustment of the door speed regulator.

WMATA maintenance records, which were introduced into evidence by Ms. Jeanty's attorney, established that the bus on which Ms. Jeanty was riding should have been inspected on October 1, 1991, October 15, 1991, October 29, 1991, and November 12, 1991. In fact, however, the bus was not inspected on any of these days. The accident occurred on November 13, 1991, the day after the last scheduled inspection.

There was also evidence that WMATA's "Standard Operating Procedures" (SOP's) required the bus driver to check the rear door for proper operation before taking the bus out for the day. The record does not reveal whether or not the driver who initially operated the bus in question on the day of the accident complied with this SOP.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. The standard of review.

On a motion for a directed verdict, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and that party (here Ms. Jeanty) is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence. See, e.g., Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 103, 143 F.2d 142, 143 (1944). If the evidence, so assessed, is insufficient to support a verdict in Ms. Jeanty's favor—if, in other words, no impartial juror could reasonably find for Ms. Jeanty—then WMATA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(a). Whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury is a question of law, which we consider de novo. Phillips v. District of Columbia, 714 A.2d 768, 772-73 (D.C.1998) (citations omitted); Nobelpharma A.B. v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064 (Fed.Cir.1998) (de novo standard applies to post-trial JMOL motion).

B. WMATA's obligations as a common carrier.

"The plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury." Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). WMATA contends that the evidence as to each of these elements was insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy Ms. Jeanty's burden. We disagree.

A common carrier transports precious human cargo, and the courts have long analyzed the relationship between the carrier and its passengers accordingly. The Supreme Court declared almost one and a half centuries ago that "when carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence." Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486, 14 L.Ed. 502 (1852).⁴ Twenty-eight years later, the Court stated that although a common carrier—in that case a railroad— "does not warrant the safety of the passengers, at all events," its agents must "observe the utmost caution characteristic of very careful, prudent men" and must exercise "extraordinary vigilance aided by the highest skill." Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456, 26 L.Ed. 141 (1880).

The foregoing principles have long been a part of the law of the District of Columbia. In Capital Traction Co. v. Copland, 47 App. D.C. 152, 159 (1917), the court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Roy, stated that common carriers "are bound to exercise extraordinary vigilance aided by the highest skill for the purpose of protecting their passengers against injury resulting from defects in ways or instrumentalities used by the carriers." This requirement has grown "out of the special solicitude shown by the courts for the safety of human cargo," Birchall v. Capital Transit Co., 34 A.2d 624, 625 (D.C. 1943), and "no rule is better established than that which holds a common carrier to the highest degree of care towards its passengers for hire." Missile Cab Ass'n, Inc. v. Rogers, 184 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C.1962); see also Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958, 962 (D.C.1994) (quoting Missile Cab Ass'n, supra). In Schaller v. Capital Transit Co., 99 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 254, 239 F.2d 73, 74 (1956) (per curiam), a case in which the plaintiff was injured while alighting from a bus, the court held that it is the duty of a carrier to use the highest degree of care in, inter alia, "providing to the passenger safe and convenient means of entering and leaving the bus."

Notwithstanding these authorities, however, we have held, as the Supreme Court did in Roy, supra, 102 U.S. at 456, that a carrier is not an insurer of its passengers' safety. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 173 A.2d 216, 217 (D.C.1961). On the contrary, the passenger has the burden of proving negligence, i.e., that the carrier failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. See, e.g., Bray v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 179 A.2d 387, 388-89 (D.C.1962). In D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Carney, 254 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C.1969), the court quoted from the cases holding that common carriers are held to the "highest degree of care," but opined that "there are no categories of care; i.e., the care required is always reasonable care." More recently, we have stated that

although the language in our cases speaks of the high degree of care required of a common carrier, the cases all hold that a common carrier is subject to essentially the same standard as any other alleged tortfeasor, i.e., an obligation to exercise due care.

Sebastian, supra, 636 A.2d at 962 (citing McKethean v. WMATA, 588 A.2d 708, 712 (D.C.1991)); cf. Pazmino v. WMATA, 638 A.2d 677, 679 n. 3 (D.C.1994) (noting the variations in our precedents in the articulation of the standard, but emphasizing that "the greater the danger, the greater the care that must be exercised"). Whether or not all of our cases can be fully harmonized with respect to the existence or non-existence of a separate standard of care for common carriers,⁵ all of the decisions recognize that the standard is always contextual, and that the carrier's relation to, and duties toward, its passengers constitute the critical context in which the carrier's conduct is evaluated.

The carrier's duty of care, vigilance, and foresight applies with particular force to the maintenance of its equipment. "A common carrier is bound to exercise a high or the highest degree of care and diligence in the ... maintenance, inspection, and use of its conveyances and their appliances...." 14 AM.JUR.2D Carriers § 1028, at 450 & nn. 12 & 13 (1964 & Supp.1998). We have stated that "a bus company, like any other common carrier, is bound to inspect its vehicles to be certain they are in proper operating order and free from any condition which may be dangerous to passengers." Bray, supra, 179 A.2d at 389. Because a...