Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State
| Decision Date | 04 December 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33648,33648 |
| Citation | 49 Wn.2d 520,304 P.2d 676 |
| Parties | WASHINGTON TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY, a public instrumentality of the State of Washington, Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Washington, and the taxpayers, property owners, and citizens of the state, including nonresidents owning property or subject to taxation in the state, and all other persons, partnerships, associations, and corporations having or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to any property to be affected by the issuance of the Tacoma-Seattle-Everett Toll Road Revenue Bonds, Series of 1955, or by the construction of the Tacoma-Seattle-Everett Toll Road or to be affected in any way thereby, and System Parking Service, Inc., Defendants and Relators, The Superior Court of the State of Washington for Thurston County, Honorable Raymond W. Clifford, Judge, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Don Eastvold Atty. Gen., John S. Robinson Asst. Atty. Gen., for relator.
Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, Lyle L. Iversen, Seattle, for relator System Parking Service, Inc.
Weter, Roberts & Shefelman, Harold S. Shefelman, Seattle, for respondent Toll Bridge Authority.
Chapter 268, Laws of 1955, p. 1092, RCW 47.59, purports to grant two additional powers to the Washington toll bridge authority (hereinafter referred to as the authority): (1) To provide a procedure for the establishing and financing of toll roads generally, and (2), specifically, to establish and provide for the financing of a toll road from a point south of and through Tacoma, thence through Seattle to a point south of Everett.
Section 17 of the act provides a special court procedure whereby 'The authority may * * * have its authority to issue bonds * * * and the legality of all proceedings in connection therewith * * * determined * * *.' The act further provides that, if any of its provisions be declared unconstitutional, such provisions shall be severable and not enforced.
The authority commenced this action to determine the validity of proposed bonds for the financing of the authorized Tacoma-Seattle-Everett toll road.
System Parking Service, Inc., and the attorney general (representing the state) each appeared and resisted the petition, alleging that the act is unconstitutional; that certain of its severable sections are unconstitutional, and that the authority had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
The cause was tried to the court. It determined that § 13 and a portion of § 17 were unconstitutional. The remaining sections of the act were declared constitutional, and the authority was adjudicated to be legally authorized to issue bonds. This review followed.
The attorney general, representing the state, makes four assignments of error, and System Parking Service, Inc., make eleven. All of the assignments may be classified under two general subjects: (a) The entire act is unconstitutional, and (b) certain of the severable sections of the act are unconstitutional.
With reference to the assignments of error classified under 'a' (the entire act is unconstitutional), it is contended that the toll road act violates Art. II, § 19, of the state constitution, which provides: 'No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.'
This constitutional provision contains two mandates to the legislature: (1) That a bill contain no more than one general subject, and (2) that such single subject be expressed in the title.
With reference to (2), does the title indicate the subject or subjects contained in the body of the act?
The title of chapter 268, Laws of 1955, p. 1092, reads in part as follows:
'An Act to facilitate vehicular traffic in the state of Washington by providing for the acquisition, construction, improvement, extension, reconstruction, maintenance, repair and operation of toll road projects by the Washington toll bridge authority; defining the powers and duties of the Washington toll bridge authority, cities, towns and other political subdivisions and agencies of the state with respect to such toll road projects; specifically authorizing and establishing the location of the Tacoma-Seattle-Everett toll road project and pledging a portion of the excise tax on motor vehicle fuels to assist the financing thereof; * * *.'
In one of the earliest opinions where this issue was presented, we stated:
'* * * the legislature must be the judge of the scope which they will give to the word 'subject,' and * * * so long as the title embraces but one subject, it is not inimical to such constitutional provision [Art. II, § 19], even although the subject as thus used contains any number of subsubjects.' Marston v. Humes, 1891, 3 Wash. 267, 275, 28 P. 520, 523.
In DeCano v. State, 1941, 7 Wash.2d 613, 627, 110 P.2d 627, 634, we said:
'* * * The legislature may, if it chooses, adopt a very broad and comprehensive title in a bill, in which case great liberality will be indulged to hold that any subject reasonably germane to such title may be embraced within the body of the bill.'
In State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 1951, 38 Wash.2d 834, 232 P.2d 833, 835, we held that a title similar to the one at bar constituted a general title, and, quoting from Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 1949, 35 Wash.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651, stated:
"* * * the rule may be stated as follows: Where the title of a legislative act expresses a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will, or may, facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act and are germane to its title."
In our opinion, the title to chapter 268, Laws of 1955, is general in nature, and adequately expresses the subject matter contained in the body of the act.
As to (1), does the body of the act contain more than one general subject, and, as expressed in Gruen v. State Tax Commission, supra, is the subject matter expressed in the title of the act germane to such single subject?
It is relators' principal contention that the body of the act violates the constitutional prohibition against the inclusion of more whan one subject in a single bill, in that the act contains enabling legislation for toll road projects generally and provides specifically for a toll road from Tacoma through Seattle to Everett.
In a broad sense, chapter 268, Laws of 1955, deals with toll roads, but, separating the act into its component parts, it has two purposes: (1) To provide legislation, permanent in character, empowering a state agency to establish and operate all toll roads, and (2) to provide for the construction of a specific toll road linking Tacoma, Seattle, and Everett.
The first purpose grants the power to build toll roads in general and is continuing in effect, applicable to every toll road project henceforth to be authorized and constructed. It does not refer to the problems of a certain project, but, rather, is enabling legislation having no particular relationship to any specific road.
The second purpose is to provide for the construction of a Tacoma-Seattle-Everett toll road, and, although related to the first purpose to the extent that both pertain to toll roads, the second purpose is subject to accomplishment, and is not continuing in character. It is not germane to the purpose of creating an authority for the establishment of toll roads generally.
We adhere to the construction which we placed upon Art. II, § 19, of the constitution, in Power, Inc., v. Huntley, 1951, 39 Wash.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173, in which case this court declared chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex.Sess., unconstitutional. It was apparent, from reading the title and from reading the act itself, that two subjects not germane to each other were included in a single act. At page 198 of 39 Wash.2d, at page 177 of 235 P.2d, we said:
'Another constitutional question is raised which must be determined here, and that is whether the entire act is unconstitutional because it violates Art. II, § 19, of our state constitution, * * *.
'This provision contains two prohibitions: (1) No bill shall embrace more than one subject (the purpose of which is to avoid hodgepodge and 'logrolling' legislation); and (2) no bill shall have a subject which is not expressed in the title (the purpose of which is to notify the members of the legislature and the public of the subject matter of the proposed legislation). * * *
'In the present...
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