Washington v. Aircap Industries Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:91-3153-18.
• Citation: 831 F. Supp. 1292
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: James A. WASHINGTON, Hattie P. Rivers, James L. Scott, and Beulah M. Parsons, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AIRCAP INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Defendant.

831 F. Supp. 1292

James A. WASHINGTON, Hattie P. Rivers, James L. Scott, and Beulah M. Parsons, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AIRCAP INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2:91-3153-18.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

August 30, 1993.

Kenneth L. Childs, Columbia, SC, for plaintiffs.

Linda Wohlbruck Runge, Columbia, SC, for defendant.

ORDER

NORTON, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs' motion to approve notice of class action and certify subclasses; defendant's motion for summary judgment; and plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Background

Defendant, Aircap Industries Corporation ("Aircap"), is an Ohio corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of MTD Products, Inc., which manufactures outdoor power equipment. Aircap's Manning, South Carolina plant manufactured lawn and riding mowers. This business was cyclical and Aircap's work force varied with production demands.¹ Historically, Aircap laid off some employees at the start of the summer and rehired them at the end of the summer. During these layoff periods, Aircap paid group health insurance for affected employees. Myers deposition, at 51-52, cited in plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, at 19.

On March 6, 1991, defendant posted the following notice on all company bulletin boards regarding the anticipated summer layoffs:

We are tentatively scheduling the plant to be closed as follows:

Monday, May 27th for Memorial Day (paid holiday).

Thursday, July 4th for Independence Day (paid holiday) Friday, July 5th (no pay holiday)

Monday, July 22nd thru Friday, August 2nd — plant shutdown.

Inventory:

Plant inventory will begin Thursday, July 25th thru Saturday, July 27th. Employees who are needed for the inventory will be notified by their supervisor.

Note:

In order to be paid for your holiday, you must work the day before and the day after the holiday. You must also have worked for Aircap Ind. for 30 days prior to the holiday.

Plaintiffs' exhibit # 1, submitted with plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

On or about June 6, 1991, Aircap laid off approximately thirty-three employees. On June 17, 1991, Aircap instructed the workers in three departments to assemble outside the plant. A written notice was distributed to each employee, stating that he or she was being laid off, effective that day, and that the layoff would exceed six months. A fourth department was assembled in the cafeteria where a company representative verbally informed these employees that they were laid off and that the layoff would exceed six months.

II. Subclass Certification

On January 21, 1992, this court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). On July 8, 1992, this court created three subclasses, A, B, and C. Subclass A consists of permanent employees who were not laid off by defendant from 1986 through 1991.² This subclass also contains former Aircap employees hired after 1986 who were employed for more than one year and were never laid off prior to June 1991. Subclass B includes employees laid off every summer since 1986, including persons hired after 1986 who were laid off every summer after being hired. Subclass C consists of employees who do not come within the definition of subclasses A and B.

On September 29, 1992, this court, on plaintiffs' motion with defendant's consent, realigned the subclasses without altering subclass definitions. On October 30, 1992, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and moved to certify subclasses A and B. Defendant consented to certification of subclasses A and B without waiving its original objection to certification.

A party seeking class certification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). This court finds that plaintiffs have established that subclasses A and B meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).

The named plaintiffs James A. Washington, Hattie P. Rivers, James L. Scott and Beulah M. Parson are all members of subclass C. Because this court already certified these persons as representative of the entire class, it is axiomatic that these persons qualify as representatives for subclass C. This court finds that subclass C meets the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and therefore this court will certify subclass C.³

Next, this court must consider whether to certify the subclasses under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1) or (3). This court finds certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1) appropriate because

adjudications with respect to individual members of the subclass which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests....

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(B). While neither party opposes certification pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1) plaintiffs correctly note that certification under this rule typically requires more than a stare decisis effect. See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1182 n. 37 (D.C.Cir.1976), aff'd 431 U.S. 864, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) (to qualify under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(B), the court's decision must as a practical matter conclude the interests of other members). However, this court is concerned with the effects of issue preclusion rather than stare decisis. A decision in this case would preclude defendant or a potential plaintiff from raising certain issues regarding the application of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act to the June 1991 layoffs at the Manning plant. Therefore, this court will certify subclasses A, B and C under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(B). Further, this court directs plaintiffs to resubmit proposed class notice in accordance with this order.

III. Standard of Review

Defendant moves for summary judgment and plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. To grant a motion for summary judgment, this court must find that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, this court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The judge is not to weigh the evidence himself but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials" of its pleading, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), but must produce sufficient evidence to reasonably support a jury verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11.

The non-moving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.

Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir.1992) (cite omitted). See also Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985) ("Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice. A trial, after all, is not an entitlement. It exists to resolve what reasonable minds would recognize as real factual disputes"). However, "where states of mind are decisive as elements of a claim or defense, summary judgment ordinarily will not lie." Overstreet v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir.1991).

IV. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act") requires employers to give affected employees sixty-day notice before mass layoffs or plant closings which would result in the termination of a large number of jobs. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. The purpose of the WARN Act is to

provide protection to workers, their families and communities by requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant closings and mass layoffs. Advance notice provides workers and their families some transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs, and, if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully compete in the job market.

WARN Act, 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1990). "WARN is a remedial statute and must be construed broadly." Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F.Supp. 680, 685 (D.Minn.1990), citing Belland v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 726 F.2d 839, 844 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 245, 83 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984).

Defendant qualifies as an employer for the purposes of the WARN Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1).⁴ The operational shut-down of defendant's Manning facility qualifies as a "plant closing" for the purposes of the WARN Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2).⁵ The statutory period under the WARN Act is from June 6, 1989 to July 5, 1989. See Order, filed July 8, 1992, at 2-4; 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B) (the WARN Act applies to employers who lay off in excess of fifty employees or...