Washington v. Ameron Automotive Centers

Decision Date25 May 1983
Docket NumberNo. 83-81,83-81
Citation432 So.2d 1193
PartiesCalvin WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERON AUTOMOTIVE CENTERS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Gibbens & Blackwell Dennis R. Stevens, New Iberia, for defendant-appellee.

Fruge & DeJean, Kenneth DeJean, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.

Before GUIDRY, STOKER and LABORDE, JJ.

STOKER, Judge.

Plaintiff, Calvin Washington, appeals the dismissal of his suit for worker's compensation benefits allegedly due him as a result of injuries he suffered on October 1, 1977, while employed as an auto mechanic by defendant, Ameron Automotive Centers (Ameron). For reasons set out below, we affirm.

The parties stipulated that Washington suffered an injury to his back on October 1, 1977, while lying on a front-end rack under an automobile and using a wrench. They stipulated further that Washington's medical expenses in the amount of $4,452.89 were paid by Ameron and compensation benefits were paid to Washington from October 1, 1977 to June 26, 1978. The benefits were terminated as a result of a report from Dr. Earl Rozas which indicated that Washington could return to his former employment.

Also the parties stipulated that each time Ameron was presented with a demand for reinstatement of benefits, it had Washington re-examined by Dr. Richard Levy. Ameron refused to reinstate benefits based on Dr. Levy's reports.

Washington filed this suit on June 5, 1979, seeking reinstatement of benefits, past and future medical expenses, and penalties and attorney's fees based on Ameron's alleged arbitrary refusal to pay. The trial court dismissed the suit and this appeal followed.

Essentially, the issue before us is whether Washington remains disabled by the October 1, 1977 accident. It is apparent from the trial court's reasons for judgment that Washington was found not to have been disabled beyond June 26, 1978. As stated before, the parties stipulated that Washington suffered a work-related injury. The medical evidence presented in the form of reports and depositions fully supports the judgment and is more fully discussed below.

FACTS

Washington was seen and treated on November 14, 1977 by Dr. Earl Rozas, an orthopedic surgeon, whose reports were admitted into evidence at trial. Dr. Rozas diagnosed Washington's condition as acute lumbosacral strain and recommended conservative treatment consisting of a lumbosacral corset, physical therapy, and muscle relaxants. He continued to treat Washington and placed him in the hospital from February 19, 1978 to March 7, 1978, for intensive physiotherapy and traction. After the hospital stay, Dr. Rozas reported Washington had improved ninety per cent.

After several more visits, the last of which was on June 5, 1978, Dr. Rozas reported that Washington could return to work, stating in a report dated June 18, 1978, that he could "... find no objective evidence to support the subjective complaints he has had over the last two or three weeks." Dr. Rozas stated further that "It is also my opinion that there is no permanent physical impairment as a result of this injury." In reliance on this report, worker's compensation benefits were terminated on June 26, 1978.

Washington was seen and evaluated by Dr. Dorsey Dysart, a neurologist, on August 8, 1978, September 21, 1978, and October 27, 1978. An electromyogram was performed along with nerve conduction studies. Dr. Dysart noted that "The patient was quite hysterical during the electromyographic testing." Some minor objective findings were noted but the doctor reported, "The patient should be treated at this point conservatively in view of the possible secondary psychological response to the injury as demonstrated by his terrible behavior during the process of testing." Dr. Dysart also reported that Washington was able to return to work when he made his examination.

Reports of at least six other doctors appear in the record, most of which show no objective findings to support Washington's complaints. Two of these doctors were deposed and their findings are discussed below.

Washington was examined on two occasions by Dr. Richard Levy, a neurosurgeon. Ameron had the examinations made as a result of Washington's demand for reinstatement of benefits. On each occasion, September 22, 1978 and December 3, 1980, Dr. Levy reported that he could find no objective neurological problems and there appeared to be no reason Washington could not return to work. In reliance on these reports, Ameron refused to reinstate benefits.

Washington relies primarily on the reports and deposition of Dr. Raoul Rodriguez, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Rodriguez first saw Washington on July 16, 1981, almost four years after the accident. Other visits were on November 24, 1981, February 18, 1982, and February 25, 1982. The only objective findings reported by Dr. Rodriguez were slight atrophy in the left leg and abnormal reflexes. These symptoms were present only in the first two visits, not in the two February visits. Dr. Rodriguez could not directly relate Washington's complaints at the time of these visits to the accident in 1977 nor could he comment as to Washington's present condition since February 25, 1982, was his last visit. Trial of the matter was held on April 15, 1982.

In his brief on appeal, plaintiff makes the following assignment of errors:

1. "The trial court applied too strict a test in denying plaintiff's claim considering it being in the nature of a workmen's compensation claim.

2. "The trial court abused is discretion in completely disregarding the testimony of Dr. Raoul Rodriguez, plaintiff's physician, who was the only physician who had seen plaintiff for quite some time prior to trial.

3. "The trial court erred in its reasons for judgment, by considering the report of Dr. Dysart and interpreting Dr. Dysart's report to mean that plaintiff's injury may be aggravated by posturing or malingering when in fact the report merely referred to 'plaintiff's terrible behavior', during the process of testing.

4. "The court failed to provide plaintiff with proper medical treatment for further diagnosis as per the recommendation of Dr. Rodriguez.

5. "The court failed to apply the odd lot doctrine and correct burden of proof once plaintiff had clearly shown by a preponderance of the evidence and through unimpeached testimony as to his present disability that he fell into the odd lot doctrine and the court thereafter failed to apply the proper presumption to the defendant to show that plaintiff was not so disabled or placed in an odd lot."

Although the basic issue in this case is whether plaintiff continues to be disabled, we will address the specific allegations of error set forth above in the order presented.

I.

As this court stated in Ellis v. Rapides Parish School Board, 419 So.2d 990 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982):

"While we recognize that in compensation cases the law is to be...

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3 cases
  • Landry v. Louisiana Hosp. Service, Inc., 83
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • April 3, 1984
    ...not serve in that capacity. Dobard v. State Farm Insurance Company, 437 So.2d 366 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983); Washington v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 432 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983). Further, Dr. McNally was a specialist in endocrinology, diabetes and metabolic disorders and had special ......
  • Savant v. Employers Nat. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • February 4, 1987
    ... ... Washington" v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 432 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983) ...  \xC2" ... ...
  • Burnes v. Wizard Enterprises, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • May 10, 1989
    ... ... See and compare Washington" v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 432 So.2d 1193 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983) ...  \xC2" ... ...

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