Washington v. Boslow

• Decision Date: 22 May 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 73-1025-N.
• Citation: 375 F. Supp. 1298
• Parties: John WASHINGTON v. Dr. Harold M. BOSLOW, Director Patuxent Institution, and Dr. Domingo C. Sorongon, M.D., Patuxent Institution.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

375 F. Supp. 1298

John WASHINGTON v. Dr. Harold M. BOSLOW, Director Patuxent Institution, and Dr. Domingo C. Sorongon, M.D., Patuxent Institution.

Civ. No. 73-1025-N.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

May 17, 1974.

As Amended May 22, 1974.

Charles F. Morgan, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, John P. Stafford, Jr., and Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.

NORTHROP, Chief Judge.

John Washington, an inmate at the Patuxent Institution for defective delinquents, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) against Harold M. Boslow, Director of Patuxent Institution, and Dr. Domingo C. Sorongon, staff physician at Patuxent Institution, alleging that the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with proper medical care in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For relief, the plaintiff requests that this Court (1) enter a judgment declaring that the defendants' acts, policies, and practices contravene the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) enter a judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants have moved to dismiss the instant suit on the sole ground that under this Court's opinion in McCray v. Burrell, 367 F.Supp. 1191 (D.Md.1973) (hereinafter referred to as McCray), a prisoner must exhaust the state administrative remedies provided by the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission Act, Md.Ann.Code art. 41, § 204F (Supp. 1973), before he can maintain an action under § 1983, and the plaintiff has not complied with this requirement. In response, the plaintiff contends that under existing case law there is no requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Even if there is such a requirement, the plaintiff argues that he need not resort to the Inmate Grievance Commission because this remedy is inadequate since, among other relief, he seeks a monetary award, because he will be deprived of his jury trial right, and because the Commission does not accord him a full and fair hearing.

I.

In McCray, this Court made a thorough analysis of the case law under section 1983 and found that this judicial precedent did not preclude requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies where the administrative proceedings provide a fair and adequate remedy. McCray, 367 F.Supp. at 1196-1201, 1209-1210. This Court adheres to the principle of McCray and finds no reason to alter its opinion in that case. The recent Supreme Court case of Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), cited by the plaintiff, is inapposite. While the Court in Steffel did state at one point that "when federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C § 1983 . . . we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies . . ." (94 S.Ct. at 1222), the factual and legal setting for this statement differs markedly from the instant case. The only question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), "declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has been threatened, but is not pending, and a showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not been made." 94 S.Ct. at 1213. Since exhaustion will be required by this Court, the only remaining issue is whether the Inmate Grievance Commission Act in the instant case accords the plaintiff a fair and adequate remedy.

The plaintiff finds inadequacy in several areas of the Inmate Grievance proceedings. The plaintiff first asserts that the inability of the Commission to award damages is a fatal flaw to its effectiveness. A short answer to this contention would be that the plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief in this suit and, as stated in McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1208-1210, the Inmate Grievance Commission has been invested with powers comparable to the equity power of a federal court, and the prisoner will not be prejudiced by delaying an award of damages until the Inmate Grievance procedures have been exhausted. This Court, however, has gone one step further. If the only relief requested is an award of damages, the Inmate Grievance Commission Act still provides an adequate remedy to the prisoner. "The claim for monetary damages is inextricably tied to prison regulations and disciplinary procedures." McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1210. Even though the prisoner may not assert it, there is an ever-present possibility that the conditions giving rise to the prisoner's claim for damages may still exist and go uncorrected if the prison authorities are not fully apprised of them. Dene L. Lusby, Executive Director of the Inmate Grievance Commission, stated in his deposition of February 28, 1974 in this case, that when a grievance requesting only damages is filed, a hearing is held for the purpose of, inter alia, determining the validity of the claim. If the grievance is meritorious in whole or in part, the Commission would then recommend procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of the situation.

If the specific condition producing the harm will not happen again, the Inmate Grievance procedures still perform a vital function in the overall process of securing a damage award. "The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission provides a forum with built-in judicial review which can more expertly sort out the meritorious from the frivolous . . . and having taken this route the complaining prisoner can come to this Court with the issue of liability clearly defined on the record." McCray, 367 F.Supp. at 1210. While a determination of the Grievance Commission or the state courts on the merits of a prisoner's claim is not binding on this Court, a preliminary indication of validity serves as a valuable aid to a federal court. With 103 prisoner civil rights cases presently pending in the District of Maryland, a meritorious claim, of which there are few, in all likelihood cannot possibly be processed as rapidly as the State grievance procedure. Initial action by the Inmate Grievance Commission serves to alert this Court to a case in which constitutional deprivations are likely to have occurred, and this Court can move the case into its regular trial calendar.

A reasonably expeditious resolution of a prisoner's grievance can then be obtained since this Court will have before it a complete record of the controversy. Each hearing before the Commission is recorded on a Voicewriter and transcribed when an inmate seeks judicial review in the state courts. The transcript, coupled with the findings of the Commission and state courts, can be employed by this Court to arrive at the central issues for trial, thereby significantly reducing the trial time involved.

Thus the relief available from the Inmate Grievance Commission, although not exactly comparable to an award of damages, is critical to the welfare of the inmate, to the proper administration of the correctional institution, and to the expeditious resolution of the inmate's grievance.

The plaintiff next argues that requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies will deprive plaintiff of his right to a jury trial. At the threshold, this contention assumes that there is a right to a jury trial in a § 1983 suit. Only a few courts have directly addressed this issue, and their conclusions are in conflict. Compare Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F.Supp. 683 (N.D.Ohio 1972) with Cook v. Cox, 357 F.Supp. 120 (E.D.Va.1973). If there is a right to a jury trial, this Court fails to see how resorting first to the Inmate Grievance Commission will prejudice a prisoner's jury trial right. These administrative proceedings will not estop the plaintiff from having those issues appropriate for jury resolution fully tried before a jury.

The plaintiff last asserts that the Inmate Grievance Commission Act does not accord the plaintiff a full and fair hearing within the meaning of the due process clause. In McCray, this Court discussed extensively the Inmate Grievance procedures and found that these procedures satisfied the requisites of due process. The plaintiff argues here, however, that at a hearing before the Commission he is unreasonably restricted in his ability to call and cross-examine witnesses and subpoena documents, and that he is unable to engage in pre-trial discovery. An inmate has the right to call a reasonable number of witnesses, subject only to the discretion of the Commission as to the relevancy or cumulative nature of the testimony, and this discretion cannot be unreasonably exercised by the Commission. Md.Ann. Code art. 41 § 204F(h) (Supp.1973). Any unreasonable refusal to allow an inmate to call a witness is reviewable in state court. Again, the inmate has a right to subpoena documents, and this right is subject only to the Commission's determination of the usefulness of the documents in deciding the merits of the claim. Public Safety and Correctional Services R. 12.07.00.04(2) (Inmate Grievances). This right may not be unreasonably restricted by the Commission, and any such action is reviewable in state court. While the plaintiff does not have the right to full pre-trial discovery, he has not cited to any case that holds discovery to be an essential element of due process. This Court finds that the lack of full discovery does not render the hearing "unfair." Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).

The broad authority of the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services to review the orders of the Inmate Grievance Commission is also attacked as violative of the plaintiff's due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiff states that the Secretary, in deciding whether to affirm, modify, or reverse the Commission's order, is able to go outside the record and consider additional evidence. The plaintiff, however, has cited to only one case in...