Washington v. Brantley

• Citation: 352 F. Supp. 559
• Decision Date: 12 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72-2-Civ-Oc.,72-2-Civ-Oc.
• Parties: Joe Carl WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Fred BRANTLEY et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida

352 F. Supp. 559

Joe Carl WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Fred BRANTLEY et al., Defendants.

No. 72-2-Civ-Oc.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Ocala Division.

December 12, 1972.

John M. Brumbaugh, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

Andrew G. Pattillo, Ocala, Fla., Richard T. Jones, Gainesville, Fla., and Owen McGovern, Ocala, Fla., for defendants.

OPINION OF COURT

SCOTT, District Judge.

In this case the plaintiff has sued in the amended complaint three defendants: a person, a municipality and an insurer and has prayed solely for damages. Thus, upon the filing by defendants City of Dunnellon, the municipality, and The Travelers Insurance Company, the insurer, of their respective motions to dismiss, the question of whether the City of Dunnellon is a proper party defendant was brought into sharp focus.

The plaintiff has sued Brantley, the individual, for acts which he allegedly unlawfully committed in the course and scope of his duties as a police officer of the defendant City of Dunnellon. The amended complaint alleges that the municipality is liable on account of its training and supervision of the defendant Brantley and that the insurer had in force at all pertinent times with defendants a written contract of liability insurance. The action has been brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the amended complaint, this Court must accept the allegations as true. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480, 68 S.Ct. 174, 92 L. Ed. 88 (1947).

The amended complaint alleges that on or about August 31, 1971, plaintiff Washington was present at a supermarket in Dunnellon, Florida, for the purpose of purchasing groceries. While he was there, Washington was falsely accused of cheating the store of approximately fifty (50) dollars by a "quick-change" scheme. The defendant Brantley was thereupon summoned to arrest Washington.

After arriving at the store, Brantley took Washington into custody and transported him to the office of the Police Department of the City of Dunnellon for the purpose of booking and formally charging him. In the course of taking Washington into custody, Brantley searched Washington and determined that he was unarmed.

Before Washington was formally charged but while he was at the police station, Washington fled from the police station and proceeded across an adjacent parking lot. Thereupon, Brantley drew his pistol and proceeded, without sounding any warning, to shoot Washington in the back. Finally, plaintiff alleges that it was not necessary to use deadly force to effect his apprehension.

I. THE CITY OF DUNNELLON AS A "PERSON"

As a general rule and as a matter of historical understanding, it is true that, since the inferior federal courts are those of limited jurisdiction, there must be a jurisdictional statutory grant by Congress which authorizes such a court to entertain a lawsuit. See Turner v. President, Directors and Co. of the Bank of N. America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799).

The Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, 17 Stat. 13, gave birth to what is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It provides that

every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

This statute gives rise to a civil cause of action, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4) grant original jurisdiction to the United States District Courts to entertain and decide such cases. In this case the parties are in dispute as to whether the word "person" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 includes within its ambit a municipality. This Court concludes that a municipality is not included within the purview of the statute in a damage action regardless of whether local law has abolished or narrowed the scope of municipal immunity.

The classic and authoritative case on this point is Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). In that case the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether Congress intended to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of the statute. After a rather full consideration of the legislative history of the statute which was enacted by a Reconstruction Congress, the Court clearly and succinctly concluded that

the response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe the word "person" was used in this particular Act to include them. Accordingly we hold that the motion to dismiss the complaint against the City of Chicago was properly granted.

Monroe v. Pape, supra at 191-192, 81 S. Ct. at 486.

Thereafter, in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit carefully considered the breadth of the holding in Monroe. The court reasoned that, since "ordinarily, under our system of law, a decision of a higher court is binding as a precedent to the extent of the ratio decidendi of the case", id. at 321, Monroe should properly be limited to its facts. The court noted that Monroe was an action for damages for the misconduct of police officers and concluded that

thus the ratio decidendi of the decision is that no cause of action lies against a municipality under § 1983 for damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of its police officers.

Ibid.

More recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has decided the case Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358 (1971), cert. granted District of Columbia v. Carter, 404 U.S. 1014, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 661 (1972), upon which the plaintiff in this case relies. In Carter the court reasoned that in light of the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 an interpretation of Monroe must be limited to its facts. The Carter court held that the Monroe doctrine ". . . is inapplicable to the extent that local common law recognizes municipal liability", id. at 369, and, after considering the legislative history, concluded that "where local law has abolished or narrowed the scope of municipal immunity, the scope of immunity under § 1983 should follow the local rule." Ibid. Finally, the Carter court found additional support in the related statute 42 U.S. C. § 1988¹ which, on the basis of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969), the court determined ". . . to provide that the local rule shall govern in an action under § 1983." Carter v. Carlson, supra 447 F.2d at 369.

This Court has no doubt that, if Carter were controlling authority, the motion to dismiss in this case should have been denied.² In Florida, it seems to be settled state law that, under circumstances here alleged to be true, sovereign immunity is not enjoyed by a municipality. Thus, if 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed the local rule, then in Florida a municipality would appropriately be considered a "person" and subject to suit. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla.1957) (en banc). See also City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla.1965).

This Court cannot accept as controlling law the rule in Carter v. Carlson, supra. In two reported cases decided subsequent to Carter, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has considered, and rejected, the Carter construction of the statute. Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1971).³ This Court is of the opinion that it must apply the law, as determined in Monroe v. Pape, supra; Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, supra; Ries v. Lynskey, supra; and Yumich v. Cotter, supra, and dismiss the defendant municipality, the City of Dunnellon, for the following reasons.

First, the Supreme Court of the United States has authoritatively held that a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monroe v. Pape, supra 365 U.S. at 191-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, and the Fifth Circuit has construed the ratio decidendi of Monroe to mean that no cause of action lies against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of its police officers. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, supra. This Court is duty bound to apply these decisions.

Second, this Court independently concludes on the basis of the applicable legislative history, that the word "person" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include within its ambit in an action for damages a municipality and that the enacting Congress did not intend the word "person" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be elasticized so as to follow, over time, the varying dictates of local law. This Court does not decide this issue on the basis of any policy belief whatsoever that a city should be clothed with immunity, but rather, for the reason that the enacting Congress itself categorically rejected the proposal that municipalities be subjected to liability. Cf. Ries v. Lynskey, supra 452 F.2d at 174-175.

Third, this Court has considered and, with deference, hereby rejects the analysis in Carter v. Carlson, supra. The Carter court ruled that Monroe must be limited to its facts and then implicitly, but apparently, reasoned that, since the fact of local municipal immunity was not a fact considered by the Supreme Court in Monroe, local common law recognizing municipal liability is determinative of Monroe's applicability. Having reached this point, the Carter court then freshly and cursorily examined the legislative history...