Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, Inc., 5-96-0022
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Writing for the Court | HOPKINS |
Citation | 672 N.E.2d 34,284 Ill.App.3d 97,219 Ill.Dec. 719 |
Parties | , 219 Ill.Dec. 719 Malvin WASHINGTON, Special Administrator of the Estate of Magnolia Washington, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CASEYVILLE HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation, d/b/a Virgil L. Calvert Care Center, Defendant-Appellant. |
Docket Number | No. 5-96-0022,5-96-0022 |
Decision Date | 11 October 1996 |
Page 34
Magnolia Washington, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CASEYVILLE HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,
d/b/a Virgil L. Calvert Care Center, Defendant-Appellant.
Fifth District.
[284 Ill.App.3d 98] Melissa Griggs, Burroughs, Hepler, Broom, MacDonald & Hebrank, Edwardsville, for Defendant-Appellant.
Jeffrey S. Hammel, Belleville, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Presiding Justice HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Caseyville Health Care Association, Inc., d/b/a Virgil L. Calvert Care Center, appeals from that portion of the trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion to enforce a settlement agreement entered into between defendant and plaintiff, Therman Washington (Therman) as special administrator
Page 35
[219 Ill.Dec. 720] of the estate of Magnolia Washington (Magnolia). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court's order granting the motion to enforce was erroneous because the court's jurisdiction was suspended at the time it approved the settlement agreement, since Therman was deceased at the time the [284 Ill.App.3d 99] settlement agreement was signed by plaintiff's attorney (attorney Hammel) and attorney Hammel had no authority to sign the agreement. We reluctantly agree and reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We also vacate the court's order approving the settlement agreement. We additionally remand this cause for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.I. FACTS
Essentially, the facts of this case, as alleged in the pleadings and motions filed, are that Magnolia was a resident of defendant nursing home on or about December 23, 1991. On December 25, 1991, it was discovered that she had bilateral fractures of her legs. Subsequently, Therman, as guardian of the person and estate of Magnolia, his mother, filed a complaint on December 21, 1992, in which defendant was charged with negligence, with a violation of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. (West 1992)), and under a theory of res ipsa loquitur.
On June 28, 1995, attorney Hammel filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint by interlineation, and in this motion, it was stated that Magnolia died on July 3, 1994, and it was asked that Therman, as special administrator of Magnolia's estate, be substituted as plaintiff. The court entered an order that same day allowing the motion and substituting Therman, as special administrator of Magnolia's estate, as plaintiff.
On August 29, 1995, the trial court entered an order in which it was stated that the parties announced that the case was settled. A letter in the record indicates that defendant accepted plaintiff's offer to settle for $49,500 on August 28, 1995. At the time of the entry of the order approving the settlement agreement, attorney Hammel did not disclose to the court or to defendant that Therman had died on August 22, 1995, a little less than a week before the settlement agreement was entered into.
On September 28, 1995, attorney Hammel filed a notice of hearing in which counsel stated he would present a motion to substitute Malvin Washington (Malvin) as special administrator for Magnolia's estate, in place of Therman, on October 10, 1995. In correspondence sent by facsimile to defendant's counsel, attorney Hammel sent a copy of a motion to substitute Malvin as special administrator, a copy of an "Oath of Special Administrator," and a copy of a document entitled "Special Administrator's Letter of Direction and Engagement," which was signed by Malvin and attorney Hammel. This correspondence to defendant's counsel is dated September 26, 1995, but [284 Ill.App.3d 100] the signed documents transmitted with the letter are dated August 30, 1995, the day after the court approved the settlement...
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Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 89351.
...attorneys are independent contractors of their clients regarding their physical activities (Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, 284 Ill.App.3d 97, 101, 219 Ill.Dec. 719, 672 N.E.2d 34 (1996)), there were no allegations of "any physical activities undertaken by Sabo & Zahn; therefore......
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Adler v. Greenfield, Docket No. 1–12–1066.
...under agency principles, the death of the principal terminates the authority of the agent. Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, 284 Ill.App.3d 97, 101, 219 Ill.Dec. 719, 672 N.E.2d 34 (1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 120 (1957)). Accordingly, even if JP Morgan was Muri......
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Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 1-99-1377.
...client, even though as to his physical activities he is an independent contractor. Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, Inc., 284 Ill.App.3d 97, 101, 219 Ill.Dec. 719, 672 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1996). Attorney, broker, auctioneer and similar persons employed for a single transaction or a se......
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Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 1-97-2991
...as the plaintiff asserts, New York and Illinois law on the subject is identical. Compare Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, 284 Ill.App.3d 97, 219 Ill.Dec. 719, 672 N.E.2d 34 (1996) and 755 ILCS 45/2-5 (West 1996) with Ferrentino v. Dime Savings Bank, F.S.B., 159 Misc.2d 690, 606 N......