Washington v. Chrysler Corp., 685

• Decision Date: 03 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 685,A,No. 20030,685,20030
• Citation: 137 Ind.App. 482,200 N.E.2d 883
• Parties: O. R. WASHINGTON, M. H. Hudson, J. R. Mann, C. A. Miller, W. E. Randolph, E. M. Cleaver, H. E. Washington, O. E. Dalton, J. G. Kain, B. J. Brubaker, R. L. Wilkinson, Individually, and as Members and as Members and Representatives of a Class Asserting and Contending that the 'Agency Shop' Clause in a Certain Employment Contract Applicable to the above Individuals is Void and Illegal, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Pat Murphy, Individually and as a Member and Reppresentative of Said International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.) James M. Drury, Lester L. McCord, Wilbur Hudson, Individually, and as Members and Representatives of International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.) Local Unionppellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 883

200 N.E.2d 883

137 Ind.App. 482

O. R. WASHINGTON, M. H. Hudson, J. R. Mann, C. A. Miller, W E. Randolph, E. M. Cleaver, H. E. Washington, O. E. Dalton J. G. Kain, B. J. Brubaker, R. L. Wilkinson, Individually and as Members and as Members and Representatives of a Class Asserting and Contending that the 'Agency Shop' Clause in a Certain Employment Contract Applicable to the above Individuals is Void and Illegal, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Pat Murphy, Individually and as a Member and Reppresentative of Said International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.) James M. Drury, Lester L. McCord, Wilbur Hudson, Individually, and as Members and Representatives of International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.) Local Union No. 685, Appellees.

No. 20030.

Appellate Court of Indiana, In Banc.

Sept. 3, 1964.

John C. Ruckelshaus and Ruckelshaus, Bobbitt & O'Connor, Indianapolis, Gerald Rybolt, Kokomo, for appellants.

G. Richard Ellis and Ellis & Kinsey, Kokomo, for appellee Chrysler Corp.

Lynnville G. Miles, Indianapolis, for other appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal comes to us from the Howard Circuit Court wherein the appellants, O. R. Washington, M. H. Hudson, et al., individually and as representatives of a class, brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment. The appellants' complaint, omitting the caption and formal parts, reads as follows:

'The plaintiffs, for their complaint against the defendants, allege and say, that:

'1. Plaintiffs, and each of them, are employees of the defendant Chrysler Corporation, and they bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other employees of said defendant working at its Reed Road Plant, Kokomo, Indiana.

'2. The International Union, United Automobile Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.), hereinafter referred to as 'International Union,' is an unincorporated association affiliated with the A.F. of L.-C.I.O., which Labor Union represents employees of the defendant Chrysler Corporation and other employees in collective bargaining. The defendant Local Union No. 685, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.), hereinafter called 'Local Union', is an unincorporated association, chartered by and a part of and an affiliate of said International Union, and it represents employees of the defendant Chrysler Corporation in collective bargaining at its Reed Road Plant, Kokomo, Indiana.

'3. The membership of said International Union is so numerous that it is impractical to bring all its members before the Court; the defendant Pat Murphy is a member of the International Union and its local representative who will insure adequate representation of said International Union in this litigation.

'4. The defendant Local Union has so many members that it is impractical to bring them all before the Court; the defendant, James M. Drury is its president, the defendant Lester L. McCord is its financial secretary, and the defendant Wilbur Hudson is its recording secretary of such Local Union. Such individual defendants are representatives of said Local Union, sufficient to fairly insure its adequate representation in this litigation.

'5. The defendants International and Local Unions and the defendant corporation have entered into a contract by the terms of which it is made a condition of employment that all members who do not desire to become or remain members of said Local Union at said Reed Road Plant shall pay, nevertheless, to said Unions as a condition of employment such amounts that are equal to the periodic membership dues and initiation fees for and during the existence of said contract. This clause of said management Union contract referred to above became effective on or about November 2, 1961; one of said clauses in such contract reads as follows:

'(26) Conflict with State Law

'(a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this agreement an employee shall not be required to become a member of or continue membership in the Union, as a condition of employment, if employed in any state that prohibits or otherwise makes unlawful membership in a labor organizations as a condition of employment.

'(b) If and when an appellate court of any such state shall hold by final judgment or decree not subject to further review that an employer and a union may, by agreement, require employees of plants located in such state, as a condition of employment, to pay to a union amounts that are equivalent to the periodic membership dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the union or a statute of any such state shall expressly so provide then, and in either event, employees of plants in such state who are covered by this Agreement on the date when such judgment or decree becomes final, or such statute becomes effective, shall, as a condition of employment, pay to the union such amounts that are equivalent to the periodic membership dues and initiation fees on or before the tenth (10th) day after the thirtieth (30th) day following said date, and employees hired, rehired, reinstated, or transferred into such plants after said date and who are covered by said Agreement, shall, as a condition of employment, pay to the Union such amounts that are equivalent to the periodic membership dues and initiation fees on or before the tenth (10th) day after the thirtieth (30th) day after the beginning of their employment in such plant. Employees who tender amounts equal to said membership dues and, if not already a member, initiation fees, and who are not more than sixty (60) days in arrears in paying the equivalent of periodic dues, shall be deemed to have met the conditions of Section 9 of this Agreement. If such final judgment or decree, as described above, is later reversed or otherwise modified or nullified, or if the laws of any such state are later amended or are construed by that state's highest court to prohibit arrangements such as this Paragraph provides, this Paragraph of this Agreement shall terminate. Otherwise, it shall continue in full force and effect until the expiration of this Agreement.

'(c) If a final judgment or decree of an appellate court of any such state not subject to further review holds that an employer and a union may not enter into such an agreement as Paragraph (b), above, described, and if any such judgment or decree is later reversed, overruled or otherwise modified or nullified so as to permit such an agreement, or if the laws of any such state are later amended or are construed by that state's highest court so as to permit arrangements such as said Paragraph (b) described, then in any such event the requirements of said Paragraph (b), within the time limits therein set forth, shall apply to plants in such state as of the date of such event.

'6. In accordance with such contract any and all employees who do not join the defendant Union will thereafter be subject to discharge in accordance with the terms of such contract referred to above. All employees who do not join said Union, nevertheless, will thereafter be compelled to pay an amount equal to dues and initiation fees against their will, future amounts over which they will have no control.

'7. The plaintiffs consist of employees of the defendant Chrysler Corporation which such employees disapprove of such contract clause commonly called 'agency shop'; plaintiffs withdraw from said Union because of disapproval of compulsory Union security practices; plaintiffs have joined the Union since the execution of said contract in order to protect their jobs, and have been forced to pay an amount equal to the initiation fee and periodic dues required by said 'agency shop' clause in order to protect their seniority and hold their jobs with defendant company in order to support and maintain themselves and their familites. The plaintiffs, and each of them, believe that they should have the legal right to work for any employer who desires their services without being forced to pay money to labor organizations and without their employer coercing them into joining a labor organization and without being compelled to pay dues for the support and maintenance of any organization or organizations or which they are conscientiously opposed on political, social, or other grounds.

'8. Plaintiffs further state that said 'agency shop' clause is illegal and void under the laws and the Constitution of the State of Indiana, and the United States because it deprives them, and all persons similarly situated, of the free right to work where they choose and permits an employer to require his employees to associate themselves with other employees against their will, and that by such action the plaintiffs are compelled to make money contributions through such Union which in turn supports financially a political organization or group to which they are opposed.

'9. In so contracting and acting the defendants are infringing upon and violating plaintiffs' freedom of association and their right to join or not to join organizations, all as protected by the Indiana law commonly referred to as 'Right-to-Work Law', Burns Indiana Annotated Statutes, Sec. 40-2701 to 40-2705.

'10. In the event this Court does not declare this said 'agency shop' clause referred to above illegal, void, and of no force and effect, the plaintiffs and other persons similarly situated who are not yet members of the Union will be required to either join said Union to their irreparable harm and damage, or be required to give tribute to and assist said Union in the form of fees and monetary payments equivalent to initiation fees and periodic dues.

'WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court declare said 'agency shop' clause void and illegal in the State of Indiana as contrary to the laws, Constitution and public policy of...