Washington v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 23 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 86435., No. 86420
• Citation: 188 Ill.2d 235,242 Ill.Dec. 75,720 N.E.2d 1030
• Parties: Alicia WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee. John Knight, Appellant, v. The City of Chicago, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

720 N.E.2d 1030

188 Ill.2d 235

242 Ill.Dec. 75

Alicia WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.

John Knight, Appellant, v. The City of Chicago, Appellee.

Nos. 86420, 86435.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 23, 1999.

Rehearing Denied November 29, 1999.

David A. Novoselsky, David A. Novoselsky & Associates, Paul T. Julian, Julian & Associates, Chicago, for John Knight.

Victor F. Ciardelli, Law Offices of Ciardelli & Cummings, Dom J. Rizzi, Miller, Faucher, Cafferty & Wexler, LLP, Chicago, for Alicia Washington.

Benna Ruth Solomon, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel, Joshua D. Davidson, Myriam Zreczy, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Chicago, for City of Chicago.

Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in these two consolidated cases is whether the City of Chicago had a duty to construct a road median in such a way as to make it safe for use by emergency road vehicles. In reversing judgment against the City, the appellate court held that no such duty existed. 298 Ill.App.3d 797, 233 Ill.Dec. 9, 700 N.E.2d 110. We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315) and now affirm the appellate court.

The incident giving rise to this litigation took place near midnight on the night of September 11, 1989. In responding to an emergency call, a Chicago fire department snorkel truck proceeded south on South Halsted Street at approximately 35 miles per hour. In order to bypass a vehicle ahead of it, the fire truck left the roadway and drove onto a raised median that separates the street's southbound traffic lanes from its northbound lanes.

Unbeknownst to the fire truck's driver, the median contained planter boxes for flowers and cut outs to accommodate trees. As the truck proceeded along the median, its left front tire hit one of the planter boxes. The impact caused the vehicle to lose control and enter the oncoming traffic lanes, where it struck an automobile driven by Dovie Knight. Knight was killed, as was her unborn child, Laquitta. Alicia Washington, a passenger in Knight's car, was injured.

As a result of this accident, three lawsuits were filed. Knight's father, as administrator of her estate and as special administrator of the estate of Laquitta, brought suit against the City under the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.). A wrongful death action against the City was also brought by Edward Newson, Jr., who claimed to be Laquitta's father. In addition, a personal injury action was filed by Washington against both the City and the driver of the fire truck.

Knight's case was consolidated with the case brought by Newson. Those proceedings were, in turn, consolidated with the personal injury action filed by Washington. Following various developments not relevant here, the matter proceeded to trial before a jury.

As submitted to the jury, the case consisted of the claims asserted against the City by Knight in his wrongful death action involving Dovie and the claims asserted against the City by Washington in her personal injury action. Both Knight and Washington argued that the City should be held liable based on negligence. Specifically, they contended that the City was negligent on the grounds that it had constructed the median on Halsted Street "in a manner that created a condition that was not reasonably safe" and that their injuries were proximately caused by that unsafe condition.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Knight and Washington and against the City. It awarded damages to Knight in the amount of $1.5 million and to Washington in the amount of $200,000. After the circuit court entered judgment on that verdict, the City filed a timely post-trial motion pursuant to section 2-1202(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b) (West 1994)). In that motion, the City requested that the court enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, that it be granted a new trial.

The City's post-trial motion was denied, and it appealed. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the circuit court had erred in refusing to grant the City's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the appellate court's view, the City was not liable, as a matter of law, because it had no duty to make the road median safe for use by emergency vehicles. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment.

The legal principles governing our review are well established. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is properly granted where all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967). Where plaintiffs have obtained recovery against a defendant based on negligence, as was the case here, judgment notwithstanding the verdict is required if the defendant did not owe the plaintiffs a duty. See Redlin v. Village of Hanover Park, 278 Ill.App.3d 183, 190, 214 Ill.Dec. 893, 662 N.E.2d 459 (1996). That is so because "[u]nless a duty is owed, there is no negligence" (American National Bank & Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill.2d 14, 26, 171 Ill. Dec. 461, 594 N.E.2d 313 (1992)), and plaintiffs cannot recover as a matter of law (see Redlin, 278 Ill.App.3d at 190, 214 Ill.Dec. 893, 662 N.E.2d 459).

Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. In resolving whether a duty exists, a court must determine whether there is a relationship between the parties requiring that a legal obligation be imposed upon one for the benefit of the other. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill.2d 213, 227, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260 (1996). The factors relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty include the reasonable foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of such injury, the magnitude of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill.2d 418, 425, 235 Ill.Dec. 905, 706 N.E.2d 460 (1998).

The City is subject to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-102 (West 1994)). Section 3-102(a) of the Act states:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used * * *." 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 1994).

This provision does not impose any new duties on municipalities. Rather, it codifies a municipality's general duty at common law to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. Wagner v. City of Chicago, 166 Ill.2d 144, 150, 209 Ill.Dec. 672, 651 N.E.2d 1120 (1995).

Under the common law, governmental entities, including municipalities such as the City, have discretion in determining whether to perform a public work or make an improvement. Once the decision to perform the work is made, however, the work must be...