Washington v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 31 March 2022
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:20-cv-861-SEP
• Citation: 596 F.Supp.3d 1204
• Parties: Janice WASHINGTON, as personal Representative of the estate of Velma Payton, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

596 F.Supp.3d 1204

Janice WASHINGTON, as personal Representative of the estate of Velma Payton,¹Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:20-cv-861-SEP

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

Signed March 31, 2022

Emanuel Powell, III, Maureen Hanlon, Nathaniel Richard Carroll, Blake Alexander Strode, Brittney Watkins, John McCann Waldron, Archcity Defenders, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Andrew David Wheaton, St. Louis City Counselors Office, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants City of St. Louis, Missouri, Philander Hughes, Dale Glass, Jeffrey Carson, Ryan Martel Branson, Matthias Arthur.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SARAH E. PITLYK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.²Doc. [10].The Motion is fully briefed.For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied as to Count I against Defendants Hughes, Brandon, and Arthur; granted as to Count I against Defendants Glass and Carson; and granted as to Count III against Defendant City of St. Louis.

BACKGROUND

PlaintiffJanice Washington brings this action as personal representative of the estate of Velma Payton, the mother of decedent, Louis Payton, who died of an opioid overdose on August 1, 2018,³ while detained at St. Louis City's Medium Security Institution (MSI).Doc. [1]¶ 1.Her Complaint asserts claims against Dale Glass, Commissioner of the St. Louis Division of Corrections, and Jeffrey Carson, Superintendent of the MSI, in their individual and official capacities; Corrections Lieutenant Philander Hughes, and Corrections Officers Ryan Branson and Matthias Arthur, in their individual capacities; and the City of St. Louis.⁴See Doc. [1].

On August 1 and 2, 2018, Mr. Payton was an inmate at MSI housed in Dorm B. Id.¶¶ 1, 19.⁵On the evening of August 1, 2018, Payton obtained and used fentanyl in the sleeping quarters, which correctional staff monitored through video cameras.Id.¶ 21.Later in the evening, Payton allegedly entered the common area of Dorm B, also referred to as the day room, which was also monitored through video cameras by correctional staff.Id.¶ 22.

At 11:19 PM, Mr. Payton began rocking back and forth in his chair, and less than a minute later, his "head rolled back and his body slumped over."Id.¶ 23.Other detainees attempted to revive Mr. Payton, noticing that his breathing was "ragged and infrequent" and that he became cold to touch and his lips and hands turned blue.Id.¶¶ 24, 25.According to Plaintiff, during the time that the other detainees were assisting Mr. Payton, none of the Defendants entered the common area of Dorm B, despite the detainees attempting to notify Defendants of the emergency.Id.¶ 26.Two correctional officers walked past the window in the common room where the detainees were surrounding Mr. Payton and causing a commotion, and still neither officer entered the room, despite the detainees shouting that Payton was not breathing, that a man was dying in the room, and that he needed medical attention.Id.¶¶ 27-29.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not enter the room until four minutes and forty seconds after Mr. Payton lost consciousness.Id.¶ 31.At that time, instead of tending to Mr. Payton, Defendants watched as the detainees attempted to revive him with ice.Id.¶ 34.Minutes later, on-staff nurses arrived and began administering CPR and started Payton on an automated external defibrillator, which showed that his heart was unresponsive.Id.¶¶ 35, 36.The nurses also provided Plaintiff with breathing support and naloxone upon being informed by the detainees that Mr. Payton had overdosed.Id.¶ 37.Once an ambulance and EMT staff arrived at the facility, Mr. Payton was taken to St. Louis University Hospital where he was pronounced dead.Id.¶ 39.

On August 26, 2020, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts.Doc. [10].Plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment with a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), asserting that she could not adequately oppose the motion for summary judgment without discovery.Doc. [20].On review of those motions, the Court granted summary judgment as to Count I against Defendants Carson and Glass in their official capacities and ordered Plaintiff to respond to: (1)the Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments that did not require the resolution of factual disputes, and (2)Defendants’ argument for summary judgment as to Count III against the City on the basis of sovereign immunity.Doc. [40]at 10.The motion for summary judgment was denied in all other respects.Id.Therefore, the only issues before the Court at this time are whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I, and whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity as to Count III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment if it finds, based on the factual record, that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986).Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and there is a genuine dispute where "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.The burden then shifts to the non-movant to "present specific evidence, beyond ‘mere denials or allegations [that] ... raise a genuine issue for trial.’ "Farver v. McCarthy , 931 F.3d 808, 811(8th Cir.2019)(quotingWingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34 , 528 F.3d 1074, 1078-79(8th Cir.2008) ).

Motions for summary judgment in qualified immunity cases are "unique in that the court should not deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the constitutional violation claim ...."Jones v. McNeese , 675 F.3d 1158, 1161(8th Cir.2012)(quotingBrockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark. , 503 F.3d 667, 671(8th Cir.2007) )(cleaned up).Because qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[,] ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."Id.(citingMitchell v. Forsyth,472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411(1985) ).Therefore, in a qualified immunity case, "the court must take a careful look at the record, determine which facts are genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party so long as those facts are not so blatantly contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could believe them."Id. at 1161-62(quotingO'Neil v. City of Iowa City, Iowa , 496 F.3d 915, 917(8th Cir.2007) )(cleaned up).

DISCUSSION

I.Defendants Hughes, Branson, and Arthur are not entitled to qualified immunity; Defendants Glass and Carson are.

Defendants argue that all five individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.Doc. [11-1]at 12."Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless their conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable official would have known."Burnikel v. Fong , 886 F.3d 706, 709(8th Cir.2018)(citingHarlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396(1982) ).Thus, a "[q]ualified immunity analysis requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiffs make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct."Morgan v. Robinson , 920 F.3d 521, 523(8th Cir.2019)(en banc)(quotingNord v. Walsh Cnty. , 757 F.3d 734, 738(8th Cir.2014) )(quotation marks omitted)."Unless both of these questions are answered affirmatively, [a defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity."Id. at 523(quotingNord , 757 F.3d at 738 )(quotation marks omitted).

Although "[q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof," the "plaintiff ... must demonstrate that the law is clearly established."Sparr v. Ward , 306 F.3d 589, 593(8th Cir.2002)(citingJohnson-El v. Schoemehl , 878 F.2d 1043, 1048(8th Cir.1989) )."A right is clearly established only where it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ "Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna , ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7, 211 L.Ed.2d 164(2021)(per curiam)(quotingMullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 11, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255(2015)(per curiam)).Although case law directly on point is not necessary to demonstrate that a right is clearly established, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."Id.(quotingWhite v. Pauly , 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463(2017) ).The Supreme Court has reiterated in recent decisions that clearly established rights "should not be defined at a high level of generality."White , 137 S. Ct. at 552(quotingAshcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149(2011) )(quotation marks omitted).Qualified immunity exists to protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."Id. at 551(quotingMullenix,577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. 305 ).

A.Defendants Hughes, Branson, and Arthur have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff alleges that the...