Washington v. Commissioner of Correction
Decision Date | 15 July 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 18057.,18057. |
Citation | 287 Conn. 792,950 A.2d 1220 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Armel WASHINGTON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
Tejas Bhatt, assistant public defender, with whom were Jennifer L. Bourn, deputy assistant public defender and, on the brief, Lisa A. Vanderhoof, former special deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).
Richard T. Biggar, assistant attorney general, with whom were Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, Henri Alexandre, assistant attorney general, and John Davenport, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The central issue raised in this appeal is whether the interpretation of General Statutes § 18-98d, first announced in a trilogy of cases in 2004, can be applied retroactively to prisoners in custody as of the date of that decision without offending their constitutional or statutory rights. See Hunter v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 856, 860 A.2d 700 (2004); Cox v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 844, 860 A.2d 708 (2004); Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808, 860 A.2d 715 (2004). In Harris, we concluded that when a defendant is sentenced for multiple crimes on different days, and the sentences are ordered to be served concurrently, § 18-98d(a) mandates that any presentence confinement credit be applied only once regardless of whether the defendant was incarcerated prior to sentencing on a single charge or simultaneously on multiple charges. Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 823, 860 A.2d 715. On appeal, the petitioner, Armel Washington, claims that the retroactive application of Harris, Cox and Hunter to recalculate his release date (1) deprived him of his statutory right to receive presentence confinement credit toward his sentences, (2) deprived him of due process of law because the retroactive application of these cases operated as an ex post facto law by improperly enlarging the punishment for his crimes after their commission, and (3) violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because, at the time the respondent, the commissioner of correction, recalculated his sentences, his previously estimated release date on one sentence already had passed. Additionally, the petitioner argues that the trial court delegated its sentencing authority to the respondent in violation of the separation of powers doctrine and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by mistakenly advising the petitioner as to the availability of presentence confinement credit and by failing to secure the application of that credit to the petitioner's second sentence. After consideration of these claims, we find no impropriety and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The factual backdrop to this appeal, although somewhat complex, is undisputed and aptly described in the habeas court's memorandum of decision. "The petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case ([Docket No CR99-0482356-S], hereinafter `docket 1') in the judicial district of New Haven. The petitioner was arrested and arraigned in [the] docket 1 case on July 23, 1999. The petitioner posted bond that same day and was released.
"The petitioner has been continuously confined, held either in lieu of bond or as a sentenced prisoner, from April 26, 2000, to the present." (Citations omitted.) Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The habeas court concluded that the petitioner could not demonstrate any injustice to warrant the issuance of habeas relief and, therefore, rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. Thereafter, the petitioner sought certification to appeal, which the habeas court granted as to all of the petitioner's claims. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. ...
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