Washington v. O'Dell
| Decision Date | 25 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17-cv-1615-MMA-PCL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | TRACYE D. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. O'DELL, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT;
Plaintiff Tracye Washington, a California state prisoner, has filed a complaint alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the warden of R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility, associate warden, and several prison employees. See Doc. Nos. 4 (Complaint), 10 (Supporting Exhibits). Plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint. See Doc. No. 23. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion, to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 24, 28. In addition, Plaintiff moves for preliminary injunctive relief. See Doc. No. 27. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss portions of Plaintiff's complaint and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
This action arises out of events occurring between September 2016 and April 2017 while Plaintiff was housed at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD").2
On September 26, 2016, Plaintiff discovered his cell in disarray and his radio missing. When Plaintiff asked that the radio be returned, Defendant Buenostro told Plaintiff to provide documents proving ownership of the radio. Later, Plaintiff provided Buenostro the radio ownership document, but Buenostro refused to accept the document. Plaintiff then saw a social worker and explained his radio grievance. When Plaintiff returned to his cell, he "wrote a CDCR-22 Interview Request to Defendant Buenostro asking why he had confiscated plaintiff's radio and asked that it be returned." Complaint at 12.3 Plaintiff then handed it to Buenostro for his signature and copy.
On September 27, 2016, Plaintiff returned from breakfast and "discovered that one 30 pound stack of his legal work was missing." Complaint at 12. Plaintiff then requested a porter to ask Buenostro where Plaintiff's legal work was located. The porter returned and told Plaintiff that the legal work was in the "custody officers area." Id. at 12. Plaintiff then wrote a CDCR-22 Interview Request and then presented it to Buenostro for review and signature. On September 29, 2016, Plaintiff returned to his cell and found his radio and legal materials but noticed "that some legal papers related to his incarceration case and lawsuit were missing." Id. at 13.
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On October 6, 2016, Buenostro entered Plaintiff's cell and informed Plaintiff that his clinician wanted to speak with him. When Plaintiff asked Buenostro to leave his cell, Buenostro told Plaintiff that he could enter the cell any time he wanted. Buenostro then "moved toward the cell door then turned to face plaintiff with his hands on his pepper-spray canister at his side and stated, 'I ought to spray your ass.'" Id. at 14.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2016 at 9:09 p.m., Defendant Bermudez approached Plaintiff's cell door and hit the window with his baton. Bermudez told Plaintiff to pack his property because he was being moved to an upper tier cell with inmate Farely. Plaintiff responded that his medical condition restricted him to "Lower-Tier Lower Bunk" because of his "[o]steo-arthritis in his knees[,] back[,] and other joints and that he had a walking cane and chronos to prove it." Id. at 15.
Defendant Bermudez returned with Defendant Sergeant Scharr, and they demanded that Plaintiff move to the new cell "or go to the ASU." Id. Plaintiff stated that "he was not going to the upper bunk and that inmate Farely had went on suicide watch on two separate occasions in the month passed [sic] to get out of living in the cell with plaintiff, even threatening to kill someone if not moved." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Bermudez knew about Farely because he was the officer on duty during the event. Bermudez then started cursing at Plaintiff, and "struck [Plaintiff] in the face with his baton and told [P]laintiff to "pack up his shit because he was going to the hole." Id. Plaintiff packed his property and was taken to a holding cell for a pre-administrative segregation medical examination, where he "informed medical staff that Officer Bermudez had assaulted him." Id. at 16. Before Plaintiff could be placed in administrative segregation, he "expressed suicidal ideations," and subsequently he was placed on suicide watch. Id.
Around March 23, 2017, Plaintiff was released from the Security Housing Unit andmoved to a new cell. As Plaintiff approached the new cell, he smelled feces and urine, observed the toilet filled with human waste and the floor covered in feces. Plaintiff "stated he would rather go [sic] suicide watch than go into that cell." Id. at 21. When Plaintiff was not deemed eligible for suicide watch, custody staff "gave Plaintiff an ultimatum of returning to the cell or going to ASU." Id. "Plaintiff returned to the cell and was given gloves, plastic bags[,] and disinfectant to clean an area of the cell for him to lay down for the remainder of the night with the promise to have the cell inspected and repaired in the morning." Id. at 22.
Cellmate Iose, a severely mentally ill inmate, informed Plaintiff the toilet had been unusable for almost a week. Plaintiff was told that the prison no longer would contact a plumber because Iose repeatedly clogged the toilet. However, a plumber fixed the toilet the following day. While Plaintiff was disinfecting the cell, Defendant Dr. Urban talked to Plaintiff while observing the condition of the cell. Plaintiff soon discovered the extent of Iose's mental illness: talking to himself, singing aloud, walking around the cell naked at night, playing in the toilet with his feces, insisting the cell light remain on, and threatening Plaintiff with harm several times. Plaintiff asked Defendant Ruelas to contact Iose's doctor "and numerous times thereafter to move him out of the cell to no avail." Id. Plaintiff "had to go to the facility health clinic" to alert a nurse about Iose's mental health concerns. Id. After writing a request for help to Dr. Urban, Urban responded that such conditions were a part of living in a mental health unit. Eventually, Iose was placed in a mental health crisis unit after a confrontation with prison staff.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standardthus demands more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint "must contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not look beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir 2001). "However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009).
Pro se litigants "must be ensured meaningful access to the courts." Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2001); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). In giving liberalinterpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the court is not permitted to "supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted), citing ...
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