Washington v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.
| Decision Date | 14 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 2011 CA 1703 |
| Parties | TERRY WASHINGTON v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Honorable Wilson E. Fields, Judge Presiding
J. Arthur Smith, III
Seth M. Dornier
Baton Rouge, LA
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Terry Washington
Kenneth F. Sills
Baton Rouge, LA
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, KUHN, AND GUIDRY, JJ.
In this appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's judgment granting defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissing his claims with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On January 23, 2006, Terry Washington, a coach and tenured teacher certified in special education and physical education who was formerly employed by the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board ("the School Board"), filed suit against the School Board, alleging that he was wrongfully removed as athletic director and head football coach for the 2005-2006 school year and seeking reinstatement to those positions, back pay, and "all other distinctions" of the positions. In his petition, Washington contended that his appointment to those positions was terminated in retaliation for questions he raised as to possible improprieties relating to funds generated through athletic events and various fundraising sources and constituted "a termination of his professional employment without proper notification."
Specifically, Washington, who had been employed as a certified teacher at Scotlandville Magnet High School ("Scotlandville High") since August 2001 and was also serving as athletic director and head football coach for the 2004-2005 school year, contended that during the fall of 2004, he became concerned about what he believed to be mismanagement of school funds by the "principal's office." Washington further averred that when he reported the alleged mismanagement of school funds to Principal Mary McManus on March 28, 2005, she threatened to fire him and that, the next day, Principal McManus wrote to him informing him that he would no longer be athletic director for the upcoming 2005-2006 school year.
According to Washington, although Principal McManus later informed Washington that she had "changed her mind" and that he could continue as athletic director, Principal McManus ultimately removed Washington from all coaching positions and the position of athletic director at Scotlandville High after Washington made a report to a school board member regarding school funds that were allegedly missing and after Washington's wife sent an anonymous letter to the School Board requesting an audit of the school funds at Scotlandville High.
Washington averred that his removal from the positions of head football coach and athletic director without notice and a hearing: (1) violated state law, for which the School Board is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; (2) violated procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he was not provided with a hearing and because his removal was arbitrary, capricious, and not reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests; and (3) was in retaliation for his reports of alleged mismanagement of money at the school in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution.
A bench trial was conducted in this matter on July 7, 8, and 9, 2010. After Washington's presentation of evidence at trial, the School Board moved for involuntary dismissal of Washington's claims. The trial court took the matter under advisement, and on October 15, 2010, the court orally ruled that Principal McManus acted within her authority in relieving Washington of his duties as football coach and athletic director and, in doing so, had not violated any policy of the School Board. Accordingly, by judgment dated November 5, 2010, the trial court granted the SchoolBoard's motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissed Washington's claims with prejudice.
From this judgment, Washington appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting the motion for involuntary dismissal and in dismissing his claims.
In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party may move for a dismissal of the action on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672(B). The appropriate standard for the trial court's determination of a motion for involuntary dismissal is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence in his case-in-chief to establish a claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. Tinnea. 96-2718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/29/97), 705 So. 2d 782, 784. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that when taking the evidence as a whole, the fact or cause sought to be proved is more probable than not. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal, the appellate court should not reverse the trial court's ruling in the absence of manifest error. Politz v. Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge. 619 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 627 So. 2d 653 (La. 1993).
On appeal, Washington avers that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims where he was removed from his coaching and athletic director positions in violation of LSA-R.S. 17:81.5 and LSA-R.S. 17:444.
The removal of a tenured teacher is governed by the Teacher Tenure Law, LSA-R.S. 17:441 et seq., which is designed to protect the job security of teachers in the best interest of the public school system. Clark v. Wilcox, 2004-2254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So. 2d 104, 109, writ denied, 2006-0185 (La. 6/2/06), 929 So. 2d 1252. It sets forth detailed procedures that must be adhered to in order to perfect the proper removal of a teacher who has attained permanent status. Clark, 928 So. 2d at 109.
As part of the Teacher Tenure Law, LSA-R.S. 17:444, relied upon by Washington herein, provides in pertinent part as follows:
According to Washington, LSA-R.S. 17:444 applies to his promoted contractual positions of head coach and athletic director, and the provisions of this statute require that a contract employee such as himself hold a contract for not more than four nor less than two years and be terminated mid-contract only for those reasons exclusively enumerated in subsection (B)(4)(c)(iii) and only after written notice of the charges and a fair hearing before the School Board.
However, we note that LSA-R.S. 17:441(1) defines "teacher" as "[a]ny employee of any parish or city school board who holds a teacher's certificate and whose legal employment requires such teacher's certificate." (Emphasis added). In considering this definition, this court has held that it is clear that the Teacher Tenure Law is designed to protect classroom teachers, administrators, and supervisors in the teaching profession, and no specific inclusion of coaches of interscholastic extracurricular sports is made in the protective statute. Tate v. Livingston Parish School Board. 444 So. 2d 219, 221 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 446 So. 2d 314 (La. 1984). Indeed, while athletic coaches must be certified teachers in order to teach substantive school courses, as noted by this court in Tate and as acknowledged to by Washington in the trial below, there is no procedure in law requiring that one be certified as a "coach." As such, coaching duties are separate and distinct from regular teaching or instructional duties. Tate, 444 So. 2d at 221.
Thus, as this court held in Tate, a teacher who is also employed as a coach by a school board has two sets of rights: (1) his position as a "teacher" is protected by tenure (if he has acquired tenure status); and (2) his position as "coach" is protected by the contract he has, if one exists, to perform coaching duties, but not by tenure. Tate, 444 So. 2d at 221.
In the instant case, Washington acknowledged that his tenured teaching position with the School Board was not terminated.1 ...
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