Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

• Decision Date: 12 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13-56647,13-56647
• Citation: 833 F.3d 1048
• Parties: William Nathaniel Washington, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; Lee Baca ; Twin Towers Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

833 F.3d 1048

William Nathaniel Washington, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; Lee Baca ; Twin Towers Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56647

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2016 Pasadena, California

Filed August 12, 2016

Joanna S. McCallum (argued), Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mackenzie C. Smith (argued) and Paul B. Beach, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, PC, Glendale, California, for Defendant-Appellee Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

No appearance for Defendants-Appellees Lee Baca and Twin Towers Correctional Facility.

Before: JEROME FARRIS, CARLOS T. BEA, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

OPINION

M. SMITH

, Circuit Judge:

This appeal addresses the application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's (PLRA) “three-strikes” rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

, to Plaintiff William Washington's action against the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Lee Baca, and the Twin Towers Correctional Facility (collectively, Defendants). The PLRA's “three-strikes” rule prohibits a prisoner from filing an action in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has accumulated three “strikes” for prior federal-court actions while incarcerated or in detention, unless he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id . A prisoner can incur a “strike” for bringing an action “that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id .

Washington, a California state prisoner, requested leave to file suit IFP against Defendants. The district court denied Washington's IFP request on the basis that he had accrued at least three prior “strikes” under § 1915(g)

. The district court also found that Washington's complaint failed to adequately plead “imminent danger of serious physical injury” within the meaning of § 1915(g). Because we hold that the district court improperly assessed the existence of prior strikes against Washington, we REVERSE and REMAND.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

While in detention pending the outcome of a criminal trial, Washington submitted a complaint, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care and safe prison conditions, and requesting monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. Along with the submission of his complaint, Washington requested permission to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

, which would permit him to pay the $350 filing fee in gradual installments rather than as an initial lump sum. See

Andrews v. Cervantes , 493 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court found that Washington had accrued at least three strikes under the PLRA, and that his complaint did not allege “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” which would permit him to bypass the PLRA's three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). It denied the IFP request and dismissed the action without prejudice.

Below we consider the history of Washington's five prior federal filings, which Defendants claim resulted in PLRA strikes against Washington.¹

1. Washington v. Haviland , No. 2:09–CV–3052

In November 2009, Washington filed a § 1983

complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against prison wardens and various state officials. See

Washington v. Haviland , No. 2:09–CV–3052 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 3, 2009). In the complaint, Washington claimed that the defendants, in a separate state proceeding, had applied an improper sentencing enhancement, causing him to remain in prison for an additional year, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He requested compensation for his injuries, including monetary damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, actual loss of wages, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a “recall” of his sentence. Washington simultaneously submitted an IFP request.

A magistrate judge screened Washington's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)

. The magistrate judge concluded that Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), required dismissal of Washington's § 1983 claim because a favorable ruling would cast into doubt the validity of his underlying sentence. The magistrate judge then advised Washington that a habeas petition was the “proper mechanism” for challenging his sentence. On March 15, 2010, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations, denied Washington's IFP application, and dismissed the action “without prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim.”

2. Washington v. California Supreme Court , No. 2:10–CV–54

In January 2010, after the California Supreme Court denied Washington's emergency ex parte motion for relief, Washington brought an action challenging the validity of the sentencing enhancement through a mandamus petition, this time in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. See Washington v. Cal. Supreme Court , No. 2:10-CV-54 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 5, 2010). He also submitted an IFP request with the complaint.

The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California uses a standard template order for screening IFP requests. Such a template was used in this case as well as in subsequent cases Washington filed in that court. On the template order, the magistrate judge recommended a denial of the IFP request. Under the section listing “reason(s)” for the denial, the magistrate judge did not indicate that the pleading was “[f]rivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim,” or that the “denial may constitute a strike” under the PLRA. Rather, the magistrate judge offered a separate explanation in the comments section.

Specifically, she concluded that a mandamus petition was inappropriate when other forms of relief, such as a habeas petition, were available to challenge the sentencing decision. Accordingly, the magistrate judge directed the clerk to “attach the appropriate [habeas] form for petitioner to use.” The district court denied the IFP request without further comment or qualification.

3. Washington v. California Supreme Court , No. 2:10–CV–964

In February 2010, Washington submitted a near facsimile of the earlier mandamus petition, accompanied by an IFP request. See Washington v. Cal. Supreme Court , No. 2:10–CV–964 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 19, 2010). A different magistrate judge concluded that the complaint “remains an inappropriate mandamus action,” and that Washington could instead submit a habeas petition. The magistrate judge checked off the boxes on the template order indicating that the complaint was “[f]rivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim” and that “[t]his denial may constitute a strike.” The district court denied Washington's IFP request.

4. Washington v. Los Angeles Police Department , No. 2:12–CV–5873

Over two years later, in July 2012, Washington filed a § 1983

complaint in relation to ongoing state criminal proceedings. See

Washington v. L.A. Police Dep't , No. 2:12–CV–5873 (C.D. Cal. filed July 6, 2012). He again requested IFP status. Washington alleged that the Los Angeles Police Department as well as its officers and agents “committed felony misconduct to falsely imprison [Washington] and to potentially manipulate the verdict of a trial,” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Washington claimed that the defendants had forged evidence and falsified reports in a criminal investigation involving Washington. He requested damages and various forms of injunctive relief.

A magistrate judge recommended that the IFP request be denied. The magistrate judge noted that it was “not clear whether the underlying criminal case against [Washington] is ongoing or whether he has already been convicted,” but, in either case, Washington's § 1983

claim “[could] not go forward.” The magistrate judge reasoned that the claim was either barred by Heck, because it challenged a criminal conviction, or barred by Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), because the state criminal proceedings were ongoing.² The magistrate judge also noted that a habeas petition was the appropriate remedy for challenging the legality of his confinement. Accordingly, the magistrate judge ticked off the following boxes on the template order as reasons for the denial of IFP status: (1) “District Court lacks jurisdiction”; (2) “Frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim”; (3) “Leave to amend would be futile”; and (4) “Other.” Under the “Other” section, the magistrate judge wrote: “Heck barred and/or Younger abstention.” The district court denied Washington's IFP request, without leave to amend.

5. Washington v. City of Los Angeles , No. 2:12–CV–7429

In August 2012, Washington filed another § 1983

lawsuit, repeating similar facts from his July 2012 complaint, and requested IFP status. See

Washington v. City of Los Angeles , No. 2:12–CV–7429 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 29, 2012). This time, Washington modified the named defendants and the relief sought, notably removing his previous request for immediate release from custody and “thorough investigation of the criminal case,” but requesting that a “forensic document examiner be appointed to prove [the] authenticity of [the] document in question.” Washington also removed his claim of false imprisonment, but retained his allegations of due-process violations arising from police misconduct.

The same magistrate judge that reviewed Washington's previous July 2012 IFP request reviewed this complaint. On the template order, the magistrate judge recommended denying the IFP request for the same reasons as the July 2012 IFP request, but additionally checked a box stating that the denial “may constitute a strike.” The district court denied Washington's IFP request, without leave to amend.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION

“We review the district court's interpretation and application of § 1915(g)

” de...