Washington v. Louisiana
| Decision Date | 21 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 11-334-BAJ-DLD |
| Parties | ROSIE WASHINGTON AND SHELDON WASHINGTON v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This race-based employment discrimination and retaliation matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss (rec. doc. 25) and supplemental motion to dismiss (rec. doc. 36)1 , which are opposed(rec. docs. 31 and 46) and plaintiffs' motion to strike reply brief (rec. doc. 53)2 , which is opposed (rec. doc. 54), all of which have been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation.3
Plaintiff Rosie Washington is a licensed practical nurse who was employed by defendant Louisiana State Penitentiary, a state facility, from 1993 to February 1997 andagain from December, 1999 to December 9, 2011.4 Plaintiff brought suit against defendants State of Louisiana (State), Department of Public Safety & Corrections (DOC), Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP), Burl Cain, Mary Annette Dubroc, Stayce Rodriguez Menzina-Falgout, Gwen Hardin, Jennifer Lemoine5 , L. Bruce Dodd, Donald Barr, Ronald Jett, Clarion Bay, Sharon Dunbar, and Linda Bordelon alleging that while she was employed at LSP, she was subject to race-based discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment (rec. docs. 11 and 60).6 Plaintiff7 alleges that her supervisors have discriminated against her based on her race since 2008 when she refused to switch from the night shift to the day shift to accommodate a white couple who wished to work together by, among other things, denying her requests for leave, while freely granting leave tosimilarly situated white nurses; involuntarily changing her work schedule from the night shift to the day shift, while not changing the work schedule of white night shift workers; placing her on "enforced leave" and docking her pay in response to a pending investigation regarding her conduct at work, while allowing her white coworkers involved in the matter to remain at work; giving her low performance ratings that resulted in the denial of her merit increase; intentionally deducting excessive leave hours in connection with the time she was absent from work while recovering from a workplace injury; and ultimately terminating her from employment due to her race. Plaintiff further alleges that her supervisors engaged in these acts in retaliation for filing internal grievances, appeals to the Louisiana Civil Service Commission, charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and previous lawsuits against the same defendants alleging discriminatory and retaliatory conduct based on race.8 Finally, plaintiff alleges that the treatment she received from her supervisors created a hostile work environment that caused her damages.
Plaintiff brings claims against defendants in their individual and official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §2000(e), et seq.; §1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment; §1983 and §1985 and the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; independent claims under the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of theUnited States; and for damages for injuries and violations arising from the rights secured to plaintiffs by Articles I, Sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 22 of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana and Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2320 (rec. doc. 11).9 Plaintiff Rosie Washington's husband, Sheldon Washington, seeks damages sustained for watching his wife suffer the alleged wrongdoings by defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff's pleading to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff's failure to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 may be challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is subject to dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007).
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2997), and more recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, supra. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra. "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. It follows that, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - - but it has not 'show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of the United States Constitution, federal civil rights laws, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana Civil Code arising from her treatment by her employer and coworkers during her employment at LSP and during administrative hearings concerning disciplinary actions taken by her employer while she was employed by LSP. Defendants' motion to dismiss raises numerous defenses to plaintiff's claims, each of which will be address individually.
Defendants first contend that all of plaintiff's claims against the State, LSP, DOC, and the individual defendants in their official capacities, with the exception of her Title VII claims, are barred by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution (rec. doc. 25-1). Plaintiff responds by arguing that the state and state defendants have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity defense by removing plaintiff's previously filed action alleging similar claims from the 19th Judicial District Court to this court (rec. doc. 46-1). The cases cited by plaintiff do not support plaintiff's argument that waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in one case can be imputed to the same defendants in a separate case. See Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Ga., et al., 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct.1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002)(cited by plaintiffs). Moreover, defendants have done nothing that would result in waiver of their Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief, against a non-consenting state and its departments by citizens of another state, foreigners, or its own citizens. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment likewise bars the adjudication of pendant state law claims against non-consenting state defendants in federal court. See Pennhurst, supra. Congress has the power to abrogate this immunity and, although it has not done so with respect to theSection 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims alleged by plaintiff10 , it has done so with respect to plaintiff's claims under Title VII. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 279, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976)); Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 n. 1 (5th Cir.2002) (). Thus, all of plaintiff's claims against the State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, with the exception of their claims under Title VII.
The Eleventh Amendment shield of immunity extends to certain state agencies. See Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit has previously applied Eleventh Amendment immunity to both the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and the LSP, as agencies of the state. See Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313-314 (5th Cir. 1999)( applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to Section 1985 claims against DPSC); Benoit v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, No. 09-715, 2010 WL 1087945, at *1 (M.D. La. March 19, 2010)(applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to the LSP); Walker v. Stewart, No. 08-324, 2009 WL 111646, *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 15, 2009)(applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to the DPSC and "to the institutions that it maintains"). Thus, plaintiff's claims against DOC and LSP are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, with the exception of their Title VII claims.
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment also bars claims for damages against state officials acting in their official capacities as agents of the state. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, fn 55, 98 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial